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Seminar: THE RIGHT OF SILENCE
Chairman
The Honourable Sir John Kerr, K.C.M.G.,
Chief Justice of New South Wales
SYDNEY, 28th June 1973
 Introduction I
INTRODUCTION
When the English Criminal Law Revision Committee handed down its
in June, 1972, it unleashed a stormy controversy
throughout the British legal world. For the report suggested some dramatic
changes in the rules of evidence relating to the conduct of criminal trials.
The most controversial of these proposed changes were in the area of the
alleged “right of silence” which every accused enjoys under the present law.
The essence of these recommendations by the Committee are
reproduced by Mr. Justice McClemens in the ﬁrst article of these
proceedings, and form the nucleus of the discussion which follows. In very
short form the recommendations would:
0. Ahgk'sh the caution.
t. Abolish t e unsworn statement from tbs dgﬂ
|, ow t e u e to c t e accused to 've evidence at his trial, and
W if the
accused refuses to take the stand.
..Allow the jury to draw an adverse infgrgnge from the aggysed’s failure
to testif.
‘. Allow the jury to draw an adverse inferengg from the accused’5 failure
to fully expla'hr-ttrthe police when interrogated.
The entire legal community in Australia was intensely involved in
these issues and it was suggested that the Institute of Criminology hold a
seminar on the- Right of Silence. The object was to focus on these
proposals, to present the various viewpoints. and to provide a forum for the
local legal profession to comment on them. We were pleased to have a
broad representation for the seminar, featuring esteemed members of the
Bench, the Bar, the police force and the academic world. Even more
encouraging was the large response which produced the audience which
represented even wider views.
 
The seminar itself can be conviently divided into three segments. First
the papers were prepared and circulated in advance to the participants and
those who enrolled in the audience in advance. Second, those who prepared
papers spoke briefly to them, and to the general topic, often referring to
points made by other participants. These two segments are reproduced there
and form the “meat” of these Proceedings.
A third segment was the lively discussion which followed on the first
two By and large”WWW,although
some tended to be sightly schizophrenic. The ﬁrst group was composed of
thosg Wmerally aFrggg with the recommendations of the Report. In 0
this group quite natura ly were the police and the prosecutor, but also some
of the judicial sentiment. The primary argument was that the rules of
evidence and the right of silence as it now exists are the product of an
’ introduction
earlier age and their relevance has ceased to be meaningful. Criminals, it is
said. are smarter and more sophisticated, and in the light of changed
conditions the rules which may have been satisfactory at an earlier time
unfairly fetter the hands of the law enforcement agencies today.
The second group were those who disa reed with the
recommendations and wanted to retaim silence. This
group, equally naturally, was represented by the defence counsel, and also
drew some judicial sentiment. The primary argument was that the system
which has proven itself over the years should not be altered except under
the most pressing and convincing evidence that it is presently faulty. The
Committee, it is said, was operating on the assumption that too many
criminals were being freed because of the rules regarding self-incrimination,
and this assumption has been neither tested nor proved.
A final view which emerged may have a sufﬁciently large following to
be called a “group”, and that was not only to disagree with the
recommendations but also to alt ' ‘ ‘
direction of rovidin ore ' u . This view, moving
towards the position in the United States, was represented by the civil
libertarians. These three general groupings provide a guide to the
proceedings and the debates contained therein.
Special mention should be made of three particular topics which were
raised. The most important issue separated out from the report was the
WThis historical anomaly was singled out both by
t ose w 0 prepared papers and by participants in the discussion and there
was near unaminity in favor of its abolition. On this issue the three
groupings suggeste a ove e apart; Mr. Farqu ar, for instance, suggested
to Mr. Justice Neasey that —
“Whilst he was a dove in respect to the period of investigation, he
became a hawk in respect to statements from the dock .. .”.
Mr. St. John, Mr. Purnell, and Trevor Martin, Q.C.* spoke out in favor of
its retention, perhaps indicating the Bar position, and Mr. Justice Neasey,
recalling the recent ignominious defeat of an abolition proposal in Tasmania,
suggested that there may be strong political support for retention.
A second topic which received much attention was the New South
Wales Police “Record of Interview” system. In the House of Lords’ debate
on the Eleventh Report a number of Law Lords expressed dissatisfaction
with methods of recording police interviews with suspects. The growing use
of “verbals” was deplored, and a lingering suspicion of them voiced. It may
be of interest that the Memorandum prepared by Justice, the British
Section of the International Commission of Jurists, on the Eleventh Report
suggests that the chance of conviction is often lessened because collateral
disputes over confessions focus attention away from other, often substantial.
* Now Judge Martin of the District Court.
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evidence of guilt. As a result of this situation. a number of the Law Lords
expressed reservation about the recommendations concerning police
interviews but suggested that if there were an accurate and secure method
of recording such interviews they would be satisfied to expand the use of
pre-trial interrogation as evidence of guilt.
In this light the New South Wales “Record of Interview” was
presented as a method of such recording. Both Superintendent R. Lucas and
Det. Inspector W. G. Clyne of the N.S.W. Police supported the system, and
explained its workings. Mr. Pumell, in particular questioned whether the
method was not subject to abuse on some occasions. Professor R. P.
Roulston suggested that microphones or one-way mirrors might go a long
way toward eliminating the element of secrecy from police station
interviews, while at the same time allowing the questioning to be done in
private.
The third topic which was singled out for special mention arose from
the audience in the person of Mr. Justice Hutley. He directed our attention
to the problem of complicated business dealings which obscure criminal
misconduct and which are occasionally encountered in the company
liquidation area. The view was expressed that in such a unique context it
was reasonable to expect a businessman to answer questions about his
records and dealings, and that to have an absolute right of silence applied
to such people made the already difﬁcult job of the liquidator that much
harder. It was pointed out that there are a number of exceptions to the
rule against self-incrimination — Mr. Farquhar and Det. Inspector Clyne
point out a number of them in their articles — and the position put that
the area of complex business liquidation ought to be an additional one.
We are especially grateful to the Chief Justice, the Honourable Mr.
Justice Kerr, for presiding at the seminar and for his able manner of
moving the proceedings along most expeditiously.
For the assistance of those who read these Proceedings, substantial
extracts from the House of Lords’ debates on the Eleventh Report have
been included as an Appendix. The debate was held on 14th February,
1973, and comprises 132 columns in Hansard, so selection was obviously
necessary. As a result it may be that some of the speeches quoted by
participants in the seminar are not reported in full in the Appendix. Where
this is so it is hoped that readers will look on the quoted portions with the
same weight as if the speeches had been reproduced in full.
W. T. WESTLING
University of Sydney
Institute of Criminology.
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MEMORANDUM RE “THE RIGHT OF SILENCE"
The Honourable Mr Justice J. H. Mcglemens,
Supreme Court of New South Wales.
On 30th May 1972 the English Criminal Law Revision Committee
submitted to the Home Secretary its llth Report on the topic of evidence
generally and in that report it considered the right or privilege of silence in
a number of situations. The Committee consisted of eight Judges, three
Professors of Law, the Director of Public Prosecutions. the Chief Legal
Ofﬁcer to the Home Office and one Solicitor. It was therefore a strong
Committee, though its constitution has been criticised on the ground that it
contained no practising Barristers and only one Solicitor.
Among the situations it considered was the right to refuse to answer
police questions, particularly in the case of someone who is suspected of
having committed a crime. It considered the abolition of the Statement
from the Dock, with its privilege of silence in that the maker of such a
statement is not liable to cross-examination as to what he has said in the
statement and, also, the proposal, if there is found to be a case to answer,
unless his advocate has already indicated that the accused will give evidence,
that the accused be called upon to give evidence and, if he refuses to be
sworn, then the court or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty
of the offence charged, may draw such inferences from the refusal as
appears proper and whether such refusal on the basis of the inferences that
may be drawn might be regarded as corroboration.
These proposals created great controversy and there is no better place
to see both sides of controversy than the debate in the House of Lords on
14th February, 1973 when this report was discussed. The debate can be
found in Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) House of Lords Ofﬁcial Reports,
Vol. 338, No. 40 at p. 1546.
A debate in which the present Lord Chancellor, two former Lord
Chancellors in the persons of Viscount Dilhome and Lord Gardiner, the
present Chief Justice Lord Widgery and such eminent lawyers as Lord Reid,
Lord Diplock, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest and Lord Simon, took part
cannot be anything but a mine of information on the topic we are
discussing tonight.
In the draft Bill presented by the Committee to the Home Secretary
there are a number of clauses which are of signiﬁcance in relation to the
right or privilege of silence and which very substantially reduce the area of
that privilege. I would refer to some of these in this:
 The Honourable Mr Justice J. H. McClemcns 5
 
“l. (1) Where in any proceedings against a person for an offence
evidence is given that the accused
(a) at any time before he was charged with the offence,
on being questioned by a police ofﬁcer trying to
disCover whether or by whom the offence had been
committed, failed to mention any fact relied on in
his defence in those proceedings; or
(b) on being charged with the offence or officially
informed that he might be prosecuted for it, failed
to mention any such fact,
being a fact which in the circumstances existing at the time he could
reasonably have been expected to mention when so questioned, charged or
informed, as the case may be, the court, in determining whether to commit
the accused for trial or whether there is a case to answer, and the court or
jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged,
ma draw such inferences from the failure as a ea 0 er' and the failure
may, on fﬁe Basrs of such inferences, 5e treated as, or as capable of
amounting to, corroboration of any evidence given against the accused in
relation to which the failure is material.
1. (3) Nothing in subsection (1) above shall in any proceedings —
(a) prejudice the admissibility in evidence of the silence or
other reaction of the accused in the face of anything said
in his presence relating to the conduct in respect of which
he is charged, in so far as evidence thereof would be
admissible apart from those subsections; or
(b) be taken to preclude the drawing of any inference from
any such silence or other reaction of the accused which
could be drawn apart from those subsections.
1. (5) It is hereby declared that a police ofﬁcer or other person who
suspects a person of havingcommitted an offence is Wrequired by law to
caution him before questioning him in relation to the offence.
2. (1) In any proceedings a confession made by the accused may be
given in evidence by the prosecumso far as it is relevant to any
matter in issue in the proceedings and is not excluded by the court in
pursuance of subsection (2) or (3) below.
(2) If, in any proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in
vidcnce a confession made' by the accused, it is represented to the
curt that the confession was or may have been made in consequence
‘ f‘f‘y‘ressive treatment of the accused or in consequence of anyIt
0
ﬂ!
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threat or inducement, the court shall not allow the confession to be
given in evidence by the prosecution (whether by virtue of this
section or otherwise) except in so far as the prosecution proves to the
court beyond reasonable doubt that the coniessigg (notwithstanding
that it may e true —
(a) was not obtained by oppressive treatment of the accused;
and
(b) w ' of any threat or inducement
of a sort likely, in the circumstances existing at the time,
to render unreliable any confession which might be made
by the accused in consequence thereof.
(3) In any proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in
evidence a confession made by the accused, the court may of its own
motion require the prosecution, as a condition of allowing it to do so,
to prove with respect to the confession the matters mentioned in
paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (2) above.
(4) Where in- any proceedings a confession is received in evidence by
virtue of the foregoing provisions of this section, it shall by virtue of
this subsection be admissible as evidence of any fact stated therein
and of any matter dealt with in any opinion expressed therein,
including any fact or matter favourable to the accused:
Provided that at the trial of any person for an offence the court
shall not be required to treat an issue as having been raised with
respect to any matter by reason only of evidence- favourable to the
accused which is admissible by virtue of this subsection.
(5) The fact confe sion is wholly or partly W in
pursuance of subsection (2) or (3) above shall not my; the
admissibility in evidence —
(a) _o_f‘any facts discovered as a resumme confession; or
(b) as regards any fact so discovered, of the fact that it was
discovered as a result of a statement made by the accused;
or
(c) where the confession is relevant as showing that the
accused speaks, writes or expresses himself in a particular
way, of so much of the confession as is necessary to show
this about him.
(6) In this section ‘confession’ includes any statement wholly or
partly adverse to the accused, whether made to a person in authority
or not and whether made in words or otherwise.
 The Honourable Mr Justice J. ll. McClcmcns 7
 
4. (1) In any proceedings the ccused shall be com to give
evidence on behalf of himself or any person jointly c arged with him,
but shall not be compellable to do so.
(2) In any proceedings the accused shall not be entitled to mama
s ’ ' and accordingly, if he gives evidence,
he shall do so on oath and be liable to cross-examination; but this
subsection shall not affect the right of the accused, if not represented
by counsel or a solicitor, to address the court or jury otherwise than
on oath on any matter on which, if he were so represented, counsel
or a solicitor could address the court or jury on his behalf.
5. (1) At the trial of any person for an offence the following
provisions of this section shall apply unless he pleads guilty, except
that subsection (2) shall not apply if —
(a) the court holds that there is no case to answer; or
(b) before any evidence is called for the defence, the accused
or counsel or a solicitor representing him informs the court
that the accused will give evidence; or
(c) it appears to the court that the physical or mental
condition of the accused makes it undesirable for him to
be called upon to give evidence.
(2) Before any evidence is called for the defence, the court shall tell
the accused that he will be called upon by the court to give evidence
in his own defence and shall tell him in ordinary language what the
effect of this section will be if, when so called upon, he refuses to be
sworn; and thereupon or, if the court in the exercise of its discretion
under section 4(4) of this Act allows the defence to call other
evidence ﬁrst, after that evidence has been given, the court shall call
upon the accused to give evidence.
(3)W—
(a) fter being palleg ump by the court to 've evidence in
pursuance o t '5 section, or after he or counse or a
solicitor representing him has informed the court that he
will give evidence, refuses to be sworn; 2;
(b) having been sworn, without good cause refuses to answer
. w
any Question,
the court or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the
offence charged, may draw such inferences from the refusal as appear
proper; and the refusal may, on the basrs oi such inferences, Fe
96139—2
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treated as, —er as capable of amounting to, corroboration of any
evidence given against the accused.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be taken to render the accused
compellable to give evidence on his own behalf, and he shall
accordingly not be guilty of contempt of court by reason of a refusal
to be sworn in the circumstances described in subsection (3)(a) above.
(5) For the purposes of this section a person who, having been
sworn, refuses to answer any question shall be taken to do so without
good cause unless —
(a) he is entitled to refuse to answer the question by virtue of
section 6(1) of this Act many other enactment, whenever
passed, or on the ground of privilege; or
(b) the court in the exercise of its general discretion excuses
him from answering it.”
Each of these clauses came in for criticism in the House of Lords
debate. Some of the Lords supported some, some none, and I think none,
all. These proposals in a very real way raise questions that require close
examination by those associated with the administration of the Criminal
Law.
The law which we now administer clearly creates aW
Wanea police ofﬁcer has made up his mind to c arge
a suspect he is ound to warn the suspect and tell him;is not
obligedto sayanything but if he does say anythirigthat he says can be
givenas’ewdenceﬂatwhis ‘trial In other words, admissibility of_confessions,
, admissions or statements by, the accused (to use the words of Section MD
of the Crimes Act) depends on the exercise of a free choice to speak or to
be silent. If he speaks, then what he says, be it exculpatory or inculpatory,
i,can go before the jury who can give it such weight as they, in their
l ‘uncontrolled discretion, think proper. Woon’s case is authority for .ne
proposition that lies and evasions in the statement to the police can be
looked at on the question of guilt.
But what if a man refuses 39 M31 all? The Elice ofﬁcer gm'es_the
warning an e man just rep 1es “I refuseto answer”. As I understand the
law, neither the questionsnor the
 
  
  - ' r s question,i notagreed to, explained or"evade, '
_
hearsay anyhow and the refusal involves no acceptance by_ way of
i explanation, admission or evasion of the question. _In other words, both
question and answer are immaterial. ' ‘
 ‘Ilic Honourable Mr Justice J. H. McClemcns 9
 
On this topic, the observations of Viscount Dilhorne are interesting.
He says:
“What about when he (i.e., an accused person) is interrogated by
the police? should an inference be drawn from his failure to speak
when an innocent person would be expected to speak? I would say:
‘Yes, undoubtedly’ . . .2”
Viscount Dilhorne qualiﬁes this statement by reference to the existing lack
of facilities for a complete record of the interrogation and deals with the
risks inherent in the English method of taking statements, but that means
that Lord Dilhorne is basing his views on the mechanics, not the principle
of the thing; on the principle he comes down in favour of the absence of
the right.
Lord Gardiner, basing himself largely on Miranda v. Arizonaacomes
down strongly in favour of the right to silence and approves the approach
of the Supreme Court of the United States in that well known case.
The Lord Chancellor’s view is set out in these words:
“What about the so-called right of silence? Of course Bentham
was in favour of the right of silence, and so am I, if by that we
mean that nothing can be done or might be done to a man who
refuses to speak. But, surely, all the behaviour of an accused person
who is confronted with a charge is something which the tribunal of
fact is entitled to consider in the context of the other evidence. Take
a man — and for this purpose I am not inventing, I am reminiscing -
who is accused of incest with his daughter. His wife comes to him
with the weeping child and tells him what she has learned. To use the
language of the Bar Council he is entitled to say to her:
‘In this country, a person is innocent until proved guilty. If you
think I have committed an offence, prove it. I do not wish to
be interrogated. I wish to seek advice. I do not intend to answer
any questions until you tell me what your case against me is.’
I submit that a man so accused would have every right to say
this, or more literally, he would have every right to remain entirely
silent. But how artiﬁcial can you get in maintaining that if counsel, or
the Judge, or, worse still, the jury, discuss with candour the possible
reasons for his silence they are depriving him of one of his
fundamental liberties?”4
Lord Reid, as beﬁts a Scotsman brought up in a system of Roman
law, suggested a subsequent compulsory formal investigation such as takes
place in his country before the Procurator Fiscal.
(—ﬁ
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debate is that of the present Lord Chief Justice, W, whom
the existence of the so-called “Right of Silence” because. he says:
“The other instance, which is regarded so widely today, has an
even more unusual parentage. It is the right to remain silent under
 
\ lice interro atio hich has been referred to, with are corollary
\§_\ ,against you , Where does that come from? It comes from the Judges
Rules, First Edition, of about 1906 or 1908. At that time the judges
(with what we would now regard as considerable presumption) laid
down these rules, and they provided for the giving of a caution. The
caution was, to tell the man that he need not say anything unless he
wished to do so. The only reason why a failure to speak does not
give rise to an adverse inference is that it would obviously have been
grossly unfair if the accused or suspect, having been told in terms that
he need say nothing, was then caught in the trap of having an adverse
inference drawn from his resulting silence. The so-called right of
silence in that regard is the creation of the judges, a necessary
consequence upon their having laid down that there should be a
caution.
Although it has that rather peculiar and relatively modern
beginning, it has been one of the major safeguards of suspects in
police stations for the past 60 or 70 years. I fully recognise that and,
in sympathy with a number of noble Lords who have spoken —
among them my noble and learned friend Lord Reid — I would be
entirely in favour of the pr0position that we should not alter the
Judges Rules, take away the caution, or do anything about this
aspect of the right to silence until we have provided something better
to take its place.“5
His Lorship is there referring to the need for the mechanical record of
interrogations under conditions where the tapes cannot be interfered with,
are kept in the custody of senior police ofﬁcers, and everything that is said,
the tone of the voice and the like, should be available to the Court.
Enough has been said to show that among the most acute legal minds
in the English speaking legal world there is a great degree of divergence,
such a degree that it almost seems presumptuous of me to express my own
views. I have been a Judge now for 21 years and in that time I have
presided over many trials. see no reason, with the pasage of time, to
modify anything I said in1W5nor have I seen anything which
makes me doubt the most so
, far devised for recording and preservingethe statements 91 gm3593;, The fact
that it is brou t in o e ence on con t1ons where it cannot be later
altered or tampered with; a copy has to be served on the person who has
been questioned and his signature for it obtained, amount to quite effective
safeguards
However, the most interesting and forthright contribution to this
1
l
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I have never had a case in which an attempt was made to record
interrogation by tape recorder, and hence I am not able to express an
opinion on the doubts raised by Lord Dilhorne, Lord Reid and Lord
Widgery.
I realise that in the record of interview there lies the possibility of a
dishonest police officer leaving out a question or answer and there is the
possibility of human error. If this were done it would probably show in the
ﬂow of the record. Some of the fears that Lord Gardiner expressed were
based on the danger of the use of bullying and even brutal methods by the
police. Examples to which Lord Gardiner referred were the Shefﬁeld case
in 1963 and the Challinor case in 1964. His Lordship said that these
incidents were attributable to a small number of black sheep in the police
force, but though rare in their occurrence every effort should be made to
erect safeguards against them.
If such criticisms have any basis in relation to our own Police the
answer must be to purify‘ the police, not stultify the proper administration
of the criminal law. England and the United'States, with proliferated
decentralised police systems, and the Australian States have different
approaches and it is the obligation of Government in this State to maintain
proper standards and high morale in the police force. If a Government, with
a disciplined centralised police force under direct Ministerial control with its
own Act of Parliament and with its own Commissioner, cannot by and large
be a pure force, then it is a poor lookout for all of us.
By and large the record of interview system works well and in the
majority of cases the person interrogated is prepared to sign it, but
difficulties arise in those cases where there is’a refusal to si , and this has
been discussed in such cases as Dawson v.- R.’ R v. War-N'sH R. v. Oliver"
But what about the refusal to answer any question. Obviously no suspect
should be compelled to answer, nor should he be harassed. Anything that
looks like oppression, or threat or inducement or misrepresentation should
mean that the whole evidence of the accused’s statements, silence or
behaviour is excluded from the case, not to be referred to by Judge or
Prosecutor. This is necessary in the interests of pure administration, as is
the preservation of the voir dire.
it is scarcely the mark of innocence for a man to refuse to answe
any questions, but if he elects to refuse he should not be asked beyond
those three or four questions which are just enough to enable the
interrogator and the person questioned to be clear in their respective minds
that there is a genuine understanding and a genuine refusal. Beyond that
the questioner should not be permitted to go except on the penalty of the
price — complete inadmissibility of everything.
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     as ar as t 1: ng 1sh Committee suggests. Perhaps the safest way would be
to develop a rule that could be stated along these lines.‘ —-
The onus (except in special cases) never shifts from the Crown. It has
to convince the jury of the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But
in determining whether it is satisﬁed beyond a reasonable doubt it has to
consider the Crown’s evidence and the accused’s explanations. If the
accused’s explanations might possibly be true then he is entitled to an
acquittal, but in deciding whether any explanation might possibly be true
'1 when ori nall
ex 7 e re used it. The jury ought to consi er w ether he might
Wected to tell his story or give his explanation or
contradict the information put to him at the interrogation. If he might
reasonably have done any of those things that renders it easier for the jury
to be satisﬁed that his story or explanation or contradiction is not true.
The mere fact that an explanation is not true is not, standing by itself,
proof of guilt though it may be evidence of it. The real question in any
criminal trial unless there is a special provision as to onus is: “Does the
evidence taken as a whole convince of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?”
  
  
There are two other brief matters that I would like to mention on
the right of silence tonight. If one turns to the 11th Report of the English
Criminal Law Revision Committee and the draft clauses of the Bill to which
I have referred above,, there are two recommendations that they made
which were of a very Controversial nature in the matter of the right of
silence.
Within the time available to me it would not be possible for me to
mention all the considerations that were discussed in the House of Lords
debate on these two topics, namely, the abolition of the statement from
the dock and the requirement that the Judge call upon the accused to give
evidence.
1 do not think I can add anything valuable on a matter on which the
average lawyer has already strong convictions, namely, the abolition of the
right ”to make the unsworn statement. Members of the legal profession
w wor is argely onente in e ending people would be very strongly
in favour of its retention. Members of the legal profession who have not
this orientation are by and large convinced that the privilege ought to be
abolished. But, in my view, ass ' the rivile e is not abolished t
Judge, the Crown Prosecutor and the defence stoma Ee Eee i5 Eigiﬁ
comments Lil—lb; jug as each one of them sees ﬁt on the factM
accused has made a statement and not ven ev1 ence. t is not unusual in
W other to make a
statement from the dock and then for counsel for the man who has given
 The Honourable Mr Justice J. H. Mc(‘lcmens l3
evidence to seek to exculpate his client and inculpate the other by
commenting on the failure to enter the witness-box on the part of the
other client.
The present state of the law isthawI
the Cro n has the right to comment on the failure of  
some give 6V1 ence an
comment 18 ma e, e Judge “ma make suc ' ns to the 'ur in
re ard to such comment ' ' ' ‘
it. t 'n at this right to comment should extend to all the partiesg
concerned and should not be limited in the way it is limited by Section
407(2) to joint trials where one accused enters the witness-box and the E,
other does not, nor should it be limited to the defence and to the Judge \"
alone.
   
 
  
If, on the otherhand, _the statement from the dock is abolished, I
believe that the Judge, the Crown and the defence should be free to
'c6mment on the decision of the accused not to grve evrdenceThenjury
should—Be aware in the 1nterests of Justice that the accused person has t
right to enter the witness-box and be subject, as every other witness is, to
cross-examination.
But it is essentjﬂ that there be no alteration oi the my and hence I
think that t e lines on which comment ou e made are those which
were discussed in Jones v. Dunkel“ by Menzies J. in my opinion the Judge
and prosecution should have the right to make three things clear:
 
1. That the absence of the accused as a witness cannot be used to
make up any deﬁciency of evidence;
2. that evidence which might have been contradicted by the
accused can be accepted the more readily if the accused fails to
give evidence;
3. that where an inference is open from. the facts proved by direct
evidence and the question is whether it should, beyond a
reasonable doubt, be drawn, the circumstance that the accused
disputing it might have proved the contrary had he chosen to
give evidence is properly to be taken into account as a
circumstance in favour of drawing the inference.
Adapting, as I have adapted, the observations of Menzies J. would, I
think, be fair both to the accused and to the Crown and would not
impinge on the doctrine of the reasonable doubt.
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THE SUSPECT’S RIGHT TO SILENCE
The Honourable Mr Justice F. M. NeasegI
Supreme Court of Tasmania.
I
Background of the Right to Silence in History and Policy
The 11th Re ort of the ri ' l " ' 'Vraises
enough questlons, rom e answers 1 suggests, to keep other law
reform bodies busy for some time. it is not altogether possible to consider
one section of the long report in isolation from the rest, but a useful
starting point is its recommendation that the right of a suspect to remain
silent during police interrogation should be restricted.
The Committees own summary of its proposals is contained in the
preliminary section on “General Princi les” it says2that the main 0 t is
to et rid of restrictions on aam1ss151iii ‘
mo ern cond1t1ons " Another 0 Ject is to reduce the 3
amount 0 re evant evidence which could be 1ven an 'e amount'which'is
in fact iven. “This is acne," the Eommittee says, “chieﬂy by provisions"
d'e-sTgT1e1'Lto- discourage the accused from refraining from giving evidence if a
prima facie case has been made out against him, by reducing the great
restrictions as to the giving of evidence by the spouse of the accused, and
by abolishing certain privileges of refusing to answer questions.” It
continues, “We justify the reforms which we recommend for this purpose
not only because of the changed conditions to which we have referred but
mainly on the ground that there is no clear reason why the restrictions
should ever have existed." It is difﬁcult, with respect, to understand how so
prestigious a Committee could have committed itself to the view that there,
is no clear reason why the privilege against self-incrimination ever existed.
That is what the Committee appears clearly enough to have said.
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it would be a mistake to equate, without explanation, the privilege
a ainst self1nc11 ation with theﬁm rule enforced in English courts,
arid—those following the Efgiish tradition, that a suspected person under
interrogation has a right to remain silent and to beinformeﬁJILthaLtishL
Nevertheless, the modernTme is beyond doubt an outgrowth and extension
of the privilege. indeed, the Committee treats it 50.3 The writer has
elsewhere endeavoured to examine some aspects of how this came about in
English law,‘ and the present paper proceeds from the basis of views there
expressed.
A full account of the privilege against self-incrimination appears in
Wigmore’s works, his text including reference to all the main source
writings. The learned author deals with its history, and the application of it
in (principally) United States law. Having dealt with the history of the
privilege in England, he says, “The privilege, thus creeping in by indirection,
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appears by no means to have been. regarded in England as the constitutional
landmark that later American legislation has made it Whatever it was
worth to the American constitution-makers of 1789, it was not worth
mentioning to the English constitution-menders of 1689.“°ln modern times
also, the process whereby the privilege against self-incrimination was
re-shaped and extended in English law was one of “creeping indirection"
(due mainly to the traditional habit of English courts of avoiding policy
discussion in their decisions).
Wigm‘ore (his preface to the third edition — Little, Brown &
Company, Boston, 1940 — was written in March 1939) does not deal with
the privilege against self-incrimination as applvina in other than “. .. all
manner 01 proceedi in which testimony is to be taken, whether litigious
or not, andﬁmrgs‘ex parte’ or otherwise.”7 He also says. “The Federal
Fifth Amendment of course applied in Federal trials only. Nor does the
Federal Fourteenth Amendment make the provision of the Fifth
Amendment in the present respect a privilege and immunity of citizens of
the United States so as to be protected and reviewable by the Federal
Supreme Court, as against a violation by a State.”3 But that situation, even
if it was wholly true in 1940, has been radically altered in both respects in
the United States. Therein is afforded much assistance to law reformers
considering the present subject.
Wigmore comes closest to saying, by implication, that the privilege
against self-incrimination ought to be treated as applying in police
investigations of suspected persons when he reminds us that “for the
preliminary inquisition of one not yet charged with an offence, the claims
of the privilege seem valid.” He continues, “This aspect of it seems to
have been ignored by Bentham. Yet it was historically this situation which
gave rise to the privilege. The system of ‘inquisition’, properly so called,
signiﬁes an examination on mere suspicion, without prior presentment,
indictment, or other formal accusation; and the contest for one hundred
years centred solely on the abuse of such a system”? He was speaking of
preliminary examinations on oath by quasi-judicial processes, but it is the
shortest of steps to say that the privilege ought a fortiori to be available
whenever a suspected person is being interviewed in private by a police
ofﬁcer or other investigator. In fact that principle is in present day practice
applied every time an investigating ofﬁcer gives a suspect the usual caution
under the Judges’ Rules, because the caution is based upon tthrivilege
against self-incrimination just as much as it is upon the voluntary confession
rule.
Any difficulties caused by the reluctance of English courts to discuss
policy in this area are amply overcome by reference to\decisions of the
, U.S. Su reme Conn, particularly in the last thirty or so years. In the ﬁrst
p ace, that Court has held that the privilege against self-incrimination lies at
' the core of al ’ ' t to silence and also of the
Wan—Lula.
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[n Miranda v. Arizgna”) Warren C. J. delivering the opinion of the
Court, said, “lhe question in these cases is whether the privilge is fully
applicable duringﬂ'aﬂperiod of custodial interrogation. In this Court, the
privilege has consistently been altorded a liberal construction (citation of
cases). We are satisﬁed that all the principles embodied in the privilege
apply _to informal“ compulsion exerted_,hy,law.....enforcement..ofﬁcers._during_
m-custodygqgjym An individual swept from familiar surroundings into
poliCe custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the
techniques of persuasion described above cannot be otherwise than under
compulsion to speak. As a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the
isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than in Courts or
other ofﬁcial investigations, where there are often impartial observers to
guard against intimidation or trickery.
This question, in fact, could have been taken as settled in Federal
Court almost 70 years ago cites Bran v. US. 168 US. 532; Wan v.
US. 266 U.S.l). In addition to the expansive historical development of the
privilege and the sound policies which have nurtured its evolution, judicial
precedent thus clearly establishes its application to incommunicado
interrogation.
The minority view of the Court, as exempliﬁed by the judgment of
Harlan J. in the Miranda case, follows generally the Wigmore line and
disputes the constitutional validity of the majority arguments;u but
nevertheless is persuaded that, notwithstanding historical differences, the
‘kinship’ of the voluntary confession rule and the self-incrimination privilege
is “too apparent for denial?” That is as far as one needs to go for present-
purposes. The constitutional framework in the UnitedIStates cases is of little
significance to this discussion. The policy questions relating to the right to
silence during police and similar investigations into crime are exactly the
same in England and Commonwealth countries as in the United States.
Secondly, the US. Supreme Court has discussed in great detail the
reasons supporting in the present-day context a liberal and far reaching
interpretation of the suspect’s right to be silent in the face of questioning.
Further citation of United States authority is unnecessary. Most of it is
cited in Miranda’s case, in Escobedo v. Illinois‘3 and, e.g., Malloy v.
Hogan”; Culombe v. Connecticut‘s; Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of
New York Harbour.16
Of course, many people think that the Supreme Court has gone too
far in the protection accorded to the suspect; but whether that is so or not
does not matter for present purposes. What is material is that, beyond
argument, there are very weighty considerations indeed favouring a suspect’s
right to silence. They are deeply grounded in both history and sound
considerations of policy in a democracy.
I!
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ll.
Observations on the Committee's Approach
The view that the apparatus of the criminal law nowadays leans too
heavily in favour of the accused is shared by many, including the present
writer, but the Committee in the llth Report paints much too one--sided a
picture. It a--- the assum_t'gr . 1
cc mg in the Committee and elsewhere that We law of evidence
" enera sa1ueperVaes e
statement of general principles and the chapter devoted to “Interrogation of
suspects; effect of silence; Judges' Rules" The Report has been severely
criticised in this and other respects.”
     
  
In paragraph 31 of the Report we ﬁnd it stated that “some lawyers
seem to think that it is somehow wrong in principle that a criminal should
be under any kind of pressure to reveal his case before his trial. The reason
seems to be that it is thought to be repugnant - or, perhaps rather, ‘unfair‘
— that a person should be obliged to choose between telling a lie and
incriminating himself. Whatever the reason, this is a matter of opinion and
we disagree.” There follows a reference to Bentham’s well-known comment
on the rules applying to judicial interrogation of suspects, beginning: “If all
criminals of every class had assembled, and framed a system after their own
wishes etc.” There seems to be, indeed, additional reliance upon
Bentham, because the earlier statement by the Committee in paragraph 27
that “. . . the habit has grown up of looking at a criminal trial as a kind
of game to be played, according to fixed rules, between the prosecution
and the defence; and since the defence are naturally likely to be the weaker
(and the accused may very well seem stupid and helpless), it seems to be
expected that the prosecution will refrain from using all their strength and
that the judge will take any opportunity to make the contest more even”,
seems to be an echo of his “the fox-hunter’s reason’“ for allowing a
suspect to remain silent.
Bentham's contribution to law reform was, of course, enormous, but
Wigmore's opposing argument on this point is persuasive. He says,” “So far
as Bentham's argument goes, i.e., for the individual case, it is irrefutable.
Assuming this man to be guilty, there is no good reason to exempt him.
“There is no escape from this fundamental truth, so long as we confine
ourselves to the assumption on which it rests. That assumption is that the
person charged is guilty. But assume him innocent, and a different problem
is presented — a problem to which Bentham's arguments did not do justice.
“16 truth iuhaimilmW :gﬁ
least for reasonsairggspectiveoftheguiltof the accused.”
mummmﬂg- ,_
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The Committee seems to have overlooked the suspect who may or
may not be guilty, depending on how the law is to be applied to an often
confused and complex set of facts. The suspect may not know clearly
himself whether he is guilty or not. Sir Brian MacKenna refers20 to a paper
entiled “The Jury at Work",3' a study of a series of jury trials by McCabe
& Purves, in which considerations are put which would, it is thought, be
endorsed by most people with experience in the administration of the
criminal law. It is there suggested that “most suspects are in some way
implicated in the offence under investigation, either through their presenCe
at the scene of the crime, or through their commission of the actus reus,
the only question being about the state of their mind, intention, knowledge
and the like, or, in cases of violence, self-defence. All these would have
something to explain away, and they might not all feel conﬁdent of their
ability, without legal assistance, to select and state all the facts on which
their counsel might afterwards wish to rely in their defence.” Experience
indicates that innocence or guilt under the law in respect of a particular
charge is often a difficult question. Putting the suspect under a measure of
compulsion to talk when questioned would open up a huge ﬁeld for
confused, inaccurate, contradictory, or frightened answers and statements,
and subsequent use thereof by the prosecution. The list of adjectives could
be extended. Of course, this sometimes happens now, notwithstanding a
reminder of the right to silence, but there is no need for the system to try
to make it the rule rather than the exception.
It is difﬁcult to resist the conclusion that the Committee has
approached its problems mainly from the standpoint of personal impression
of the way in which the investigation and trial of crime work. A suspect is
assumed to be either guilty or else so plainly innocent that he will not be
in danger from questioning. The Committee appears to have ignored the --
substantial body of sociological research which bears on the common
reactions of persons in inferiority situations”. and it has given little or no
attention to two very important issues — the dignity of the individual
subjected to investigatory process, and public regard for the administration
of the criminal law.
 
The combined effect of the Committee’s prgmsals clearly would beI it
is submitted, that most sus cts would feel under a substanti egree of
com lsion to The right to silence would effectively be gone, even
ough remaining silent would not in itself be an offence. In cases of a
clear-cut defence raised for the ﬁrst time at the trial, usually suggesting
complete innocence, e.g. alibi, mistake, etc. — see paragraph 33, it seem
not unreasonable that failure to mention the facts constituting his defence
during questioning or when being charged should be held against the
accused if he had no good reason for not mentioning them. But the
proposal does not relate only to facts which in themselves would, if tme,
establish a complete defence for the accused, but to any “fact" relied upon
by the accused at his trial. 0n 'the face of it, this would open the door
very widely for the prosecution in addressing the jury to rely upon the
accused’s failure to mention all sorts of “facts” when being questioned.
ll
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Other objections could be taken to the positive proposals of the
Committee — for example in relation to the weakening of the corroboration
rule by the proposal to enable silence to be taken as corroboration in
certain circumstances. But the reater ob‘ect'o s ' not ' "ve
    
       rsons in ways ready meni , ' tin _ oice.
while it must be admitted that under the existing situation, regu ate y
the Judges’ Rules or equivalent police standing orders“, there are many
ways in which pressure can be put upon suspects to talk, the ofﬁcial
attitude of both the police force and the courts is heavily in favour of the
suspect’s right to complete freedom of decision whether he will speak or
not. A police ofﬁcer who is prepared to apply pit sure, whether of a subtle
or unsubtle kind, knows he is acting in deﬁance of very ﬁrm departmental
and judicial policy, and this probably has the effect of causing most police
 
7 ofﬁcers to conform.
But the situation may well be different if ofﬁcial restraint against
pressure and ofﬁcial recognition of the suspect’s privilege are removed. The
minority of the Committee recognizes this. In paragraph 52 they say that
police questioning of suspects in custody, although now generally thought
to be necessary for the due administration of the law, is “fraught with
danger." They point to the possibility of “the use of bullying and even
brutal methods by the police in order to obtain confessions, instance
particular cases in England in 1963 and 1964, and refer to the 1962 Report
of the Royal Commission of the Police.“ They also refer in some detail to
possible perjury by inventing oral admissions, to protracted questioning,
dangers in recording answers to questioning in narrative form, and the like.
The mm'5; goncludes thatI “The practicﬁ effect 91 glausg 1 of the graft
Bill will be to sion upon suspects to answer
 
questions, even when they are in custoiiy‘._”25
 
The anwsr of the mg, ,n 7 the Crnom
shoul ' '. m A ,
srm e6 t at the dangers of pacing the suspect under pressure to talk
entirely outweigh the possible advantages, and the proposals should not be
countenanced at all. It seems .4 fair comment that the attitude of some
English and Australian lawyers to custodial interrogation is too
impressionistic. The lawyer tends to look at the matter from his own
necessarily inadequate knowledge of the sociological and psychological
factors operating upon persons under interrogation. There are virtually no
local studies by other disciplines to assist him, and he tends to take little
note of those which have been done in the United States.
        it    “’9 i .1. olice' ‘ IJ
   
There is, however, ample material available in that country indicating
the many and varied psychological pressures upon the suspect open to the
police interrogator. The majority of the Court in Miranda’s case stressed
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“that the modern practice of iii-custody interrogation is psychologically
rather than physically oriented,”2°and they instanced various police manuals
and texts actually in use by law enforcement agencies in the United States
devoted to psychological aspects of interrogation“. The majority of the
Court in that ' coh‘ a reli ' wrt
our caution) is Quite insufficient to maintain the avegge individual’s ability
to preserve a free will whether to talk or not without other procedural
safeguards, such as the presence of counsel etc. See also "Confesszons anﬁ
the Social Psychology of Coercion,” by Edwin D. Driver", which details
many of the psychological stratagems commonly used. It would be naive to
think that use of some of these techniques would not grow if ofﬁcial
restraints against any interference with the suspect’s free will to speak or
not were removed. The inherent e olic inte
eat not to be care u y uarded a ainst. The law ati ll 5 in,
rinci e e in lVl ua an his n t to e rotecte a int
pressure para us 0 e a e,_ an t at situation shguld
continua
ll 1
Conclusions
It is submitted that although the criminal law does to some extent
presently overprotect persons accused of crime, reforms should be
considered mainly in respect of pre-trial and courtroom procedures,
conducted as they are in the open, rather than in respect of questioning in
the privacy of the interrogation room. As Lord Devlin is reported in the
press to have said in respect of the Committee’s proposals, convictions can
be bought at too dear a price.
One most important consideration is that the generally hi
regard for crimin r shoul ' ‘ The minority of the
mm ee rew attention to t is. There are no convictions-unless juries
convict, and juries in common experience are suspicious of confessional
material obtained behind closed doors. It is su ested that ' '
- much more acute and ublic reSv-ctor t e""¢riiﬁinal la ,
71% n . l
    
    
  
  
That is not to say that interrogation procedures should not be
improved. The suggestion that formal interrogations should be tape
recorded, for example, deserves at least some experimentation. But in the
pre-trial and trial area a number of possibilities for reform are available for
consideration. One is to abolish the unsworn statement. Others are dealt
with in other Committee proposals. The right to silence, however, it is
strongly submitted, ought to stay.
‘5‘. 5
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THE RIGHT OF SILENCE
His Honour Jud e R. F. Loreda
NH” Bistricr Court
The "right of silence" may mean many things in as many settings. In
this paper I propose to discuss it in a broad. sense as meaning the
f. t: ., .
  
   
........
s ence cannot e t e su- cc 0 an averse comment (in New
Sou Wales) or rosecu asis or any igfgrgngg 91 w. I
say “legal bas1s ecause I have no doubt that juries commonly draw
inferences adverse to an accused when he relies on the privilege.
 
I am not aware of any proposal to remove this right in the sense that
it should be an offence for a suspect to refuse to answer questions or to
tell his story when interrogated or in the witness box and I would certainly
be opposed to any such proposal. There are however, notably in the
Eleventh Report of the English Criminal Law Revision Committee, proposals
for restricting or modifying the right which, it has been suggested, would
destroy the right for all practical purposes. It may be useful therefore to
consider the main arguments and reasons for and against the existence of
the right.
ARGUMENTS—OF THE mom
0 The Historical Argument
This is an argument usually put, emotionally, by those who claim that
the right is “a treasured heritage” the “roots of which go back into ancient
times”1 and who cite Lilburn’s Trial2 as the most important of those roots.
John Lilbum was committted to prison by the Council of the Star
Chamber on a charge of printing seditious and heretical books. On
examination, while under arrest, having denied this charge, he was further
asked as to other like charges but refused to answer, saying, “I am not
willing to answer to you any more of these questions because I see you go
about by this examination to ensnare me.” He said he was not bound ‘to
answer such things as do not belong unto me; and withal I perceived the
oath to be an oath of inquiry” (i.e. ex ofﬁcio) “which was against the law
of the land, the Petition of Right and the law of God . ..yet if I had
been proceeded against by a bill, I would have answered”. In other words
Lilbum was not claiming an absolute right to refuse to answer and this is
understandable since such a right was unknown. Indeed if we look at what
the common law had to build upon it is obvious that the generations which
forced an accused to the ordeal and the compurgation oath had plainly no
scruples against compelling an accused person to speak and incriminate
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himself. The Courts of Star Chamber and High Commission were abolished
in I64! and in the highly charged political atmosphere which accompanied
the abolition. the inquisitional method of procedure (which still continues
to flourish in Europe) was swept away with it and shortly afterwards it
began to be claimed. and conceded, that no man was bound to incriminate
himself on any charge in any court no matter how properly he had been
charged} So far from being a cornerstone of British justice Wigmore
regards the privilege as having crept in by indirection”.
Apart from any question about its origin however, it must be
remembered that the conditions existing in England in the 17th and 18th
centuries so far as criminal trials are concerned were vastly different from f
today. Speaking in the House of Lords in the debate on the Committee‘s '
recommendation in February of this year Lord Hailsham, the Lord ‘
Chancellor, said: “N-
“The rules were devised by judges at a time when a prisoner
could not give evidence on his own behalf ...; he could not call his
wife, his partner or his brother as a witness in his defence. In theory
although he was entitled to counsel, the counsel could only argue
points of law. He could not appeal at all from the verdict of a jury,
however inadequate a summing up might be — and in some cases until
the middle of the 19th century they were sometimes virtually
non-existent. He was at the mercy of a Titus Oates or a common
informer paid by the results of his evidence. There was no disciplined
police.”4
Much earlier, Roscoe Pound had said:
“My contention is: (1) that the raison d’etre (of giving accused
or suspected persons immunity from legal interrogation) ceased to
have any basis in the 17th century:(3)and that as things are now it is
of little or no use to the innocent and is one of too many advantages
of which the habitual defender of professional and organized criminals
and the malefactors of means know how to avail themselves .”.5
Somewhat more cynically, Professor Glanville Williams, writing in
1955, said:
“Historically regarded, the rule against questioning the defendant
is one example of the indifference of society to the need for securing
the conviction of the guilty.”6
G The Prevention of Torture Argument
Proponents of this reason believe that the arivile e is the main
safeguard against oppression or malpracticeI particularm
argument was oremost among the objections put forward by the General
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Council of the Bar of England and Wales? The Council was most concerned
about existing malpractices and believed that the suggested alterations would
“add to the current prevalent mischief of the invention of false oral
admissions. known universally in the criminal Courts as ‘verbals"'.
One possible answer to this argument is that the right of silence is a
rule of evidence and it is no purpose of the law of evidence to stop abuses
of power.8
Neveerthless the ri t does infact arevent abuses of ower by
u t a ion or its cont'i .-r - i at proof do we have then, that the ri t
does prevet 7m. practice? Surely a “verbal” can be manufactured just as
easily out of silence as out of some explanation tendered or answer given
to questions. The same reasoning applies to other malpractices. “Those who
use third degree tactics and deny them in court are equally able and
destined to lie as skilfully about warnings and waivers.”9 Indeed I believe
‘iat One‘ on .uﬂ 1" V; ' no“ .-I I 0 '2 I‘ frustration cause-
a refusal to answer “in accordance with the suspect’s legari_ ts” than
Wi n
Consider the situation of a police ofﬁcer who has recieved information of a
plot to plant an explosive device in a building and who apprehends two
men leaving the building in suspicious circumstances. In answer to a
question, “What were you doing in the building?” each man refuses to
answer and continues to refuse to answer any other question. If one adds
that the police ofﬁcer knows that both men have criminal records including
convictions for violence and that the jury will ultimately be told that no
adverse inference can be drawn against the accused for insisting on their
legal right to remain silent and will not be told of their criminal records a
reaction otherwise than in accordance with the Judges’ Rules, whilst
certainly not excusable, is at least understandable.
 
  
    
 
 
  
An American writer (who appears to favour an inquisitorial type of
inquiry) says:
“Many advocates of privilege against self-incrimination strongly
emphasize desire to obviate risk of brutality by police and others
connected with prosecution. This invites from opponents the proposal
of withdrawing privilege for any orderly public inquiry supervised by a
judge or corresponding disinterested official. Deprived of assurance
that the prosecutor can probe for a suspect’s information by decent.
orderly questioning, police are tempted to bully their prisoner into
admissions suggesting lines of investigation usable to turn up other
evidence of guilt. The privilege may encourage torture rather than the
reverse. ” I 0
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G The Time for Reﬂection Argument
Even assuming that there is no bullying, threats or violence, it is
argued that “the great majority of people who fall foul of the criminal law
or who are suspected of doing so, are inarticulate pr weakI or fearfulI or
inadequate, or deprived most people find it difficult to sort out
réTevant facts in a situation even when assis‘tgwndmmphﬂﬂ—hy
their own solicitor It is for these sorts of reasons that a suspect will‘ 1
e a vised not to say anything untll he has had advice or time for
reilection.””
 
 
.————-—--
Time for reﬂection also of course means time to invent. I can M‘ ‘
appreciate the frustration of counsel who reads his client’s proof of
evidence, carefully taken by an instructing solicitor months after the event
and containing a plausible explanation for crashing into the motor vehicle in
front, namely that the driver had given no signal of his intention to stop
(not even a stop light) and who then ﬁnds that it conﬂicts with a signed
statement‘ in the police officer’s notebook made at the scene not
mentioning this fact and attributing the accident to a failure of the client’s
brakes.
Time for adviceWW
questions. In other wor s t e egal adviser usually comes to the conclusion
Wclient is likely to be charged with some offence and that any
answers given to questions will more probably assist the prosecution than
the accused. The lawyer’s ﬁrst duty is to his client and he must ignore the
great public interest in the assistance his innocent client could give to the \
public in solving the crime.
Time is of course frequently vital to police ofﬁcers in their
investigations. Any delay may mean the complete frustration of any
prospects the law enforcement agencies may have to apprehend criminals, I
recover proceeds of crimes or prevent further crimes.
in the face of such a powerful argument (of public interest) may i '
respectfully agree with the Lord Chancellor who said that “these gthe weak /
and the simple) are iust the people who talk naturally when confronted
with an accusation. They do not remain silent. They do not say ‘In this
country a person is innocent until he is proved guilty’. They are precisely
the people who do not get the benefit of the rule.”12
.071w “LazyProsecutor” Argument
Some advocates of the right argue that to co
 
 
ues s ' ld tend to
make the police and the prosecution lazy and inefficient in carrying out
meir 0! r 'rlng and presenting a proper case to ghe court. All thaT
would be required. it is said. would be enough mateﬁal to present a prima ?
_______J
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facie case whereupon the accused would be called upon to answer it and
either adverse inferences drawn if he refused to give evidence or to answer
or the case would be proved through the admissions of the accused.
This argument is really an argument in favour of inefﬁciency. Surely,
if by modifying the right it is possible to release the current pressure of
work upon the police force so that there will be officers available to carry
out more investigations of more crimes (at present they only have enough
men properly to investigate the most serious) .then it seems to me that the
argument reasons against the right rather than for it. Moreover the most
careful investigation may be completely ineffective without interrogation of
the suspect.”
G The “Fair Play" Argument
Bentham called this “The Fox Hunter’s Reason” which he said
consiste in in upon e carpet o ega procedure the idea of
fairness in the sense in which the word is used by sportsmen. The fox is to
have a fair chance for his life; he must have leave to run a certain length
of way for the express purpose of giving him a chance to escape.” Modern
writers speak rather of f 1 . . . “with all the owers
at its dis-’osal’ has compared with the poor accused ,- z-t
 
   
  
Griswold writing in 1955 said:
‘Torture was once used by honest and conscientious public servants as
a means of obtaining information about crimes which could not
otherwise be disclosed. We want none of that today I am sure. For a
very similar reason. we do not make even the most hardened criminal
sign his own death warrant, or dig his grave or pull the lever that
spring the trap on which he stands.”'5
Mr Justice Devlin (now Lord Devlin) in his summing up in the case
Reg. v. Bodkin Adams said:
“So great is and always has been our horror at the idea that a man
might be questioned, forced to speak and perhaps to condemn himself
out of his own mouth that we grant to everyone suspected or accused
of crime at the beginning, at every stage and until the very end, the
right to say, “Ask me no questions. 1 shall answer none. Prove your
case’."'6
The Eleventh Committee had this to say about this argument.
“Some lawyers seem to think that it is somehow wrong in principle
that a criminal should be under any kind of pressure to reveal his
case before his trial. The reason seems to be that it is thought to be
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repugnant ~ or perhaps rather ‘unfair’ .. that a person should be
obliged to choose between telling a lie and incriminating himself.
Whatever the reason, this is a matter of opinion and we disagree.
There seems to us nothing wrong in principle in allowing an adverse
inference to be drawn against a person at his trial if he delays
mentioning his defence till the trial and shows no good reason for the
delay. As to the argument that it is ‘unfair’ to put pressure on a
suspect in this way, what we said above (in Para. 27) about fairness
in criminal trials generally applies. Bentham’s famous comment on the
rule that suspects could not be judicially interrogated seems to us to
apply strongly to the ‘right of silence’ in the sense under discussion.
He wrote:
‘If all criminals ofevery class had assembled and framed a system
after their own wishes, is not this rule the very first which they
would have established for their security? Innocence never takes &Nmu
advantage of it. Innocence claims the right of speaking, as guilt
invokes the privilege of silence’.”'7
In Paragraph 27 the Committee had stated:
“We need hardly say that we have no wish to lessen the fairness of
criminal trials. But it must be clear what fairness means in this
connection. It means, or ought to mean, that the law should be such
as will secure as far as possible that the result of the trial is the right
one. That is to say, the accused should be convicted if the evidence
proves beyond reasonable doubt that he is guilty, but otherwise not. ,
‘ We stress this, although it may seem obvious, because fair
often to be thou
onl 7ST east t ere seems to be an idea that the defence have a
sacrear1§Et to the Benefit 0 '
em a c ance 0 an ac u1t
 
  
  
 
 
I find these arguments convincing The State spends a great deal of
money in the preparation and conduct of criminal trials. Jurors and other:
called for jury service give up a great deal of time with consequent loss 0
income Wasting this merely to satisfy some sporting instinct seems to me
to be quite unjustiﬁable.
    
“Justice though due to the accused is due to the accuser also. The
concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament.
We are to keep the balance true.”18
.Relaxation of the Rule would make police interroqution “open ended”
and would 1e en trials.
The English Bar'gis concerned that the proposals of the 11th
Committee would mean greater latitude to police officers to extend
interrogations which would proceed on the basis that if the suspect
W
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an w1tness. hic1 act might later be relied on at 15 ma 1 e Court or
jﬂiwou w TuWW
is so concerne t at the trial woul ten to ecome a ma 0 why the
accused did or did not fail to disclose some matter thus complicating and
lengthening the procedure.
I have already stated my view as to the relation of the rule and
oppression by the police. The view that a jury would view some omission
by the accused in a manner unfair to him is in my opinion a demonstration
of lack of faith in juries — a lack of faith that I do not share. The
Committee’5 proposal is only that the Court or the jury should be entitled
todraw such inferences as appear proper in relation to facts which the
accused could reasonably have been expected to mention. He must still be
1 given the beneﬁt of any reasonable doubt. The Bar’s concern in relation to
the complication of the trial seems strangely at variance with the “Lazy
Prosecutor” argument. Undoubtedly there would be arguments and issues
concerning interrogations, but so there are now. From my point of view the
trial would at least be free of the embarrassment of having to tell a jury
that they should not draw inferences which common sense demands that
they should draw and which they probably will draw anyway.
0n the other hand there is some evidence that tightening the rzulle (as
occurred in the United States following the Miranda and Escobedo“ cases
would lengthen and complicate trials. Mr Justice Reardon of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, speaking at the 15th Legal Convention in
Brisbane in 1969 (four years after Miranda) said “the Miranda and
Escobedo cases have . .'served to complicate the administration of criminal
justice . ..The application of their principles in practice has proved to be
quite difﬁcult". His Honour illustrated his point with details of trials which
K‘PS‘E taken twice as long because of issues which had arisen as a result of
‘t e application of those cases.
SQ:®@ The Rule prev least he! s to rev nr “witch huntin ”
There is a stron ublic feelin for leaving people alone—against .
disturbin the eace of an individual b way of compulsory appearances
 
        
  
 a;.11m. e 'c ar y type ﬁshing expedition as always had an
Wracter. Perhaps the reason is because each of us has something to
hide or at least something which would embarrass him if it were made
public. An American professor has calculated that 100% law enforcement
would not leave enough people (Americans) at large to build and man the l
prisons in which the rest would reside.22 The rule was born in the climate l
of public opposition to the inquisitorial methods of the Courts of Star ‘
Chamber and High Commission and in my view there would be similar
opposition to such methods today. I certainly would be opposed to them. I
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would also be opposed to giving police officers a power to arrest for
questioning as exists in the United States or France.
M. Simon (a former President of the Court of Appeal in France and
Chairman of the French Section of the International Commission of Jurists)
related the present French system at the Conference of Justice held in
London in February this year. I have attempted to summarise his remarks
as follows:
“Specially selected ‘judicial police ofﬁcers’ who feel that the presence
of a person is necessary to the success of their investigation may take
him into custody and keep him incommunicado for 24 hours. He
may not communicate with anybody, has no right to counsel and is
compelled to answer the questions which are asked of him. After 24
hours if the police officers feel they should detain him further they
must take him before the prosecution and must ask for a prolongation
which can be granted for another 24 hours (which is a maximum
except where security matters are involved) in which case the custody
can be prolonged up to 5 days. There are certain precautions that
must be taken such as time for rest and food and the various times
must be noted in a register but non-observance of these precautions
does not nullify the proceedings. When the police feel they have
enough evidence they take the subject and the ‘verbal’ he has signed
(he must sign it or give reasons for not signing) to the prosecutor
who decides whether to release him or take him before the examining
magistrate. Generally the examining magistrate prefers to keep the
suspect in pre-trial custody ‘because he feels this will get him to say
what he has to say and eventually to admit his guilt’. The magistrate
may also delegate part of his powers to the police and the policeman
is then transformed into a judge. When he appears before the
examining magistrate he has the right (but not before then) to be
assisted by counsel and from then on not to answer any questions
except in the presence of his counsel. When ultimately he comes to
trial and the jury retires to consider its verdict the judge retires with
them ‘to keep them on the right track’.”
Monsieur Simon did not say what the percentage of convictions was
in France!!!!!
lf I thought that the proposals for modifying the rule could lead to a
system even remotely resembling the system outlined by M. Simon I would
be passionately opposed to any such modiﬁcation. But I do not — I cannot
imagine that Australians brought up in the British traditions and under
British as opposed to continental systems would stand for it. This argument
is more pertinent in the United States in relation to Senate inquiries than it
is to our system of criminal law.
'
N
I
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c There IS. no satisfactory method of accuratelt' recording an
interrogationI
 
The minority of the Committee, for example, took the view that
clause 1 of the Draft Bil] (modifying the right) should be suspended until
such time as provision has been made for the electronic recording of
interrogations in police stations.
No doubt tape recorders have many advantages. They can record, for
example, inﬂections in the voice and hesitations that may result in quite a
different conclusion from that which could be drawn from the bare words
of a statement. But tape recorders can be tampered with and the material
remains in the control of the police after the interrogation to enable
tampering to take place. The police dislike the idea because a malicious
suspect could in the midst of an interview call out “stop twisting my arm".
It would also of course impede the “P.C. Hard and P.C. Soft” technique of
interrogation.
Justice believes that suspects should be required to answer questions
but before a magistrate, and no other statement made by the accused
whether oral or written should be used against him (with the exception
of tape recorded statements made on arrest or before arrival at the Police
Station).23 There are many practical difﬁculties involved in this proposal. It
would shut out the genuinely voluntary confession of a person who gave
himself up and signed a statement confessing the crime but who afterwards,
when he could be brought before the magistrate, changed his mind. it
would impose enormous additional burdens on magistrates and not least in
importance it would tend to change magistrates from judicial ofﬁcers into
inquisitors.
The Record of Interview type of interrogation now usually employed
in New South Wales is not in use in England. I believe a properly taken
record of interview with a copy handed to an accused after it has been
read over and signed by him is a reasonably satisfactory method of
recording an interrogation. It is by contemporaneous questjon and answer
which cannot be afterwards altered and as such answers the main objections
of the minority of the Committee.”
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ARGUMENT IN FAVOUB OF MODIFYINé THE RIGHT
The Rule is contrary to General Social Conduct
r
Apart from the criminal law, societ and the individuals com rising it
commonly draw adverse inferences from silence when it is proper to do so
and-mto incriminating questions.
 
 
The parent who questions his child about money missing from the
household “kitty” demands answers. There is no record of George
Washington claiming the 5th Amendment in relation to the cherry tree. The
school teacher informs the members of his class that they will all be “kept
in” until the pupil who wrote the insulting remarks on the blackboard
confesses (threats). The husband who arrives home late forgetting to remove
the lipstick from his collar knows that adverse inferences will be drawn
from his silence (and probably from his answers).
Is it surprising when the members of a jury in a rape case look in
wonderment when a judge solemnly tells them that they must not draw any
inferences adverse to the accused because of his silence when questioned
having just been told by counsel for the accused that they should infer
consent to the act of intercourse from the silence of the prosecutrix.
It denies Courts the ﬂﬁ‘ iii“?
1 If oneW that, ideally, the best evidence should be resented to
Wto ena e the jury to come iomcmon — that is to
convict if they are satisfied of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, otherwise to
acquit — then clearly the accused usually is the most qualiﬁed wita%’
that res ec the accuse ec mes 0 we vidence or to answer ques lOI‘lS
tﬁen wayshouldnot he " ' '
 
Opponents of this view argue that an accused person would not be
likely to do himself justice that he would be tricked into admissions by a
wily crown prosecutor. If this argument means that a guilty person might
be forced to admit his guilt then this is really the “Fair Play" argument
which is considered above. If it is meant that an innocent person will be
tricked into some answer which suggests his guilt then I do not agree. It is
not my expereince that Crown Prosecutors try to trick an accused. Juries
would be quick to acquit if there were any suggestion of trickery.
It really all depends upon whether one trusts juries. I do.
  
OMS.
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Abolition or at least modiﬁcation of the right would help":1 atire
n mm a on o: gustrce '
Hardened criminals often take advantage of the right to refuse to
answer any questions at all and this may greatly hamper the police and
‘ even bring their investigations to a halt.26 The communit has an "go t t
I believe however that there is an even greater danger to the proper
administration of justice likely to ﬂow from the right — even more likely if
the rules are tightened in an endeavour to preserve or widen the right. A
dedicated police ofﬁcer who is frustrated by having his investigations
brought to a halt as a result of the suspect’s insistence on the right is likely
to do one of two things. Either he will lose interest and cease to be a
dedicated police ofﬁcer (apathy) with a consequent loss to the community
in the solution of crime, or alternatively he may commit a small breach of
what he regards as a stupid illogical rule (aggression). The initial breach
however has to be compounded by lies to avoid the discovery of the
breach. Attacks by the accused, his counsel, the judge or by newspapers
cause him to lie further and his mates “close the ranks" so that more
police ofﬁcers tell lies to protect him. Small breaches degenerate into
massive breaches and ultimately into complete disregard for the rules and
lying becomes commonplace. This serious state of affairs will not be
remedied by intensifying the attacks nor by tightening rules which are
already disregarded. The next step is of course a loss of public conﬁdence
in the police, and a lack of pride by the police in themselves. In New York
“there is an atmosphere of an almost total civic paralysis as to whether it is
possible to restore law and order to an extent that people can live there in
safety and tranquillity and as civilised human beings the citizens have
ceased to have conﬁdence in the police force"2". The Miranda case may
not have caused this situation but it appears to have done nothing to
improve it in eight years. I believe that it has contributed to it. Roscoe
Pound writing in 1934 said:
“No amount of thundering against the third degree and its derivatives
and analogues will achieve anything. . my proposition is that the
remedy is to satisfy the reasonable demands of the8police and
prosecutors for an interrogation of suspected persons ..
What are these demands? An Article entitled “The Interrogation of
Suspects’ by Inspector Crowley of the Victorian Police2°contains many
statemcnts of methods and attitudes which must make a lawyer feel
uncomfortable. For example “It can usually be said of the top interrogators
in any police force that they enter into an interrogation as a contest which
they are determined to win.” Such an attitude is hard to reconcile with the
presumption of innocence. Nevertheless l have no doubt that what he is
saying is true and if we are to continue with police interrogations as a
 
 35His llonourJudgc R. l". Lovctla}
means of crime investigation we must accept what we cannot change and
bend our efforts towards improving what we can. Ultimately the result will
depend upon the integrity of.the Police Force which can only be built up
from within (so that members of the Force have such pride in the Force
that they eschew anything which could damage its reputation). Attacks
from without are likely to have the opposite effect.
The first step towards improving relations between the public and the
police is to cease demanding that police carry out investigations in an
illogical impracticable way handicapped by a right which is a negation o
interrogation. If we do this then I believe we have a better basis for and
better prospect of stamping out oppression and malpractice that no one
interested in justice would countenance.
The Right is IIlogicaI and Inconsistent
In addition to the statutory prohibition30 against commenting on the
failure of an accused to give evidence it is usual for a judge to inform the
jury that they must not draw any inference adverse to the accused by
reason of his silence when questioned or charged. However if, when
questioned or charged he blushes, appears confused, if he hangs his head, if
he makes inconsistent statements, that is all right: it is evidence against the
accused, or arguably evidence in his favour. But if he says nothing,
apparently the jury are to adopt an attitude towards his silence which they
would never adopt in the conduct of their family or business affairs.31
Moreover, no objection is taken to using documents written by the
accused or conversations ascribed to him by other witnesses. Thus said
Bentham “what the technical procedure rejects is his own evidence in the
purest and most authentic form; what it admits is the same testimony,
provided that it be indirect, that is. have passed through channels which
may have altered it and that it be reduced to the inferior and depraved
state of hearsay.”
The Right is also subject to one notable exception. Where the Crown
has proved that goods recently stolen were found in the possession of the
accused, the jury should be told that they may ﬁnd the accused guilty of
larceny or receiving unless he gives a reasonable explanation of his
possession. An explanation given when first called for, of course, stands
upon a different footing from one given when an accused has had time to
invent a story.
The doctrine of recent posse'ssion in my experience has not given rise
to the problems and difficulties that opponents of the Committee’s
recommendation suggest would follow modification of the right.
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CONCLUSION
l have dealt with the argument for and againsr the right in a manner
that makes it clear that I am in favour of modifying it in the manner
recommended by the Eleventh Committee.
I appreciate that in supporting the recommendations of the Committee
—— and I do so most respectfully having regard not only to the
composition of the Committee but to the great amount of time and
consideration, extending over many years, that the Committee gave to
preparing the Report — I shall be strongly opposed by many “supporters of
the liberty of the subject”. I concede that, to lawyers brought up in the
English tradition, the proposals are startling. However, might I suggest that
even the most enthusiastic supporters of the right should consider the
proposals with an open mind. Change almost always meets opposition. When
in “1780 Sir John Fielding proposed for the first time a regular police
force it was bitterly opposed throughout the country, led by the Lord
Mayor and all the justices of the kingdom.” (The Chairman of Justice)
There was similar strong opposition to proposals to allow an accused to give
evidence and to many other advances which we now accept as basic matters
to ensure a fair trial. This opposition torchange continues to the present. In
England in 1967 in the face of opposition a number of amendments to
criminal procedures were enacted (including provisions for majority verdicts
and for notice of an alibi) which have so far not been enacted here. So far
as i am aware they are working well.
We should not fall behind.
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THE RIGHT OF SILENCE:
A PUBLIC DEFENDER’S VIEWPOINT
H. F. Q.C.. I.L.B.,
Senior Public e en er for N.S.W.
Those who have been asked to present papers at this most important
seminar have been requested to do so in these terms:—
(1) What is the purpose served today by the right of silence?
(2) Should it be restricted and if so to what extent?
(3) If restricted what safeguards should be introduced?
Amongst lawyers, the “right of silence” has always been a fruitful
source of argument and debate. It was none other than Bentham who wrote
on the proposition that suspects could not be judicially interrogated:
“If all criminals of every class had assembled, and framed a
system after their own wishes, is not this rule the very ﬁrst which
they would have established for their security? Innocence never takes
advantage of it. Innocence claims the right of speaking, as guilt
invokes the privilege of silence.”l
It is the view of the English Criminal Law Revision Committee that
this famous comment was equally applicable to the “right of silence.”2
Indeed it is the recommendations of that committee which have
stimulated current discussion on the merits of the “right” in England and
indeed in this State.
So far as the State of New South Wales is concerned there is a
Criminal Law Committee here too and it is currently engaged in looking at
the criminal law with a view to change where necessary. It was through the
good ofﬁces of Professor K.O. Shatwell, Dean of the Faculty of law and
Director of the Institute of Criminology, University of Sydney, that
arrangements for this seminar were made, with a view to assessing the
reactions of members of the profession to the far reaching changes
suggested by the English Criminal Law Revision Committee in regard to the
“right of silence.” These reactions will then be passed on to our own
Criminal Law Committee.
As I am a member of that Committee I would like it understood that
the views I express in this paper are my own and I in no way speak for
the Committee.
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Because I am an advocate who is engaged in defending people accused
of serious criminal acts, or alternatively, appearing for those who are
appealing against convictions arising out of serious criminal acts, I realise I
must be careful when expressing my views to ensure it is my head and not
my heart that guides me May I assure you that I am just as much
concerned as anyone to see that ourWfunction efficiently
and justly, holdinga proper balanceuwbgttvmmmthe
accused, for without a proper system of criminal justice our society will
qu1te obviously collapse. One would need to be a complete fool to be
insensitive to the realities faced by our American friends. We are all aware
that American cities are ﬁghting a desperate battle with those who are
attempting to take advantage of the weaknesses in their system of criminal
justice. The type of “organized crime” that is striking at the heart of
America can strike here too. Some people demand that we meet ﬁre with
fire and ensure that weakness in the law and weakness in its administration
is eliminated. These are sentiments that can readily be understood. The
difficulty is to preserve the fine balance I have already mentioned.
Because of the signiﬁcance of the recommendations of the English
Criminal Law Revision Committee so far as the current inquiry in this State
is concerned, let us look at those recommendations I say this because it is
my feeling that if recommendations were to be made for alterations in our
law as it affects the “right of silence” it would be along the lines suggested
in England. I do so because I cannot conceive of changes to our law more
far-reaching than those. The Criminal Law Revision Committee in their
Report — Clause I.'INTERROGATION 0F SUSPECTS: EFFECT OF SILENCE:
JUDGES’ RULES said this:
Paragraph 28. We propose to restrict greatly the so-called “right of
silence” enjoyed by suspects when interrogated by the police or by
any one charged with the duty of investigating offences or charging
offenders. By the right of silence in this connection we mean the rule
that if the suspect, when being interrogated omits to mention some
fact which would exculpate him, but keeps this back till the trial, the
court or jury may not infer that his evidence on this issue at the trial
is untrue. Under our proposal it will be permissible to draw this
inference if the circumstances justify it. The suspect will still have the
“right of silence" in the sense that it is no offence to refuse to
answer questions or tell his story when interrogated; but if he chooses
to exercise this right, he will risk having an adverse inference drawn
against him at his trial.
Then follows this footnote to the paragraph: In relation to the trial
the “right of silence” enjoyed by the accused means that the
prosecution have the burden of proving his guilt, that he may refrain
from giving evidence and that the prosecution may not comment on
96139—4
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his omission to give it. Under our proposals discussed in paragraphs
110 to 113 below, comment on the omission will be allowed and it
will be permissible to draw inference from it. we do not propose to
weaken in any way the principle that the prosecution have the burden
of proving the guilt of the accused; in fact our proposals discussed in
paragraphs 140 to 142 are intended to strengthen this principle in one
respect.
Paragraph 30. In our opinion it is wrong that it should not be
pemrissible for the jury or magistrates' court to draw whatever
inferences are reasonable from the failure of the accused when
interrogated to mention a defence which he puts forward at his trial'.
To forbid it seems to us to be contrm to common sense and,
without helping the innocent, to give an unnecessary advantage to the
guilty. Hardened criminals often take advantage of the present rule to
refuse to answer any questions at all, and this may greatly hamper the
police and even bring their investigations to a halt. Therefore the
abolition of the restriction would help justice.
Accordingly I propose to examine suggested changes to the “right of
silence” in the context suggested above, the mining that change is
We.5-; re existinlaw —
  
(l) Gives an unnece the i1
(2) Facilitats the o- rations of haru 1.!- :3s . _ . . .mmalw'sho ofnte rfusce
to answer any questions at all.
 
(3) Because of the restrictions it imposes, it inhibits justice,
Perhaps it should be mentioned that the Committee consisted of eight
Judges, three Professors of Law, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the
Chief Legal Adviser to the Home Ofﬁce, no barristers and one solicitor.
I feel it is true to say that the legal profession in England is highly
critical of the proposed changes and the report of the Bar Council, which
embraces the views of 10 senior counsel and five junior counsel, is
devastatingly against them. These barristers, include Treasury Counsel and
senior and junior counsel with extensive experience both for the prosecution
and the defence in criminal cases.
If the “right of silence" is modiﬁed as suggested then there will have
to be changes to the law as we know it. The Criminal Law Revision
Committee envisages that silence might be regarded as corroboration and
that the requirements of the Judges’ Rules to caution a suspect would be
abolished or replaced by different kinds of wamings or intimations. The
Committee also proposes that the right of an accused person to make an
unsworn statement should be abolished.
 llon‘artl Purncll 41
It would appear proper at this stage to draw attention to the fact
that the Criminal Law Revision Committee is concerned that because of
weakness in the system too many hardened criminals are being acgmtted of
serious crime. en te ouse of Lords debated the report 0 the
Committee. none other than Lord Gardiner, the former Lord Chancellor,
stated that none of the submissions made by the Bar Council, “Justice”,
the Society of Labour Lawyers and the London Criminal Court Solicitors’
Association supported that proposition. Lord Gardiner went on to say that
figures he had from a research project carried out by the Oxford Research
”I
Group over about a year at assizes and quarter sessions around Oxford, /
l
g
e
showed that in a review of 475 cases, there were acquittals in 173 cases. In
those vauittals, 30% were directed by the Judge because of the absence of
evidence to prove the case. In a‘ further 25% the Police admitted they had
prosecuted for “policy reasons” and had not expected to get a conviction.
in a further 11% of the cases the Crown witnesses went back on their
proof or the evidence simply wasn’t good enough.3
Leaving aside the English scene let us consider the position in N.S.W.
As in England, many people charged in this State with serious crime, plead
guilty. The “hand-up” brief system created under S. 51A of the Justices
Act 1902—68 is utilised in a large percentage of all cases in indictable l
matters. Let us look at the statistics‘for Sydney Quarter Sessions for the
year January to December, 1972, whilst at the same time remembering that
Quarter Sessions has jurisdiction in all indictable matters other than charges
that were previously capital, viz. murder, wound with intent to murder,
rape and those arson charges that carry life imprisonment. Quarter Sessions
deals with charges of manslaughter, wounding with intent to do grievous
bodily harm, both these charges carrying life imprisonment, robbery in all
its forms, including those offences that carry life imprisonment and a
maximum penalty of 20 years, attempted rape and other serious sexual
offences and a large variety of offences of dishonesty. Let us also remember
that Sydney Quarter Sessions serves a very large city metropolis thatggcan
be compared with large cities overseas. The statistics are as follows:— ‘1"
 
 Persons Committed for Trial or Sentence ......... 2272Persons Reversing Plea of Guilty Under S. 51A ...... 121Total Persons D/W at Sydney Q.S. ............ 2151
‘ ill .
Total Pleas of Guilty either by S. 51A or after Committal for 1
Trial ............................ I899 " °
Persons who Stood Trial at Sydney 05. .......... 252
Persons Convicted After Trial ................ 156
Persons Acquitted After Trial ................. 96
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The further general breakdown of these ﬁgures means this:
Lg“ 0‘ a“ W
tiose tr ed were convicted;
( o nose tr ed were acquitted.
 
   
7711's means that only 4.46% of all people charged went free.
 
This is a ﬁgure much lower than the ﬁgure quoted for Oxford, where
it appears about 56 persons were acquitted on grounds that were not of the
Crown‘s making, out of a total of 475. That ﬁgure represents about 13% in
round ﬁgures.
My own experience would indicate that throughout N.S.W. generally
there could be a higher rate than 4.46%, particularly in rural areas.
Statistics are not readily available but I am sure the ﬁgure would not go
beyond 10%. So far as the Supreme Court is concerned I have no hesitation
in saying that it certainly isn’t getting any easier to obtain an acquittal in
very serious criminal cases. This view is shared by other experienced
criminal practitioners.
As a citizen I ﬁnd these statistics very reassuring. I am also pleased to
see that they conﬁrm a view that I had formed and certainly expressed on
a number of occasions publicly, that juries in Sydney were not perversely
acquitting people charged with serious crime.
With a considerable experience of serious trials in this State, I can say
categorically with Lord Salmon, whose views are later quoted in this paper,
that I know of very few acquittals indeed in N.S.W. for which a reason
cannot be ascribed. I would adopt Lord Salmon’s remarks:
“In my view there is no doubt that the vast majority of those
acquitted in this country are, in truth, not guilty.”4
Distinguished practitioners in England appear, from what I have read,
to be of the view that the big criminals are readily convicted and quote the
cases of the “Great Train Robbers” and such notorious offenders as the
Kray brothers.
My own experience in N.S.W. is that these men certainly do not get
off scot free. I can remember very few notorious criminals being acquitted.
They seem to be able to afford senior counsel and frequently their cases
are protracted. So far as I am concerned the prospect of acquittal after a
lengthy trial in this State is almost negligible. I would defy anyone to show
me that my view is wrong.
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We are here and now considering the question of the “right of
silence” because of problems that are being experienced overseas of an
upsurge in serious crime and indeed of the operations and depredations of
sophisticated criminals. I accept that there has been an increase in serious
crime in London for instance, because none other than the Lord Chancellor
when addressing the House of Lords in the debate I have already referred
to pointed to the fact that when he went to the Bar some 40 years ago
there were four courts at the Old Bailey, some of which sat only
intermittently. There are now 30 courts.S Of course he did not mention
that part of the problem could be traced to the large number of “trafﬁc”
or “driving” cases now being tried by those courts. We are all too familiar
with the sad scene in America. Perhaps they could help themselves there if
they abandoned some of their unreal rigidity in regard to firearms
legislation, but that is another matter. They also have a massive problem in
regard to “driving” offences.
There has been an increase in serious crime of a particular kind in
this State in recent years. Part of this is due to an increase in population,
but in the case of robbery in its various forms, it is an extension of a
crime that has increased overseas. In this State the rate of arrest for these
offences is very high. A large number of these offenders also plead guilty.
There has also been a large increase in offences of larceny and breaking,
entering and stealing. But what is wanted so far as these offences are
concerned is prevention. In other words a more efﬁcient Police Force,
although I would be the first to concede that prevention is not always easy.
I feel constrained to say that there is no doubt that our courts are
feeling the strain of increased work loads. The Central Criminal Court,
Sydney Quarter Sessions, and the Court of Criminal Appeal are notable
examples. In 1967 the Senior Public Defender would have appeared in
about 40 appeals I am now asked to appear annually for some 150
appellants to the Court of Criminal Appeal. Appeals to the Court of
Appeal, Criminal Division, in England show a similarly significant increase. I
have no doubt that better standards of education and greater awareness
amongst criminals of their rights has something to do with this.
But the answer to all this is not a restriction of darts such as “the
ri t of s’ence.” T e answer ‘es elsewher I for one won 5 ar wrt a
campaign 0 o away e no oriety afforded criminals by the press,
radio and television, particularly at the committal proceedings stage. Too
many offenders are made to appear as “interesting people.” My practical
experience indicates that excess publicity actually stimulates the commission
of certain offences. This is particularly true amongst the unstable and
mentally troubled in the community. Heavier and heavier sentences have
been tried in many places, including N.S.W., but I am not convinced that
this is the answer.
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The abolition of the “right of silence", as l have already mentioned,
necessarily involves changes to the system as we know it. But an example
of what I regard as sheer hysteria amongst the apostles of change, is one of
the suggestions of the Criminal Law Revision Committee, that a witness
cross-examined as to credit may be asked whether he has been acquitted on
an offence. The fact that he has been acquitted of an offence should not
reﬂect on the credit of any witness.
The Committee when reviewing the “right of silence”, called in aid
none other than Salmon L. J. (as he then was) in giving the judgment of
the Court of Appeal in R. v. Sullivan? The accused, who was convicted of
smuggling watches from Switzerland, had refused to answer questions by
customs ofﬁcers. The judge in the course of his summing up (pp.104—5)
had referred to the refusal and gone on:
“Of course bear in mind that he was fully entitled to refuse to
answer questions, he has an absolute right to do just that, and it is
not to be held against him that he did that. But you might well think
that if a man is innocent he would be anxious to answer questions.
Now, members of the jury that is what it really amounts to.7
The Court of Appeal said with reference to this:—
“It seems pretty plain that all the members of that jury, if they
had any common sense at all, must have been saying to themselves
precisely what the learned judge said to them. The appellant was not
obliged to answer, but how odd, if he was innocent, that he should
not have been anxious to tell the customs officer why he had been to
Geneva, whether he put the watches in the bag and so on.”8
Then after referring to the authorities, the judgment went on to say
that sometimes comment on the accused’s silence is unfair but that there
was no unfairness in this case. It then continued:
“The line dividing what may be said and what may not be said
is a very ﬁne one, and it is perhaps doubtful whether in a case like
the present it would be even perceptible to the members of any
ordinary jury.”9
The court held that they were compelled, in the existing state of the
law, to hold that the judge’s comment was a misdirection, but they
dismissed the appeal under the proviso to s.4(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act
1907 (c.23) on the ground that “no possible miscarriage of justice
occurred.”
The Committee said “We agree with the court’s criticism of the
present rule.”'O
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As the Committee has sought to use that judgment ofW
it is obviously a matter of considerable interest to see what 15 r s 1p
had to say in the House of Lords in what was in fact his maiden speech.
“I certainly fully share the general deep concern on account of
the enormous rise in the incidence of serious crime. It increases at an
even faster pace than inﬂation, and the problems of how to contain
either seem to be equally intractable. But I am conviced that the
answer is not devaluation; certainly not the devaluation of British
justice which, however unintentionally, would in my view inexorably
follow if some of the major recommendations in this report were to
be adopted.
‘Wﬁm the temerity to challenge the whole philosophx
wrecommendations namHy, that the risianave of
serious crime can somehow be stemmed—by a relaxation of the
Wwe have built up over the generations to ensure that
Whall 0 free. There is not a vestige of evidence to
.meW—W—Jyan—(H would invite your Lordships to reject it.
I am convinced that the comparatively minute proportion of guilty men
who are acquitted has absolutely nothing to do with the alarming rise
in the rate of serious crime. I say this from my own experience and
from the published ﬁgures. If I may bore you for a moment with my
own experience during nearly seven years when I had the honour of
being a High Court Judge: During that time I went to every circuit in
the country as judge of assize, as well as to the Old Bailey on a
number of occasions. I must have presided over hundreds of criminal
trials. There were not more in all that number than about half a
dozen cases in which the jury acquitted when I considered that they
ought to have convicted and, on reflection, when I looked back on
them, I came to the conclusion that at any rate as far as some of
them were concerned there was a good deal to be said for the jury’s
point of view. A one or two per cent wrongful vauittal of guilty
men is surely a small price to ensure that the innocent should go free.
In any event, these acquittals never bothered me, but I should
not have slept in my bed if any innocent man had been convicted by
the jury. Fortunately, that never happened.
 
“Mayl say a word about the ﬁgures to which Sir Robert Mark,
for whom I have great regard, has referred. He has pointed out that
the published ﬁgures show that one out of two men tried by judge
and jury is acquitted. I confess that I am rather sceptical about
statistics. Assuming however, as I do, that these ﬁgures are correct,
they are still misleading unless looked at in their context. The context
which the published ﬁgures reveal. if you examined them closely,
show that out of every 100 men brought to trial before judge and
jury, 71 plead guilty. Of the remaining 29 per cent, half are
acquitted. This means that 85%? of the men brought before a
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judge and jury for trial are dealt with as guilty. and only l4‘/z%
escape. As any of your Lordships who may be familiar with racing
will immediately recognize, that means that the odds are at least 7 to
1 against any man who is brought to trial being acquitted. These are
not very tempting odds for a prospective criminal. Compare these
ds with the far higher odds of a criminal, guilty of serious crime.
escaping detection and arrest. ‘lt is the detection rate. in m
submission, not the conviction rate. whtch,may,,,w,eIL be one of the
causes 0 the incre ' ' ' ‘ e 0
police, who do magniﬁcently with the exiguous numbers and material
at their disposal. The odds against a guilty person escaping are
far greater than 7 to 1, unless one assumes that all the 14‘/z% who
are acquitted must in reality, be guilty because they have been
charged. That would be a shocking assumption. In some countries of
course, the courts are the creatures of the executive, and if there is a
prosecution a conviction almost inevitably follows after what is usually
a mock trial, but in a free society that, happily, is impossible.
  
“In my view there is no doubt that the vast majority of those
acquitted in this country are, in truth, not guilty. The jury acquit
because there is no evidence which would justify a conviction, or
because the judge directs them to acquit. Very rarely does a jury
allow a guilty man to escape in respect of serious crime such as
murder, robbery with violence, protection rackets, housebreaking,
mugging or “thugging” as, in my view, it could more appropriately be
called. It is the increase in serious crime which is concerning the
public. The public is not unduly perturbed about the number of
empty milk bottles that maybe stolen, or about cars that may be
parked on yellow lines. It is the increase in serious crime with which
we are concerned and I do not believe there is any evidence that any
relaxation in our rules would, in any way, help in that direction.
“The suspect acquittals occur mainly in the realms of motoring
offences where the members of the jury sometimes say, "There but
for the grace of God go I”, or in fraud cases where the prosecution
has been so overloaded or unnecessarily complicated that, in the end,
the jury is left in a fog. The laws of evidence, the criminal procedure,
are not responsible for acquittals such as these, still less for any rise
in crime.W
,W and the odds against a criminal being arreste or a
serious crime — I am not counting the milk bottles or the yellow lines,
where the odds are about “evens”— are about 10 to 1 against and in
may cases much higher. It seems hardly sensible to ignore that factor,
and to attribute the rise in serious crime to the fact that if a criminal
is detected he has a chance — though a very slight one — of being
wrongfully acquitted.”“
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During the course of this paper I have indicated a number of times
that if the right of silence is abolished other radical changes will also have
to be made, In par. 43 of their report the Criminal Law Revision
Committee said this:
“If our proposal to allow adverse inferences to be drawn from
the accused’s silence is accepted, it follows that the requirements of
the Judges’ Rules to caution a suspect must be abolished or replaced
by different kinds of warnings or intimations.”
For well over a century British justice has demanded that a presiding
judge should tell a jury in regard to the “onus of proof", that it is the
Crown that bears that onus from start to ﬁnish of the case and that the
Crown has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and that it is not the
task of the accused to prove his innocence. Further (in the light of the
cautions given to the accused) that they are not to draw any adverse
inference because it has been given in evidence that at some earlier stage
the accused whether when he was being interrogated by the police, when he
was being charged or when he was being committed for trial by the
Magistrates’ Court remained silent. If a judge fails to give these directions
the conviction will be quashed and a new trial ordered.
The sections of the Criminal Law Revision Committee’s report
relating to Clause 1, (Interrogation of Suspects: Effect of Silence; Judges
Rules) constitute a serious attack on those principles which have so long
been a hallowed part of the British legal system. The two principles are
intertwined; the principle that the prosecution must prove its case and it is
not for the accused to prove his own innocence, and the principle that a
man cannot be convicted as a result of the fact that he remained silent at
some stage before he reached his trial. It is precisely because the burden of
proof remains always with the prosecution, that the prosecution cannot rely
upon the silence of the accused in support of their case.
As Lord Foot said in the House of Lords:
“If the prosecution relied in support of their own case upon the fact
that the accused had remained silent at some earlier stage it would be
tantamount to saying: “if you are innocent, and were innocent when
you were earlier charged, why did you not protest your innocence at
this stage?” Is it not perfectly clear that the right of silence. so called
is an integral part of the general rule that it is the business of the
prosecution to prove their case?
“What does Clause I propose in this regard? I suggest that it proposes
that these ancient safeguards which we have heard recited at every
criminal case we have attended before a judge and jury; these
hallowed principles that judges have been compelled to tell to juries.
on peril of having the verdict upset—should be breached and that
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these elementary propositions. as they have for so long been regarded.
should be revised and in some senses reversed. The reason I say that
they are being breached is that what (‘lause I provides is that the
failure of the accused person at any stage prior to his trial to disclose
a fact upon which he later relies. that being a fact which he might
reasonably have been expected to disclose. can be counted to his
disadvantage and an adverse inference drawn. ls that not in fact the
abrogation of the right of silence?”)2
My own view is that for too long police in N.S.W. have relied on
confessions to obtain a convicTrronmm V, ,i U... inence against
an accuse is a confession. What is required i a higher standard—0T police
inmﬁrm play the best of scientiﬁc aids. I had always
thought that the British police had an enviable record in this regard, but
was amazed to find none other than Lord Reid speaking of the public
disquiet in that country, which he said had been increasing over the
operations of a few members of the police force who aroused the suspicion
of juries over “verbals and things like that.”13l am staggered to see such an
expression used with regard to the British police. I thought such practices
were conﬁned to this State or at the most to Australia generally.
 
Lord Reid made a point of fundamental importance in the same
speech when he said:
“. .. you must do nothing which will prejudice the innocent accused.
You must bear in mind that an innocent accused person is often
stupid, he is often slow, he is often overawed and generally nervous.
The result is that he must have a fair deal. If we start thinking again
from the beginning we must take as our basic test: Is this giving that
kind ofa man a fair deal?"14
Of course, the Criminal Law Revision Committee to give them their
due, expressed concern as to how to accurately record what an accused
said, if he was to speak. In par. 50 of their report, they eventually decided
as a majority view that tape recorders be used on an experimental basis. In
my view, it is a pretty unsatisfactory state of affairs to have a committee
recommending the abolition of the “right of silence” but being unable to
offer a means whereby the admissions can be faithfully recorded. That is
the real heart of the problem. Compulsion to speak must not lead to
prejudice to the accused.
In the course of this paper I have relied to a considerable degree on
the views expressed by those with great experience in the administration of
criminal justice — justice as practised under the British system. l am
generally critical of the abolition of long standing rights. But if anything
can add to my already existing misgivings it relates to the further matter as
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set out in pars. 40. 41 and 43 of the Report of the Criminal Law Revision
Committee:
Par. 40. “Under the clause, in any case where an adverse inference
may properly be drawn from the accused’s silence, it will be
permissible to treat his silence as corroboration of the evidence against
him for any purpose for which corroboration is material ...”
Par. 41. “Our decision to recommend that silence might count as
corroboration was taken only after very full consideration. The
following seem to us to be the arguments against allowing it to count
as corroboration:
(1) To allow silence to give rise to an adverse inference is a strong
measure, and it may be thought excessive to go further and in effect
cause the safeguards provided by the rules as to corroboration to be
dispensed with merely because the accused has failed to mention a
fact on which he relies in his defence.
(2) Since failure to mention a fact is something negative, it may be
thought that it cannot be sufficiently direct to be rightly treated as
corroboration for the purposes of the special requirements as to
corroboration.”
ln Par. 42 the committee advanced arguments put forward in favour
of allowing silence to be corroboration. None other than Viscount Dilhorne,
who in the House of Lords tabled the motion drawing attention to the
Eleventh Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee on Evidence,
could not accept the recommendations as to corroboration in their entirety.
He said this:
“The committee further recommends that the accused’s silence
when an innocent person would be expected to speak can be treated
as corroboration of the evidence against him. If my view is accepted
that will only be in regard to his silence, until a satisfactory safeguard
is devised, after a prima facie case has been made against him at his
trial. There are some offences where Parliament requires that there
should be evidence of corroboration. I would expect that if that
evidence of corroboration is not produced by the prosecution before
their case is ended, the Judge would accept a submission that there
was no case to answer. But there are other cases where it is open to
a jury to convict on the evidence of a witness alone, but when it is
safer if there is'evidence of corroboration. In those cases I see no
reason why the silence of the accused when a case has been made out
for him to answer should not be regarded as corroboration. That is
common sense and that is a desirable change.”ls
Whilst I obviously do not share the learned Viscount’s views in their
entirety it is interesting to note that even he was of the view that the
committee had gone too far.
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One of the things that the Committee also considered was the old
question of compulsory interrogation of accused persons before a Magistrate.
The committee concluded that —
“. . .we do not think it has been. or could seriously be claimed
that the system would make it more likely that the person
interrogated would tell the truth. The formality of the procedure
would, we think, often defeat its own purposes and the person
interrogated would be likely to refuse to answer questions ..."’°
The general statement in Par. 47 of the committee’s report, from
which the above is an extract leads me to gravely question how the
committee could make such statements and yet ultimately make the
recommendations they made. Be that as it may, it is obvious that the
committee sought evidence from a prominent lawyer who was familiar with
the French system. Doctor Manfred Simon, a distinguished French judge,
gave evidence in which he said in effect that the “proposals contained in
the report sought to introduce the features of many foreign systems into
English law without incorporating the safeguards which existed in their
home countries.” He added:
“The proposals seem to me to be the ﬁrst timid step to
dismantle the venerable fortress built by many generations of British
lawyers to protect the innocent and to challenge the arbitrary action
of government. It is a sad illustration of the insidious process whereby
standards of even the most civilised countries can under modern
pressures subtly but irresistibly be eroded. ”17
Lord Salmon said of Dr Simon’s evidence that the “only word of the
Doctor’s evidence with which he quarrelled was the word ‘irressistibly’. He
went on to say:
“I am convinced that there is a host of people in this country
who will resist to the last and resist successfully, any attempt to
erode the basis upon which British justice stands".18
Lord Ritchie—Calder is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for the Study
of Democratic Institutions in California. He returned to take his seat in the
House of Lords for the debate on the Report and described how a visiting
lecturer had delivered a paper at the Centre setting out the changes
suggested by the Criminal Law Revision Committee. To use His Lordship’s
words:
“The effect on my international colleagues, who included visiting
Fellows from Eastern Europe and distinguished members of the
American legal profession, including Robert Hutchins,, was traumatic.
To see the underpinning of the traditional standards of British justice
being removed shook them; indeed they were so shaken that nothing
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would have prevented me ﬂom coming back and taking part in this
debate. "'9
It would be unfair of me to leave this all important debate in the
House of Lords without quoting what the Lord Chief Justice of England,
Lord Widgery. said about -the right of silence. He said:
“It certainly has never been the law of England as I understand it,
that a man could not be convicted on the evidence of his silence.”20
His Lordship went on to quote as illustrations, the doctrine of recent
possession; those cases where a father accuses someone of assaulting his
daughter and the person accused remains silent in circumstances in which a
jury might think an innocent man would speak, and accordingly they may
if they think it right, draw an inference of guilt from his silence. He also
claimed that it was such things as the English Criminal Evidence Act 1898
that said that if a man fails to give evidence at his trial, the judge can
comment on his failure but the prosecution cannot, and the right to remain
silent under police interrogation after being cautioned in accordance with
the Judges’ Rules, First Edition, which created the so called right of silence.
Lord Widgery went on to say that
“I would be entirely in favour of the proposition that we should not
alter the Judges’ Rules, take away the caution. or do anything about
this aspect of the right of silence until we have provided something
better to take its place.”21
In this State of New South Wales a W has grown up with the
approval of the Courts of Betectives conductingW, with
suspects giving answers to questions after they have been typed in their
presence.22 If conducted fairly they give a suspect time to think about his
answer to a question before he gives it, although the procedure generally
means that considerable pressure falls on the suspect (who in almost all
cases has not had the beneﬁt of legal advice), to make an answer. It can be
appreciated t e sus ect is cautioned unless he is resolute
enou t lled to ve some sort
0 answers. A lot of pressure can be brought to bear on a person aone in
a Police Station, by the mere formal procedure of having 2 Police Officers
interrogate that person in the manner mentioned. The document goes to the
jury as an exhibit and a later changing of the initial story, as can be
appreciated, leads to difﬁculties for the accused at his trial.
What I am endeavouri ‘ there ‘ ' erable
 
pressure on the -
    
 
interro ator. Such questions can be quite loaded and if wrongly answered
L'f'eaie much trouble for the accused when called for trial. It is my View
that we already have in this State'a procedure which by its nature virtually
forces a suspect to speak and really amounts to a negation of his “right of
silence". If the Police are diligent and pursue further enquiries as to the
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veracity of what the suspect has said, they are in a position to give
evidence where applicable of a rebutting kind, which may be admissible at a
trial. It follows that it is absolutely undesirable to pressure a suspect into
making answers in any circumstances, let alone on the basis as suggested by
the Criminal Law Revision Committee, viz. that he be told that if he
doesn't answer it could lead to an adverse inference being drawn against
him at his trial.
Speaking of Records of Interview, as they are commonly called, one
sees this type of question fairly often these days:
Q. And would you agree that to discharge a shotgun at a person at
that range is an act obviously dangerous to human life?
A. Yes.
As will be appreciated a murder suspect would be unlikely to know
that one of the heads of murder can involve a killing during the course of
an act that is obviously dangerous to human life. What is involved is a
question of law in the ﬁrst instance, although the circumstances of the
shooting are a question of fact for the jury. The Court of Criminal Appeal
says the test to be applied is an “objective" as opposed to a “subjective"
test.23 Even Judges have difﬁculty in making up their minds whether that
view of the law is really correct having in mind the undoubted
“subjectivity” of the law of homicide in general. Perhaps I need ‘y no
more on this aspect: Is it seriously suggested a suspect should have to
answer that sort of question?
As I come to the end of this paper I feel it is proper to turn again
to what Lord Gardiner, the former Lord Chancellor, said in the House of
Lords debate on the “right of silence”. He read to the House from none
other than the famous judgment of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Miranda v. Arizona?” appreciate that some people may say that it
is such judgements that have brought about a good deal of the difficulty
being experienced in America in the administration of criminal justice. That
may in part be true, but there is no getting away from the fact that the
passage quoted by Lord Gardiner contains a salutary reminder of the
struggle by others to obtain rights which may too easily be discarded. None
of us should fail to note that the Supreme Court of the United States
noted that the privilege against self incrimination was the essential mainstay
of our adversary system:
“We sometimes forget how long it has taken to establish the privilege
against self incrimination, the sources from which it came and the
fervor with which it was defended. lts roots go back into ancient
times. Perhaps the critical historical event shedding light on its origins
and evolution was the trial of one John Lilburn, a vocal anti-Stuart
Leveller, who was made to take the Star Chamber Oath in 1637. The
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oath would have bound him to answer to all questions posed to him
on any subject He resisted the oath and declaimed the
proceedings stating:
“Another fundamental right l then contended for, was, that no
man’s conscience ought to be racked by oaths imposed, to
answer to questions concerning himself in matters criminal, or
pretended to be so. . .
“On account of the Lilburn Trial, Parliament abolished the inquisitorial
Court of Star Chamber and went further in giving him generous
reparation. The lofty principles to which Lilburn had appealed during
his trial gained popular acceptance in England. These sentiments
worked their way over to the Colonies and were implanted after great
struggles into the Bill of Rights. Those who framed our Constitution
and Bill of Rights were ever aware of subtle encroachments on
individual liberty. They knew that ‘illegitimate and unconstitutional
practices get their ﬁrst footing by silent approaches and slight
deviations from legal modes of procedure The privilege was
elevated to constitutional status and has always been as broad as the
mischief against which it seeks to guard We cannot depart from
this noble heritage.
“Thus we may view the historical development of the privilege as one
which groped for the proper scope of governmental power over the
citizen. As a noble principle often transcends its origins, the privilege
has come rightfully to be recognised in part as an individual’s
substantive right, a right to a private enclave where he may lead a
private life. That right is the hallmark of our democracy We have
recently noted that the privilege against self incrimination — the
essential mainstay of our adversary system is founded on a complex
of values All these policies point to one overriding thought: the
constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect of
government — state or federal—must accord to the dignity and
integrity of its citizens. To maintain a ‘fair state individual balance’,
to require the government ‘to shoulder the entire load’, to respect
the inviolability of the human personality.our accusatory system of
criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an
individual produce the evidence against him by its own independent
labours, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it
from his own mouth ln sum, the privilege is fulfilled only when
the person is guaranteed the right ‘to remain silent unless he chooses
to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will’.”25
a View erso
In my opinion what has been recommended b the Criminal Law
Revision Commiitee constifu'mem f to modii the law With _
frﬁrm 1n ressure on accused thus Virtuall 05h 'n .
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repellent in the case of those “who are innocent but often stupid, often
slow. often overawed and undoubtedly nervous".
Returning to the questions this paper is intended to answer I would
say this:
(1)
(2)
(3)
The “ri_ t of silence“ is still uard in ur sytem of
crtmm ice. ’ ' lmpO a ' o the
Mnocenf person who may be stupid. slow, overawed and
nervous.
 
     
   
It is something that is admired by legal systems different from
our own adversary system and on no ass
5 ' factoril a ' “ . This is particularly
true because there is no doubt a current tendency to cut into
the rights of the individual by the creation of absolute offences
and offences which put an onus on the accused of proving his
innocence.
I can see no basis for the restriction of the “right of silence”
because it is maintained that hardened criminals successfully take
advantage of it. The evidence clearly indicates that this
contention is not supported by fact. No other compelling
reasons have been advanced to my satisfaction and I am of the
view that there can be no question of restriction when those
that advocate restriction have been unable to recommend
satisfactory safeguards.
SUMMARY
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
The “right of silence” is a valued part of our legal heritage.
It should only be abandoned if it can be clearly shown that it
leads to a breakdown in the proper criminal process.
The advocates of change use as their primary argument that
hardened criminals take advantage of the “right" and cause a
breakdown in the proper criminal process.
Expert opinion does not support that proposition. On the
contrary such opinion regards the “hardened criminal premise”
as being fallacious.
The people most likely to suffer by the abolition of the “right
of silence” are the innocent who are often stupid, slow,
overawed or generally nervous.
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(6) The abolition of the “right” would on the recommendation of
the Criminal Law Revision Committee lead to other
substantial changes in the law of a far reaching kind.
very
(7) A very substantial body of opinion is against the abolition of
the “right" and the arguments advanced by that body are much
more compelling than those arguments put by those who favour
change.
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THE RIGHT TO SILENCE
A POLICE VIEWPOINT
Detective Inspector W. G. Clyne,
N.S. W. Police.
Until recent years, it was commonly accepted that the fear of
detection and subsequent conviction was the greatest deterrent to crime.
However, criminal statistics from this and many overseas countries show a
disturbing increase in the crime rate sufﬁcient to raise a query if such a
deterrent still exists. It is unnecessary in this paper to quote detailed figures
of increases in the crime rate in the State of New South Wales: these have
been well ventilated in the news media and reference can be made to them,
if required, in the Annual Reports of the New South Wales Police
Department. One aspect giving concern is the fall in the “clear up” rate
which basically reflects the number of arrests in relation to the crime
reported.
The important matter to be considered is the reason for this upsurge
in serious crime in recent years in countries such as Australia, England and
Wales, and the United States of America. Obviously, one factor has been
the shortage of manpower which seems to have been common to all Police
Forces. The question, however, has been raised by eminent legal men as to
whether this increase in the crime rate is attributable in some measure to
the out-dated procedures under our laws governing the investigation of
offences and the prosecution of those responsible.
The primary purpose of enforcing the law is to enable citizens to be
free from criminal attack — to enjoy freedom of movement and conduct
within the framework of existing laws. Law enforcement necessarily restricts
the liberty and freedom of movement of those persons who, by engaging in
criminal activity, interfere with the rights of others. To arrest such a person
is not a denial of the criminal’s civil rights, for no one has the right to
violate the law.
The whole system for the administration of criminal justice is related
to a punitive process; those who are guilty ought to be punished. Modern
attitudes, however, properly recognise that there should be as many
alternatives as possible to the Courts in the exercise of such principles in
order to ensure sensible ﬂexibility having due regard to current crime
trends. We must not lose sight of the fact that the certainty of punishment
and the fear of punishment generate respect for and obedience to the law.
'1
.
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In dealing with the subject matter, I intend to conﬁne myself to
(a) matters associated with the questioning of a person suspected of
committing a crime,
(b) the detention of such person as distinct from an arrest, and
(c) the privileges enjoyed by an accused person appearing before a
Court upon his trial.
It would not be appropriate for me to delve into the history of “self-
incrimination” or the many very important judicial decisions which have
been made over a number of years in this and in overseas countries on the
same matter. They should be left to those qualiﬁed and capable of expertly
dealing with them. It would be more correct for me to approach the
subject as a practical Policeman and to stress some of the problems facing
Detectives and Police generally in their endeavours to carry out their duty
on behalf of the law abiding members of the public.
Let us ﬁrst consider the nature of the crime being committed in these
modern times and the type of criminal responsible. Only a few years ago an
armed hold-up, for instance, was regarded with considerable alarm in Police
circles and it claimed the maximum attention. It brought considerable press
and other publicity and the general comment was to the effect that we
were “getting more like America every day”. But what of today? Now such
an offence, although still regarded by the Police as serious, is accepted by
the media and the public as virtually commonplace and unless there are
exceptional circumstances, it is soon forgotten. This is an example of one
type of offence only, and the same applies to crime generally. Urban
society in particular seems to have adopted a regrettable apathy towards
crime and the fact that their own neighbours are the victims. Unless they
or their families are personally affected they are not particularly interested.
I make reference to this public attitude to stress the difﬁculties facing
Police in our modern society in the investigation of crime. The community
does not provide Police with the information on criminal matters it did in
the past, and this is one reason why Police now turn to the Legislature for
assistance and additional powers to enable them to combat the rising crime
rate and the organised, sohisticated criminal of today. The criminal element
revels in this public apathy and so we have an upsurge‘ of crimes of
violence, many involving the use of ﬁrearms, knives and other weapons.
Bombings are the order of the day and when one adds the real problems
facing this country associated with drug-trafﬁcking and drug-taking, the
overall picture becomes rather frightening.
The modern criminal has an increasing awareness of his “rights" and is
quick to take advantage of every one of them. The “right to silence” in the
face of Police interrogation is, of course, regarded as one of the safeguards
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for the individual against oppressive behaviour by persons in authority, but
if all suspected persons exercised their right and remained silent when
interviewed, the task of the Police would be rendered impossible.
This basically is the principal argument in favour of a review of such
right. In their efforts to solve crime, Police must ask questions and if a
suspected person when questioned remains silent or fails to give an
explanation of circumstances which connect him with an offence (except in
certain specific cases, such as physical or mental inability), then in any
subsequent Court proceedings against him in respect of such offence, his
silence or failure to give an explanation should be the subject of
consideration by the jury when considering guilt or innocence and, in fact,
regarded as corroboration of other evidence implicating the accused.
Further, if he introduces into his defence a fact which he failed to mention
upon his interrogation, such failure should also be capable of an inference
by the jury adverse to the accused.
Today, there is a high degree of professionalism in our Police Force.
Its members are dedicated men and women with the knowledge and
expertise to carry out faithfully, and well, their duty in protecting the
law-abiding members of the public. It cannot be denied there have been
some exceptions where Police have been over-zealous and to have also been
a party to some impropriety. This is something which occurs in all Police
Forces and it gives great concern to senior Officers and, in fact, to all other
members of the Force.
Most of the objections to the relaxation of the law in regard to the
questioning of suspects and the admissibility of confessional statements
seems to have stemmed from the comparatively few occasions when
criminals have made allegations against the Police concerned as to the
circumstances leading up to the making of such statements. Because of
these isolated instances. many criminals receive the benefit of our restrictive
legislation to the detriment of the general law-abiding public we endeavour
to protect.
It is a human characteristic that a wrong-doer will often unburden
himself of his guilt upon arrest and. indeed. be mentally relieved after
having done so, but it is also human for this same person whilst on bail
awaiting his trial and mixing with his friends, to regret his moment of truth
and seek to explain his statement by allegations that he was subjected to
violence or threats of violence or that the evidence by the Police against
him had been fabricated. A common approach is that attack is the best
means of defence with the hope that the trial Judge may exercise his
discretion in rejecting the statement or, if admitted in evidence. the jury
will be in some doubt as to who is to be believed or at the very least, the
weight to be given to such evidence.
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In order to assist Police combat effectively present day crime and
criminals, I submit it is imperative that provision should be made in law
(a) for the abolition of the “caution” as now required;
(b) that if a suspect upon being questioned remains silent or if he
fails to mention a fact on which he relies in his defence at a
later hearing, that such silence or failure be regarded as
corroboration of other evidence tending to implicate such person
in the offence;
(c) for the limited detention of a suspect for the purpose of
questioning and inquiry;
(d) for the abolition of the right of an accused person to make an
unswom statement upon his trial, that any statement he wishes
to make be on oath from the witness box, be subject to cross-
examination and to comment by the Prosecutor.
All these matters have been the subject of many discussions over a
number of years by many distinguished lawyers as well as within Police
circles.
With the exception of the one relating to “detention”, the points
referred to were speciﬁcally dealt with in the Eleventh Report of the
Ch'minal Law Revision Committee on Evidence (General) in England and
this Report provides strong support for their introduction into this State.
The Report recommends the abolition of the “right to silence" which
a suspect enjoys at present in the sense that his failure, when being
interrogated, to mention a fact on which he relies in his defence at a
subsequent hearing may be treated as indicative of falsity: further, that it
may be capable of corroboration of other evidence. As a consequence, a
Police Ofﬁcer would not be required to administer the “caution” as now
laid down.
Page 26 of the Report recommends this warning:
“You have been charged with (informed that you may be prosecuted
for) . . . If there is any fact on which you intend to rely in your
defence in court, you are advised to mention it now. If you hold it
back till you go to court, your evidence may be less likely to be
believed and this may have a bad effect on your case in general. If
you wish to mention any fact now, and you would like it written
down, this will be done.”
The abolition of the right of an accused person to make an unswom
statement is recommended in the Report. This is designed to put pressure
on the accused to give evidence at his trial. When it is decided he has a
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case to answer, the Court will warn him of the effect of his failure to give
evidence when called upon to do so. If he then refuses or refuses to answer
a question, adverse inferences may be drawn from his refusal and it may be
treated as corroboration. He would not be compelled to give evidence. In
addition. the prosecution, as well as the Court, would be able to comment
on the accused’s refusal to give evidence and to draw the attention of the
jury to the inference which may be drawn.
These points in the Report (in addition to many others) as well as
certain clauses in a Draft Bill incorporating such points, were subject to
considerable comment in the House of Lords, London, on 14th February,
1973, by eminent jurists. In general, the speakers did not favour the
pr0posals but some aspects gained support.
For instance, Viscount Dilhorne favoured the abolition of the right of
an accused person to make an unsworn statement. He pointed out that an
unsworn statement is not evidence in the strict sense and that it must be
difﬁcult for a jury to decide what weight, if any, to give toit.He added that
if an accused person is to give evidence at his trial he should do so like
any other witness from the witness box and on oath. He also agreed with
the Committee’s recommendation that the prohibition on the prosecution
commenting on the accused's failure to give evidence be abolished, adding
that it must appear to a jury very odd that there should be no comment
by the prosecution on this failure.
Viscount Dilhorne regarded as unacceptable the Committee’s
recommendation that it should be permissible for a Court or jury to draw
whatever inferences are reasonable from the failure of the accused, when
interrogated by the Police, to mention a defence which he puts forward at
his trial. Nor did he think it right that any'inference should be drawn from
an accused’s silence on committal proceedings before the Magistrates and
that the accused should be entitled to reserve his defence. if he so wishes,
to his trial.
Viscount Dilhorne also said, however, he was in favour of an inference
being drawn from the failure of a person to speak on being interrogated by
Police, when an innocent person would be expected to speak, but for one
thing: there is not now available a complete record of the interrogation. He
was opposed to the recommendation unless and until a- satisfactory method
of recording what happens during the investigation is brought into use.
This proviso was mentioned by other speakers in the House of Lords
and various suggestions were made in relation to the recording of
interrogations. This aSpect has also been discussed by many legal men over
past years and will be specially referred to later in this paper.
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In regard to "cautions”, Viscount Dilhorne said:
“Rules for the behaviour of the Police should be the function of the
Home Ofﬁce, not the Judges. It should be for the Judges to say what
evidence is allowed in the courts, but that is quite a different matter.
I take the view that in these modern days there is really no need for
any such rules and no need for there to be any ‘caution’. Surely
there are few people now who are so stupid as not to realize that if
interrogated in relation to the commission of a crime, what they say
may be given in evidence.”1
The Lord Chancellor pointed out that the Committee had drawn
attention to an eitremely complicated, obsolete and unintelligible ﬁeld of
the law which is urgently in need of rationalisation and reform, and the
present state of which has a distinct bearing on the current prevalence of
crime. He added that there was no ﬁeld more urgently in need of reform.
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gesr, along with other speakers, referred to
Jeremy Bentham’s oft quoted statement on the subject of the restriction of
the interrogation of suspects and it is still worthy of mention.
Bentham said, “If all criminals of every class had assembled and
framed a system after their own wishes is not this the very ﬁrst that
they would have established for their own security?” And further,
“Innocence never takes advantage of it, innocence claims the right of
speaking, as guilt invokes the privilege of silence.”
The Lord Chancellor referred to an article in Modern Law Review by
Professor Hart2 on the relevance of Bentham to present-day law. Professor
Hart represented Bentham as a prophet of rationalising law or “the
de-mystiﬁcation of law”. The Professor came to the conclusion that the
recommendations of the Criminal Law Revision Committee were
“Benthamite” both in spirit and in substance and that the recommendations
of the Committee were largely recommended by Bentham in 1828.
Sir Reginald Shall (formerly a Justice of the Supreme Court of
Victoria) in an article in Washbum Law Journal3 refers extensively to
self-incrimination and confessions to Police. In dealing with Police power to
ask questions he states:
“1 agree that the police should not have the power to punish for
failure to answer them (incriminating questions) for that is the
function of the courts. But the sanction tending to compel an answer
would be, in the case of Police questioning, the right to use as
evidence a failure or refusal to answer. 1 do not believe modern
democratic society can any longer afford a rule which, after all, if the
risk of untrue confessions can be excluded, merely helps the
law-breaker to evade conviction. To me, as a British lawyer, the
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notion of a criminal having a legal, still more a constitutional, right to
avoid conviction and punishment, by silence unattended by sanctions,
wears in this sophisticated. truth-seeking, scientiﬁc age the aspect of
an anachronism."4
Sir Norman Skelhorn, Q.C., Director of Public Prosecutions, England,
presented a paper to the Third Commonwealth and Empire Law Conference
in 1965 in which he dealt with the subject of interrogations and the
prosecution of offenders in a practical and realistic manner. Three portions
of his paper are worthy of quotation. They are as follows:
“The whole of the procedure governing both the investigation by the
police of offences and the subsequent prosecution of an accused is
under our law rightly designed to provide safeguards in an endeavour
to ensure that no innocent person shall be convicted. It is submitted,
however, that the time has come for us to consider whether the dice
is not too heavily loaded in favour of suspects and accused persons
and whether our procedure could not with advantage be altered so as
to facilitate the proof of guilt and consequent conviction of offenders
without unduly jeopardising proper safeguards against innocent persons
being wrongly convicted.”
"At present the balance is heavily weighted at all stages in favour of
the suspect or accused. Thus a suspect is not obliged, and must
always be warned that he is not obliged, to make any statement or to
disclose in any way the nature of his defence or indeed even to
indicate whether he admits or denies committing the offence with
which he is charged; similarly at his trial the accused is under no
obligation to give any evidence or to make any statement in answer
to the charge and the prosecution is precluded from making any
comment on the failure of the accused or of a spouse of the accused
to give evidence.”
In regard to “cautions”, Sir Norman Skelhorn stated:
“The rule, therefore. that a su5pect shall be informed that he is not
obliged to say anything unless he wishes to do so, does not, it is
submitted, of itself do anything to ensure that his subsequent
statements are voluntary in the sense that I have already deﬁned. It
does little or nothing to protect an innocent person wrongly suspected
but on the other hand hampers the proper investigation by the police
in questioning a person rightly suspected of having committed the
offence. Further, the fact that a suspect was under an obligation to
answer questions put to him, and that his unjustiﬁed refusal to do so
could properly be taken into account evidentially against him at his
trial, would in no way prejudice the innocent and would facilitate the
obtaining of evidential proof in the case of the guilty. For the above
reasons I venture to suggest that practice should be altered and that
the principle that no man should be required to incriminate himself
should no longer be applied to suspected persons.
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Many other learned gentlemen have given support in past years to the
liberalising of the law and procedures to facilitate Police investigations.
However, it seems that much more support would be forthcoming if
procedures were introduced and adopted by Police in the questioning of a
suspect or an offender whereby all happenings associated with such
interviews were made appparent.
This matter has been exercising the thoughts of senior Police Ofﬁcers
in this and other States of the Commonwealth for some years with the
object of eliminating suggestions of improper conduct by Police in the
course of interviews. Various procedures have been adopted and laid down
in Police Instructions or Orders, all designed to overcome the problem and,
in general, they achieve their purpose.
Many suggestions which have been made in regard to the procedures
at interviews appear scund in theory but they are just not practical. Most
of these have been made by persons outside Police Forces. They include
such matters as:
the use of electronic sound equipment such as tape recorders,
including the carrying of pocket recorders by Police; tape recorders at
Police Stations being equipped with “speaking clocks” so that times
are superimposed on the record; for such recorders to be kept in
locked boxes to prevent tampering, the key being retained by a very
senior Police Ofﬁcer and the operator being able to switch the
recorder on and off only; ‘
the use of ofﬁcial shorthand writers and for them to be available
when required to record all details of the interview;
that Counsel or a Solicitor carry out any examination of a suspect
and to be available when required;
that a Magistrate or a panel of well disposed citizens be available at
all times to be present during interviews; and
that all interviews be conducted before a Nhgistrate in Court with the
suspect represented but no charge preferred.
While all these suggestions have merit, there would be considerable
difﬁculties associated with their adoption/in practice. For instance, if a
Policeman really wanted to be unscrupulous, ways and means could be
found to tamper with or fabricate a tape-recording.
Lord Ritchie Calder, when the committee’s Report was discussed in
the House of Lords said:
“I add rry voice to those who distrust tape recordings. In terms of
tape recordings I am a para—professional, for broadcasting purposes, and
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I know how easily tapes can be doctored most convicningly. I could
produce to you a suspect’s incriminating silence on tape, produced by
means of a magnet, even if, as the Report suggested, you had a
speaking clock. If it were in a sealed casette, I could still produce you
an incriminating silence. In fact, tapes can be tampered with to a
great extent.”5
In regard to the other suggestions of an independent person being
present at the interviews, this would be rather difﬁcult as suspects are
questioned and offenders arrested in various parts of the State, at odd
hours of the day and night, seven days a week. The initial interview
commences with a suspect at the time of his arrest, this being the obvious
time to ask questions as to, for instance, stolen property in his possession,
his whereabouts at the time of the commission of the offence he is
suspected of committing, his co—offenders and suchlike. The answers he gives
in these circumstances are crucial. On many occasions, it is not even
possible to make contemporaneous notes let alone have the conversation
recorded or have an independent person present.
Having Magistrates, independent shorthand writers or other observers
standing by throughout the State at Police Stations or in the vicinity on
the odd chance they may be required to be present at a formal interview
between Police and a suspect would be quite unreasonable and the overall
circumstances could not possibly justify such procedure.
Let us take an example of what happens when a suspect is
apprehended or detained for questioning. Take the case, for instance, of a
bank hold-up by armed offenders. One man is arrested near the scene of
the crime, is put into a Police car and the Police, naturally, are anxious to
find out what actually happened at the bank, the identity of all the
offenders responsible and the location of the stolen property. If they had
to wait until they could get that man before a Magistrate or other
independent person or to the location of a tape recorder to question him,
the other offender or offenders and the property would by then have been
most difficult to locate. The Police would be left with perhaps just the one
prisoner who, if he maintained his “right to silence”, may be difﬁcult to
convict. In these circumstances, time is vitally important and the immediate
interrogation of the man arrested could well be the only lead as to the
identity of the other offenders and the whereabouts of the stolen property.
ln many cases, time is not so important but Police experience is that
in many instances people, whether suspects or not, will immediately become
much more guarded, suspicious and unhelpful when they know that what
they are saying is being recorded.
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On this point let me refer to an article by Gerhard 0. W. Mueller.6 In
regard to questioning he states:
“In my own Police experience I have learned that it is much
easier to get answers from a suspect whom one engages in a friendly
interview (chat) at his home, before sufﬁcient evidence for an arrest
has been accumulated, than from an arrestee at the station house.
Somehow the suspect clams up at the station house and the chance
for easy response is lost once and for all. True, the suspect’s answers
given at his home prior to arrest are quite likely false. So much the
better! False answers are the wedge which will ultimately split the
block. Involvement in contradictions, false alibis, etc., will render the
ultimate conviction of the suspect without his further personal
participation relatively easy.”
In the same Journal7, Professor Fred. E. Inbau, Professor of Law at
Northwestern University, sets out that criminal offenders, except, of course,
those caught in the commission of their crimes, ordinarily will not admit
their guilt unless questioned under conditions of privacy, and for a period
of perhaps several hours. He points out that is is impractical to expect
admissions or confessions to be obtained under circumstances other than
privacy. He states that recourse to our every day experience will support
the basic validity of this requirement. For instance, he states, in asking a
personal friend to divulge a secret or embarrassing information, we carefully
avoid making the request in the presence of other persons and seek a time
and place when the matter can be discussed in private. The very same
psychological factors are involved in a criminal interrogation, and even to a
greater extent.
I speak from my own personal experience when I say that the
approach to a suspect varies in nearly every case. Psychological tactics and
techniques are important to meet the personality of the person being
interviewed. There is nothing “unethical” in regard to an approach in this
way and in many cases, an admission of guilt will be forthcoming or
information supplied which can then be checked in interviews with other
persons.
The interview with a hardened, professional criminal is a different
matter. Here we are faced on many occasions with the well known “wall of
silence" common in the underworld. Persons interviewed,whether suspects or
not, are fearful of giving any assistance to the Police.
It is in cases such as this that the criminal element take full advantage
of the “right to silence”. When sufficient evidence is available and an arrest
of an offender of this type is made, it is probable he will have nothing to
say when questioned and decline to give any explanation ‘of facts which
appear to implicate him. If sufﬁcient evidence is not immediately available
 Detective Inspector W. G. ('Iync 67
to prefer a charge he is released and then has the opportunity of arranging
an alibi and preparing an explanation to suit the allegations should he later
be required to appear before a. court in connection with the same matter. It
is in these cases that the suggested amendments to the law previously
mentioned would assist the investigation of crime and the conviction of
offenders.
THE RECORD OF INTERVIEW
In this State, it has been found that by far the most satisfactory
method of conducting formal interviews with suspects, offenders and even
potential witnesses is the now well known typewritten “Record of
Interview.” This system has been in operation in this State for many years
and in 1964, became the subject of a Judgment by His Honour, Mr Justice
McClemens, in the case R. v. Ragen.8 The circumstances of this case are
widely known and there is no need for me to enter into detail. The
principle was then established for the acceptance into evidence of signed
Records of Interview, subject, of course, to other legal provisions being
complied with, particularly in regard to the answers being given voluntarily
in the legal sense.
Many Records of Interview are brought into existence daily
throughout this State and in most cases they are signed by the person being
interviewed. They are regularly used in cases ﬁnalised at the Courts of Petty
Sessions, Quarter Sessions and Criminal Courts. In practically all “Hand-up
Briefs”, that is those dealt with by way of a plea of “guilty" under the
provisions of Section 51A of the Justices Act. a signed Record of Interview
comprises an integral part of the Police brief.
It may be of assistance in this paper to indicate the format of a
typewritten Record of Interview and the procedure which is adopted.
Firstly, there is a caption which gives the name of the Police Ofﬁcer
conducting the interview and the name of the person being interviewed, also
the date and place where it is being conducted. Next the names of those
present are recorded, then the time of commencement.
The ﬁrst question usually brieﬂy outlines the allegation which is the
subject of the interview; it includes the usual caution with a query as to
whether the person being interviewed understands clearly the circumstances
under which it is being conducted. He is told that it is intended the
questions asked and any answers which may be given will be recorded. The
questioning then proceeds, each question being typed as it is asked and
then the answer if one is given. The questions are numbered consecutively
for ready reference.
If any breaks for refreshménts or otherwise occur, this is recorded,
together with the times of suspension and resumption. When documents or
other exhibits are shown to the person being interviewed, a specific
r—_____
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reference is made to this effect. if a document is read to him by the
interviewer or read by the interviewee, this is also noted.
At the conclusion of the questioning, he is asked if he wishes to say
anything further in respect of any of the matters mentioned in the
questioning. He is also asked if he desires to make a written statement in
regard to the subject of the questioning, such to be a separate and distinct
document from the recorded interview. He is again cautioned in the normal
way when being asked his wishes in regard to such statement. At the
conclusion of the recorded interview, the time is inserted. He is then asked
to read through the interview and is invited to make any alterations he
wishes and to sign each page of the document if satisﬁed it is a correct
record.
If the person being interviewed signs the document, the Ofﬁcer
conducting the interview then signs his own name as witness to the
signatures. The senior member of the Police Force available and independent
of the investigation (a commissioned Ofﬁcer if possible) is then called in to
take observations. He inquires of the interviewee if he has any complaint
and asks him to identify his signatures on the document. The independent
observer then initials (or signs) the recOrd and adds his rank, together with
the time and date. He then makes his own personal record of his
observations for future reference if required. If any complaints are made l
arrangements are made for them to be noted and they are then inquired 1
into.
If the person interviewed is charged or it is intended to proceed
against him, a c0py of the document he has signed is supplied to him at
the conclusion of the interview and his receipt obtained.
Cases do arise where the person being interviewed declines to sign the
typewritten record. The psychology of some offenders is that they will
answer questions, agree to have them recorded but will sign nothing. In
some cases, they will even initial alterations but will not append their
signature. In these cases, the senior Police Ofﬁcer in attendance at the
Criminal Investigation Branch or the Police Station is called in to take the
usual observations, inquire if there are any complaints, initial the document
and insert the time and date, and will then make his own personal record.
Where a person has not signed a record of interview, a copy is not
supplied to him at the time of its completion but he is advised that, should
he wish, he may make an application to the Commissioner of Police for a
copy. This application is then dealt with on its merits. The Commissioner is
then advised by his Ofﬁcers as to whether it is proposed to seek to tender
such document in evidence for the prosecution and generally speaking, if
such is the case, a copy is supplied. However, if it is felt that it is merely a
contemporaneous document which might be used to refresh the recollection
of a witness, then as a general rule, a copy is not supplied. Naturally,
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questions such whether the document is of a confessional nature or has
been adopted by the person concerned, although unsigned, become matters
for consideration by the Commissioner.
The procedure as outlined in regard to the making of Records of
Interview is standard throughout this State and is considered the most
practical and fairest way of conducting and recording interviews with
suspects and persons arrested without prejudice to the legal position or the
best interests of the community.
Considering the great number of recorded interviews which are utilised
throughout the State before Magistrates and in the higher Courts, the
validity of very few is contested. Of course, many of these documents also
contain information and explanations of an exculpatory nature which have
some bearing on the case for the defence or upon the action subsequently
taken by the Court. The accused, it should be stressed, has the protection
of judicial expertise as well as the beneﬁt of the discretionary rule which
the Court does not hesitate to use where it is considered that the
document’s admissibility would operate unfairly against such accused.
Experience has shown that it is not uncommon for persons, from
psychopathic or other causes, to confess to crimes of which they are
innocent. This is so particularly in murder cases which have received
considerable publicity, e.g., the Wanda Beach murders. Police are then
required, in effect, to prove that such persons are not the actual offenders.
Police Instructions provide for careful investigations to be carried out’ in
such matters.
When dealing with Ragen’s case, His Honour, Mr Justice McClemens,
made speciﬁc reference to Police Instructions in this State formulated as a
guide to Police for the proper conduct of interrogations. He indicated that
if these Instructions were complied with, there could be no valid criticism
of the Police concerned. The question of amendment to these Police
Instructions has been the subject of lengthy and close scrutiny by a Sub-
Committee sponsored by the Institute of Criminology and it is understood
that there is no great departure from the procedure already laid down,
contemplated.
u - r n
In relation to the ri of persons being interviewed,
there are certain statutory provrsrons aready in existence in this State
which severely restrict such “right.” For instance, the N.S.W. Companies
Act, 1961, as amended9 makes provision for the compulsory answering of
questions, under penalty. of Inspectors appointed to investigate the affairs
of the company. $\ . “(mun‘z -
The provisions of the N.S.W. Motor Trafﬁc éctlo requires the driver
of a motor vehicle in a num er 0 Situations, un er compulsion and subject
to a penalty, to supply certain information to a Police Ofﬁcer or to
another person driving a motor vehicle involved with him in a collision.
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Under theCW”=1
licensee is require under penalty to answer questions put to him by a
member of the Police Force of or above the rank of Sergeant. in relation
to certain records he is required to keep and transactions he carries out as
a licence holder. Not only does the law require him to answer the questions
but it is an offence under that particular Act to fail to answer truthfully.
One might even extend the point by referring to the ancient common
law offence of “ ‘ ' ' felon ” which created the offence against a
person who knowing that a felony had been committed and being in
possession of information which might lead to the apprehension of the
offender, omits to communicate that information to some appropriate Police
authority, thereby failing to discharge the duty resting on all citizens to
maintain the law of the land. I would venture to say that if this common
law misdemeanour was reconstructed and introduced into the Statute books
of this State. Police would be in a much stronger position to control crime
and criminals to the material benefit and advantage of the honest members
of the community.
Take the position of a Policeman in our own Police Force. When a
complaint is received against him and he is under investigation by a senior
Ofﬁcer, the Policeman is compelled under Rules made by virtue of the
Police Regulation Act to report on such complaint and to answer truthfully
questions directed to him. Further, in the event of criminal proceedings
being taken against such Policeman, his report and his answers given under
compulsion, may be admitted in evidence against him.12
By these examples it will be seen that the abolition of a person’s
“right to silence” as now suggested would not be something unique.
THE RIGHT OF DETENTION
Closely allied to the “right to silence” and the question of its
retention is the necessity to consider the introduction of some provision to
give Police speciﬁc rights to detain a suspect for questioning or in
connection with the investigation of a crime. Any real benefit to be derived
by Police from a suspect’s “silence” or failure to mention certain facts
could be nullified without some power of detention being introduced.
The MS. W. Summary Offences Act, 1970, Section 59, provides as
follows:—
“A member of the Police Force may stop, search and detain—
(a) any person whom he reasonably suspects of having or conveying
any thing stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained or any thing
used or intended to be used in the commission of an indictable
offence; or
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(b) any vehicle in which he reasonably suSpects there is any thing
stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained or any thing used or
intended to be used in the commission of an indictable offence.
However, this section is limited in its application. Police Instructions
provide that when a Police Officer is endeavouring to discover the author of
a crime, there is no objection to his putting questions in respect thereof to
any person or persons, whether suspected or not, from whom useful
information can be obtained. The Police Ofﬁcer, however, has no authority
to exercise any restraint whatever upon the person being questioned, or
detain him in any way, and such person is entirely free to come and go as
he pleases.
In these circumstances, the investigator often labours under a grave
handicap. If a suspect refuses to be detained for the purpose of questions
being put to him, the Police Ofﬁcer must then make up his mind whether
or not to arrest him. Frequently, a decision must be made without
hesitation and not only in respect of his own conduct but with due regard
to other Police acting under his direction. If he arrests and it is later
established that he did not have “reasonable cause” for doing so, he is
liable to an action for damages for false arrest and wrongful imprisonment.
lf he does not carry out the arrest, then and there, he stands the chance of
losing his prisoner for all time. In addition, the question of a charge of
neglect of duty under the Police Rules could well arise.
Professor K. 0. Shatwell, Dean, Faculty of Law, University of Sydney,
draws attention to the difﬁculties confronting Police in regard to the
questioning of suspects and their detention in his paper presented at the
Third Commonwealth and Empire Law Conference held in Sydney in
August, 1965. Therein he states:
“Many crimes can only be solved by questioning a number of people
at an early stage in the investigation, when they are, at most, possible
suspects. Such a process plays a necessary part in narrowing the ﬁeld
of inquiry, and, contrary to popular belief, it produces a surprisingly
large number of genuine confessions of guilt which are the result of
no other pressure than skilful and persistent questioning over a period
not excessively prolonged. The net result of the legal rules, however,
is to exclude any legal basis for questioning of this kind in the case
of a person who at the outset makes it clear that he will neither
answer questions nor voluntarily remain in the company of a police
ofﬁcer. The police ofﬁcer is then placed in the dilemma of having to
choose between the risk of an action for false imprisonment and the
abandonment of the inquiry in so far as it depends upon the
questioning of a particular person.”
There is no Speciﬁc legal deﬁnition between detention and arrest. Any
form of restraint by a Police Ofﬁcer is. in law, an imprisonment.
96139—6
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Technically, a person who goes to a Police Station on the “invitation” of
the Police because there may be evidence to justify a charge against him
could be regarded legally as under arrest and not merely detained,
dependent upon the effect the “invitation” had on that person’s state of
mind.
In practice, the problem arises frequently where the question of
identiﬁcation is involved. In many cases, a suspect is taken to a Police
.Station in order that he may be placed in an identiﬁcation parade for
witnesses to view him. If he is identiﬁed, there would probably be
sufﬁcient evidence to justify a charge but in the absence of an
identiﬁcation, it would be likely that no charge could be preferred and the
suspect would be released.
The position of a Police Ofﬁcer in regard to the detention of a
suspect, as well as the very fair procedure of a “line-up” for identiﬁcation
purposes, is somewhat obscure and uncertain. It is my contention that some
speciﬁc legal provision should be introduced in order that Police may carry
out their investigating duties in a manner which will beneﬁt the public
interest and assist the Court in ascertaining the truth. Such a provision is
sorely needed and, in my opinion, would certainly not be detrimental to an
innocent person.
Should any speciﬁc authority to detain be forthcoming, the question
would arise as to what would be a reasonable period of time for such
detention before further steps are taken and the type of crime to which it
should relate. I see no real objection to the right to detain being
restricted to indictable offences, but no stipulated time should be imposed.
It would be unsatisfactory to nominate any particular period of time as the
seriousness of the crime involved and the surrounding circumstances would
vary. From the Police viewpoint, and in the interests of the community,
which should always be the paramount consideration, it would be desirable
that the period be left open to what could be regarded as “reasonable” in
the circumstances. i would stress that the period of time should be one for
the Court to consider in its judicial capacity, each case being considered on
its own particular merits.
UNSWORN STATEMENTS UPON TRIAL
The abolition of the right of an accused person to make an unsworn
statement on his trial is recommended in the Eleventh Report of the
Criminal Law Revision Committee on Evidence and it is referred to in page
5 of this paper. Any amendment to the law along these lines in this
State would be warmly welcomed by Police and undoubtedly such a change
would add its quota to the deterrent effect on the commission of crime.
In this State. the rights of an accused person when on trial are
provided for in Sections 405 and 407 of the Crimes Act.l3 However. it can
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be said that the combined effect of these Sections relieves an accused
person from giving evidence on oath but allows him to put his unsworn and
untested statement to the jury. When he makes a statement from the dock,
he is not subjected to the rules of evidence. There is no obligation on him
to speak the truth and the accused may say what he likes. His statement
shall be taken into account by the jury as a possible version of the facts.
The Committee’s recommendations in regard to unsworn statements
have received the support of many eminent jurists and some reference has
already been made to them in this paper.
I have spoken to many jurymen over a number of years and this
“right“ of an accused to refrain from giving sworn evidence. and not be
subject to cross—examination the same as witnesses, leaves them puzzled and
bewildered. It is generally regarded as being fair to the accused beyond all
reason.
Many instances occur of an accused making completely unfounded and
unjustified attacks and criticisms of Police Ofﬁcers and other witnesses in
unsworn statements from the shelter of the dock and the Crown not being
in a position to reply to them. Further, false alibis or statements
contradicting the sworn and tested evidence, are made from the dock on
many occasions and the Crown, not having prior knowledge of the defence
case, is not able to answer it effectively. This aspect is of such importance
as to be the subject of consideration at Police Commissioners’ Conferences
and I believe has been the subject of discussion before the Criminal Law
Committee under the Chairmanship of His Honour, Judge G. Amsberg.
I recall a juryman expressing concern to me on one occasion when
two accused were charged with raping a young girl. The victim had been
subjected to a strong attack whilst she was under cross-examination by
defence Counsel but both accused made unsworn statements from the dock
vilifying the character of the girl. The juryman was most indignant that the
accused were able to do this and not be subject to any questioning and I
then explained to him the law in this regard. In this particular case, both
accused were found guilty by the jury.
It is generally regarded that fraud matters for many reasons are more
difficult than others to present to a jury. The offenders—in these cases are
usually men of the “conﬁdence" type and adept with words. In an involved
matter they have little trouble. when making unsworn statements from the
dock, to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurymen, thus giving
themselves a good chance of acquittal. If the accused were required to enter
the witness box and be cross-examined and for their answers to be the
subject of comment by the Prosecutor when addressing the jury, there
would be every reason to expect a result favourable to the Crown. If there
is a refusal to answer questions while in the witness box, it would
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obviously weight heavily in the minds of the jury as indicative of guilt.
From the dock. an accused says only what he wishes the jury to hear in
his own interests.
SUMMARY.
To summarise. the Police viewpoint is that crime trends indicate an
urgent necessity for the restriction of some of the so-called “rights” of the
law-breaker to enable Police to combat the ever-increasing activities of
modern day criminals and that steps should be taken to -
(a) abolish the "caution":
(b) provide for the situation where if a suspect upon being
questioned remains silent or fails to mention a fact on which he
later relies for his defence. that such silence or failure be
considered corroboration of other evidence tending to implicate
him:
(c) give speciﬁc power to Police to detain a suspect for questioning
and inquiry for a reasonable period:
((1) amend the law to provide for suspects to be placed in a
“line-up” for identiﬁcation:
(e) amend the law to require notice of alibi to be given where the
defence intends to rely upon the same; and
(f) abolish the right of an accused person to make an un5worn
statement from the dock upon his trial.
The suggestion that innocent people may suffer by the introduction of
these matters is unreal and without foundation. In this State we have an
efﬁcient and capable Police Force giving expert service to the community.
Its members are dedicated men who carry out their duties skilfully and
impartially. They are entitled. as custodians of the community. to ﬁght
crime without being unduly fettered and if given the beneﬁt of the
suggested changes in the law, will have a better chance. in our expanding
and complex community. to bridge the gap between crime rate and crime
detection.
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R. v. Travers (1957) 74 W.N. (N.S.W.) 484
55.405 and 407 Oimes Act (N.S.W.) (1900-1960)
5.405 —
(1) Every accused person on his trial, whether defended by counsel or not,
may make any statement at the close of the case for the prosecution, and
before calling any witnesses in his defence, without being liable to
examination thereupon by counsel for the Crown, or by the Court, and
may thereafter, personally or by his counsel, address the jury.
s.407—
Every accused person in a criminal proceeding ....... , shall be competent,
but .......... not compellable. to give evidence in such proceeding in
every Court.
Provided that:
(1) No such person charged with an indictable offence shall be liable —
(a) to be called as a witness on behalf of the presecution; or
(b) to be questioned on cross-examination as to his previous
character or antecedents. without the leave of the Judge.
(2) The failure of an accused person or of the wife or. husband, as the
case may be, of an accused person to give "evidence, shall not be
made the subject of any comment by the judge or by counsel for the
Crown.
Where two or more persons are being tried together, and comment is
made, by or on behalf of any of them, upon the failure of any of
them. or of the husband or wife. as the case may be, of any of
them, to give evidence. the judgc may make such observations to the
jury in regard to such comment or such failure to give evidence as he
thinks ﬁt.
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THE RIGHT TO SILENCE —
A CIVIL LIBERTIES VIEWPOINT
Mr R. J. B. St John, LLM. (London)
LLB. (Sydney), Bamlster—at—Law,
President, Council ofCivil Liberties.
A basic principle in British criminal jurisprudence is that the onus of
proof remains on the Crown from start to ﬁnish of a criminal trial. The
accused is not bound to assist the Crown in the discharge of this onus and
the so called right to silence is simply one facet of the principle. Any
interference with such right will result in a different and lesser onus of
proof in criminal cases. The possible amendments derogating from the right
to silence fall into two categories, ﬁrstly making it compulsory for the
accused to answer questions put by investigating police or allowing
comment to be made when the accused has failed or declined to answer
questions from interrogating police.
The object of a criminal trial is to establish whether the accused
committed certain acts with the necessary criminal intention. Whether an
accused had a faulty recollection of his movements at the time of the
alleged crime or whether the accused declined to answer questions or on
answering questions told lies is not the object. To lay emphasis on the
accused’s failure to answer questions is getting away from the issue in a
criminal case. Adverse comment on failure to answer amounts to a practical
diminution of the Crown’s onus.
On those who propose amendment and diminution of the right to
silence there falls the onus of justiﬁcation. The present system has worked
up to now and the question is what is the evil in the present system sought
to be overcome by the amendment.
Firstly, it should be asked how many accused under the present
system decline to answer any questions. This would be difficult to
determine because no doubt in some instances the police allege that
questions were answered when they were in fact not answered. However, if
it is to be asserted as a fact that the instances of declining to answer have
increased then evidence should be produced.
If it is to be asserted that if the accused declines to answer questions
he has a greater chance of acquittal, surely statistics could be compiled
from trials held. As far as I am aware there is no such statistical
information available.
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The usual justiﬁcation for increasing the police power and making it
easier to infer guilt is a rising crime rate, an increase in the number of
unsolved crimes or a decreasing rate of convictions. The usual reaction to a
'rising crime rate is to look to possible deﬁciencies in the law with a view
to making it easier for the prosecution to succeed. Other possible
contributing factors are ignored. If there is an increase in crime over a
period during which the legal system has remained the same it can be
asserted that as the legal system has not changed the causes of the increase
are elsewhere than in the system.
Several areas can be suggested for investigation. Are the police
sufﬁcient in numbers? Are the police efﬁcient? Are the police honest? One
factor in crime increase on which criminologists universally agree is that once
cities reach a certain size there is a dramatic increase in the crime rate. If
those in control fail to prevent expansion of our cities within limits is it
the legal system which is to blame for the increase? Of course it can be
suggested that once the problem has arisen it has to be solved irrespective
of the causes. To this suggestion it can be answered that when we know
the real cause of the problem it can be attacked more realistically.
It seems generally agreed that the amount of patrolling done by
police. whether it be on foot or in vehicle, reduces the crime rate. The
number of police available to investigate crime must to some extent govern
the clear up rate. The priorities of Government expenditure have never
favoured the administration of justice and law enforcement.
lt is interesting to note that in most places overseas where there has
been a sharp increase in the crime rate, such as in the United States of
America, there appears also to have been a sharp rise in police corruption.
On one’s reading it would appear that the New York police could be
perhaps the most corrupt force in the world. New York’s crime rate has
achieved the same distinction. So far as I am aware no investigation has
been made by criminologists as to the relationship between the rate of
crime and the degree of corruption amongst police. However. it does seem
that a strong relationship must exist because police can only be corrupt in
relation to law enforcement. Selling immunity to criminals would be their
most obvious source of corrupt income.
In short it is my opinion that to tamper with existing systems of
criminal jurisprudence because crime has increased without investigating all
the factors which caused the increase is a futile exercise.
lf the right of silence is to be swept aside or in some way lessened,
practical problems must be considered. For example if the Crown or Judges
are to be allowed to comment adversely upon the fact that an accused has
refused or declined to answer questions. what is the relevant time of
refusal? What warnings are given by the police that declining to answer may
affect the accused adversely? As the law presently stands police can ask
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anyone questions at any stage of an investigation and those questions
necessarily are asked of the people who are either guilty or innocent of the
crime in question. For example it could be established that ﬁve particular
men were present at the relevant time in premises where a crime has been
committed and that four of them answer questions exculpating themselves
from the crime and the ﬁfth declines to answer and all are charged: The
one who has declined to answer will be in a worse position than the other
four, assuming the Crown is unable to disprove the exculpatory statements
made by the four.
What sort of questions are going to be allowed? Cross-examination in
private by police ofﬁcers will result in unfair questions: non-sequitur type
questions: double-barelled questions—the type of questions which a Judge
disallows.
Is there going to be any independent person present to see fair play
and record the questions and answers or see that a correct record is kept?
Most people who occupy a criminal dock are neither articulate nor
sophisticated. Their background is often not one which equips them well in
the verbal medium. A great number need assistance in formulating simple
narrative statements. It is often these people who refuse to answer because
they have no faith in their ability to give a good account of themselves.
There are often good reasons for a suspect to refuse to answer questions.
Accounting for his movements may involve disclosing matters considered by
him to be private, an adulterous association for example or some other
activity regarded as immoral.
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THE RIGHT TO SILENCE:
A CROWN PROSECUTOR’S VIEWPOINT
Mr V. R. Wallace, Q.C.,
Deputy Senior Crown Prosecutor.
The title of this paper was not of my own choosing, but was given to
me. On reflection, it appeals to me as a succinct, expressive and apt
description of what I apprehend to be the subject intended for discussion.
The title conveniently embraces the two areas in which a right to silence
exists in our system of administration of criminal law - that at the pre-trial
and investigatory level; and that at the trial scene.
I do not see the purpose of the discussion to be an investigation of
the historical development of the right to silence of any person suspected
or accused of crime. Excellent sources of reference to that history are
Sections 2250 and 2251 of Wigmore'and Chapter 3 of the 3rd Edition of
Professor Glanville Williams’ The Proof of Guilt.2
The latter reference deals rather with the right to silence at trial.
Professor Williams therein comments upon the inaptness in that area of the
term “Privilege against self-incrimination", pointing out that the person
charged with crime has not merely the liberty of refusing to answer a
question incriminating himself; he is freed even from the embarrassment (if
he chooses not to enter the witness box) of being asked the question. Of
course, if the accused chooses to give evidence, the exclusion does not
extend to a question the answer to which might be incriminatory of the
very offence charged. The term “Privilege against self-incrimination” more
aptly describes the privilege of any witness to refuse to answer an
incriminating question.
Although it is not proposed to refer to the history of the emergence
of the right to silence as it currently exists, it is as well to bear in mind
from the outset that the right is clearly but another example of the
empirical growth of principles of criminal procedure. Firmly entrenched
though it be as a legal right, it is certainly not, as incautious counsel
sometimes describe it, a “constitutional” right.
One needs also to bear in mind a real distinction in history and
principle between the emergence of the right to silence in the two areas
mentioned. The right to silence at trial has the longer history and, put in
most general and therefore probably inadequate terms, now persists in its
present form because of an apparent aversion to an accused person being
obliged to run the risk of convicting himself out of his own mouth; and
insistence to the letter upon the principle that it is for the prosecution to
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt from its own resources.
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The right to silence during the investigation process scents to me to
have become established. again put in most general and probably inadequate
terms. and subject to the growth of what has come to be known as the
"discretionary rule“. because of the untrustworthiness of what a person
suspected of crime might say against his own interests under questioning,
unless clearly voluntarily.
As Dixon. J. said in McDermott v. R., “If (the accused) speaks
because he is overborne. his confessional statement cannot be received in
evidence and it does not matter by what means he has been overborne. If
his statement is the result of duress, intimidation, persistent importunity, or
sustained or undue insistence or pressure. it cannot be voluntary It is
also a deﬁnite rule of the common law that a confessional statement cannot
be voluntary if it is preceded by an inducement held out by a person in
authority and not removed before the statement is made."3 And
further. “The view that a judge presiding at a criminal trial possesses a
discretion to exclude evidence of confessional statements is of comparatively
recent growth .. .. there has arisen almost in our own time a practice...of
excluding confessional statements made to officers of police if it is
considered upon a review of all the circumstances that they have been
obtained in an imprOper manner”.4
It is because of its empirical growth and development that I see the
rule under discussion as being always liable to critical analysis and
questioning, so often as social conditions and pressures change. As the
Honourable Mr Justice Neasey of the Supreme Court of Tasmania said by
way of introduction to his paper “The Rights of the Accused and the
Interests of the Community”, delivered to the 15th Legal Convention of the
Law Council of Australias. “In recent times debate has been growing in
countries traditionally associated with the common law as to whether
persons accused of crime do not presently enjoy procedural and evidential
advantages which on balance are not justifiable in principle. and which
modern society. beset by rising crime rates, cannot afford”.
As was pointed out in that paper, “In every criminal trial the power
of the State is asserted in the most direct way against the individual, and
consequently fundamental rights of the individual to liberty and integrity of
person and personality are always in issue, both in the investigatory
procedures and in the trial itself” 6 Within the legal profession. and that
whether one customarily appears for the prosecution or for the defence in
criminal trials. I would think it to be generally appreciated that the criminal
law constitutes both a threat to and a protection for individual
independence and integrity. In somewhat stronger words than I am myself
accustomed to using. it has been said that the criminal law is that on which
“men place their ultimate reliance for protection against the deepest injuries
that human conduct can inﬂict on individuals [lt] governs the
strongest force that we permit official agencies to bring to bear on
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individuals. lts promise as an instrument of safety is matched only by its
power to destroy ....Nowhere in the entire legal ﬁeld is more at stake for
the community or for the individual”.
It is manifest that the eminently proper concern that the basic rights
of a possibly innocent person — indeed, one who is presumed to be
innocent until proved to be guilty — must be interfered with no more than
the safety and security of the community require; and the necessity for
some encroachment upon the personal freedom of the suspected or accused
person, in order that the safety and security of all other individuals may be j
maintained, must lead to a continual conflict of interests.
It is the determination of where lies the proper balance that is of
paramount concern — and that balance, I suggest, as it may be considered
to be from time to time.
For a most learned and well-informed treatise upon the right to
silence, in the two areas I have mentioned, I can do no better than refer
readers to the paper of the Honourable Mr Justice Neasey already referred
to. It would be beyond my ability or capacity usefully to add to its
content; and with his conclusions I find myself in substantial agreement.
lntemperance of language and emotion have too often clouded an
essentially objective approach to resolution of the conflicting views
expressed. The often cited words of Cave, 1., in R. v. Thompson8 are
shown by experience in more recent times to be somewhat exaggerated. The
records of our superior criminal courts establish that very many persons,
charged upon little or no more than admissions made, conﬁrm such
admissions by pleading guilty on arraignment, or unsuccessfully repudiate
them at trial. Accused persons are known to plead guilty and maintain that
plea against the advice of their legal representatives.
It is not a question of admissions having little or no worth. They are
customarily accepted as being, when made voluntarily by a person of sound
mind, the best proof of guilt; and there is no general rule of law that a
person cannot be convicted of a crime on the sole evidence of a confession
by him of his guilt.9
There is room for doubt whether reliance on the right to silence in
fact operates in many cases to the real advantage of him who claims the
right. Jurors tend to be pragmatic in their resolution of disputed questions
of fact and I rather feel that despite repeated and sincere warnings given
them as to the unavailability of any inference adverse to the accused from
his resort to his right to silence, whether during investigation or at trial,
jurors are prone to take the View that one innocent of crime, or with a
plausible explanation to offer in answer to allegations, would have protested
that innocence vigorously from the outset, or would have been quick to
advance his explanation.
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There have been occasions when l have thought an accused to have
been poorly advised to maintain silence and when it has seemed to me that
an explanation subsequently given only at trial might well have resulted in
no trial being mounted had it been earlier discloSed.
If there is to be some encroachment upon the right to silence of
persons liable to be questioned about their suspected complicity in crime, it
is obvious that safeguards would need to be applied and vigilance
maintained against any abuse of extended powers of questioning given ever
though I do not personally believe that there would thereby be placed any
greater temptation in the way of those investigating crime to induce
admissions upon which they might then seek to rely. to the neglect of
other sources of proof: or any greater temptation to misconstrue or invent
admissions as a facile way of proving guilt.
Police generally come in for a great deal of criticism from many
sources, some unexpected. It would be idle to deny that some police
ofﬁcers through over-zealousness or other improper motives may exceed
their proper functions in the investigation of crime, but long experience of
many police officers as witnesses for the prosectuion impels me to say that
the overwhelming majority of them are honest and conscientious men, in no
way different from a similar majority of their fellow citizens. In stating
that, of course, I have highlighted the inherent danger of allowing police
generally more extended powers of interrogation because of the presence in
their midst of those few who would abuse such powers.
There also tends to be overlooked. I feel, the sanctions against the
abuse of power, exercisable by juries. Jurors in this day and age are in the
main sensible, reasonable and relatively well-educated men, who generally
evidence a well-developed and innate sense of justice and fair-play.
As to the right to silence at trial I propose to say little, unless by
way of invited comment. Actual silence, which an accused has the right to
mintain, is rarely experienced and always extremely hazardous. If there is
a case to answer, the trial judge lets the matter go to the jury. The jury,
not unnaturally, expects some answer to be made. If it be denied them,
then as a matter of commonsense and, indeed, as a matter of law, they
may the more readily accept the evidence called by the prosecution and the
more readily draw the inferences and conclusions of fact necessary to
establish guilt — and almost invariably will.
The unsworn statement permitted an accused at trial is not a
maintaining of silence, but it is generally regarded as analogous to it and is
customarily referred to in any discussion of the right to silence. That is no
doubt because in such a statement the accused says only what he chooses
to say, entirely free from any questioning by those, including jurors, who
might be disposed to test in some way the accuracy and‘veracity of his
utterances.
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A compelling criticism of the statement from the dock appears in
Professor Williams’ “The Proof of Guilt". already referred to.lo
I would add nothing to that criticism except to make the comment
that whatever usefulness it might once have had, the unsworn statement has
virtually outlived it. It would be a rare occasion indeed when no member
of a twelve-man jury is aware of the right of an accused to give evidence
should he wish to. His reluctance so to do is not likely to enhance
acceptance by the jury of the completely untested answer he otherwise
makes.
There are some who see unfairness to an accused in permitting him to
be questioned by a “skilful cross-examiner”. They show scant respect for
the trial judge. who, one might expect. would be quick to limit the
cross-examiner both as to the content and manner of his questioning; and
again tend to forget that the reaction which may be expected from the jury
to any overbearing or oppressive conduct on the part of the cross-examiner
will inhibit any excesses of zeal or enthusiasm by him — certainly if he be
one with any experience at all in prosecuting for the Crown.
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THE RIGHT OF SILENCE : THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
W. T. Wesrling, .4.B. (Occidental College. Los Angela's),
J.D. (N. Y. U. ). Lecrurer in Law, University of Svdney.
I. INTRODUCTION
“The courtroom is a splendid place where defense attorneys
bellow and strut and prosecuting attorneys are hemmed in at
many turns. But what happens before an accused reaches the
safety and enjoys the comfort of this veritable mansion? Ah,
there's the rub. Typically he must ﬁrst pass through a much less
pretentious ediﬁce, a police station with bare back rooms and
locked doors."1
The picture which is so graphically painted by University of Michigan
law Professor Yale Kamisar is a commonly recognized portrait of the
essence of the right of silence in America, and represents current legal
thought of the subject. 2 Thar right is not unique in the United States.
Indeed, if it were we would not be meeting today to discuss it in a context
half a world away. What is unique is that it is based on a written
Constitution, and as such has developed along a much different tract than
any comparable Australian or English right. Overseas observers have
frequently commented on the extraordinary lengths to which American
courts have gone to protect the right. 3 It is not the purpose of this paper
to make comparisons. Rather it is to trace briefly the American experience
so that when viewed alongside the other papers presented at this seminar
the comparisons may be made by others.
It is the hope that in the process of this survey some often
overlooked areas will come into focus. There are a number of issues which
are directly or indirectly related to the right of silence. The fact that the
American basis is a written document should not put us off the track of
examining these related areas, for it is here that we may ﬁnd a portent of
the future for Australia. Also, in the light of some contemporary political
movement in the direction of a written Bill of Rights for Australians it may
furnish some illustration of how some speciﬁc planks in the United States’
Bill of Rights relate to modern criminal procedure.
11. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The right of silence in the United States is grounded on speciﬁc rights
in the Constitution. It is absolutely necessary to lay out this Constitutional
framework at the very start to understand the development of the right of
silence.
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Amendment Five of the United States Constitution provides:
“no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself . . .”
Amendment Six provides:
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defence.”
Amendment Fourteen provides:
.. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
It is important to remember that the United States has a dual court
system: both State and Federal Courts hear criminal matters. The United
States Supreme Court has general supervisory powers over the lower Federal
Courts and can exercise that power without reference to any specific
Constitutional language. 4 As to State matters, the Supreme Court has no
such powers, and can exercise judicial review only when there is some basis
in the Constitutional text for the state law or procedure.5
Ill. DEVELOPMENT
A. Silence at trial
There has never been any debate about the principle that the accused
is allowed to stand mute at his trial. This is apparent from the Fifth
Amendment language. Once the accused has elected to stand mute, however,
there arises the question of what comment may be made on this silence by
the prosecution or judge, and what inference the jury may legitimately draw
from that silence. In the Federal Courts the rule quickly evolved that no
comment was to be made and no inference was to be drawn.6
 
The States split on the issue: some states allowed comment and
negative inferences, other states refused to allow either. This situation was
sanctioned by the Supreme Court because the control of state criminal
proceedings was left to the states.
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“We are of the view that a state may control such a
situation in accordance with its own ideas of the most efficient
administration of criminal justice. The purpose of due process is
not to protect an accused against a proper conviction but against
an unfair conviction." 7
After nearly two centuries of indecision, in 1965 the Court
reinterpreted Adamson v. California and held that the Fifth Amendment as
applied to the States 8 required that the accused’s right to silence be
protected from abuse by the backdoor approach of comment on its
exercise.
“For comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the
‘inquisitorial system of criminal justice,’ which the Fifth
Amendment outlaws. It is a penalty imposed by courts for
exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege
by making its assertion costly.” 9
If the accused takes the witness stand and testifies at his own trial,
this acts as a waiver of his right to silence and he may be cross-examined
on anything which is raised by his direct testimony. The limits on
cross-examination are thus the same as for any other witness; this includes
impeaching a witness’ credibility by asking him about prior felony
convictions. There is no provision in any American jurisdiction for an
unsworn statement which is not subject to cross-examination.
B. Silence before trial
To continue Professor Kamisar’s analogy, once we leave the mansion
we must turn to what goes on in the gatehouse. The right of silence
controversy here focuses on admissions and confessions. '0 Under the
rules of evidence such statements are admissible, although hearsay, because
their underlying truth and veracity is supported by being contrary to the
interest of the maker. H Thus in purely evidentiary terms, confessions
and admissions of the accused are admissible in court at his trial, regardless
of whether he has elected to testify or not, so long as they are voluntary.
Originally American jurisdiction adopted the common law position
that dealt with the question merely as one of voluntariness. A confession
which is forced or purchased by threats, overpersuasion or promises is
involuntary within this evidentiary framework. Thus, if an accused’s will is
overborne or if his confession is not the product of a rational intellect and
a free will, his confession is coerced and not admitted in evidence, ‘2 and
this coercion can be psychological and mental as well as physical. '3
At first the panorama of the tortured confession of a man who says
anything to avoid more pain was a thing to be dealt with by individual
judges in individual cases. But, while good in theory, it soon turned out to
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be too optimistic in practice. in 1897 the Supreme Court ruled that
coerced confessions were prima facie inadmissible under the Fifth
Amendment so far as the Federal 'Courts were concerned. '4
in 1936 the same rule was applied to State Courts on the basis of the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of “due process of law” rather than the
Fifth Amendment right of silence which at this time was felt inapplicable
to the States. '5 These two decisions and their contemporaries were based
on the presumption of unreliability due to the coercion. They also mark a
retreat from the belief that judicial discretion will sift the “good" from the
“bad” confessions. In Brown v. Mississippi the defendant was physically
beaten for several days before he confessed. yet his statement was admitted
into evidence by the trial court and his conviction affirmed by the highest
state court.l6
With the case of Lisenba v. California in 1941 the rationale changed
from unreliability to “fairness”.
“The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude
presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental
unfairness in the use of evidence whether true or false
“As applied to a criminal trial. denial of due process is the
failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very
concept of justice."'7
Subsequently in 1963 the provisions of the Fifth Amendment were
made applicable to the States. as part of the “due process” required by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”
This second theme is recorded by Chief Justice Warren in a more
recent case:
“The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions
does not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also
turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the
law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can
be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict
those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals
themselves.” '9
Professor Karlen notes a trend in Supreme Court opimions which
disparages confessions as evidence compared with “extrinsic evidence
independently secured through skillful investigation.”2°
When an issue of compulsion is raised by the defence the trial court
must ﬁrst rule on its admissibility into evidence. It is improper to do this
in front of the jury. since there is no effective way to erase it from the
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jury‘s mind if the confession is inadmissible. Thus the proper procedure is
to determine admissibility out of the presence of the jury but if it is ruled
admissible by the trial judge the defendant may still pursue the issue by
trying to persuade the jury of the unreliability of the statement because it
was coerced.2|
C. Procedural safeguards
The procedural safeguards which the Supreme Court required for
lower Federal Courts 22 were not imposed on the State courts until much
later. When they were, it was usually through the Fourteenth Amendment.
This was done by interpreting “due process of law” or-J‘equal protection of
the laws” in the sense of fundamental fairness, or, after 1963, by holding
the Fifth Amendment applicable to the States. Safeguards thus applied
include a prompt arraignment, reasonable opportunity for food and sleep
while in custody, the assistance of legal counsel and a caution as to the
accused’s legal rights. The two most important and controversial procedural
safeguards were promulgated in the historic cases of Escobedo 23 and
Miranda. 2“
Danny Escobedo had been arrested on a murder charge. While the
police were questioning him, Escobedo’s attorney appeared at the police
station and requested to see his client. He was refused permission to
interview Escobedo until the questioning was complete. At the same time,
Escobedo himself was requesting the opportunity to confer with his lawyer
before answering any more questions. He was.refused permission to see his
attorney, confronted with a statement from his co-suspect accusing
Escobedo of ﬁring the fatal shot, and admitted complicity but denied being
the trigger man. There was no allegation of violence or coercion other than
the facts stated here. Over defense objections the statements made by
Escobedo were introduced by the State in the subsequent trial for murder
and he was convicted. On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the
conviction was afﬁrmed.
In the United States Supreme Court, however, the conviction was set
aside on the evidentiary issue of the confession. Combining the Fifth
Amendment right against self incrimination with the already established
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Mr Justice Goldberg for the Court held:
“We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into
police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations
that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect
has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with
his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of
his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has
been denied ‘the Assistance of Counsel’ in violation of the Sixth
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Amendment to the Constitution as ‘madc obligatory upon the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment: and that no
statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be
used against him at a criminal trial.”25
At another stage in his opinion, Mr Justice Goldberg summarised the
position thusly: “Our Constitution strikes the balance in favour of the
right of the accused to be advised by his lawyer of his privilege against
self-incrimination.” 26
The Escobedo case connects up the right to silence with a long series
of opinions elaborating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 27 In the
words of Mr Justice Black: “right to use counsel at the formal trial is a
very hollow thing when, for all practical purposes. the conviction is already
assured by pre-trial examination." 28
One final stage was yet to come. If Danny Escobedo’s confession was
inadmissible because he had a lawyer but was prevented from conferring
with him, what of the indigent accused who wants legal advice but cannot
hire a lawyer? The right to have counsel appointed for an indigent
defendant at trial was established, but not in advance of trial. 29 This
question was answered in 1966 in Miranda v. Arizona. 30 The Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of “equal protection” includes the right to counsel
stated by the Sixth Amendment. Ernesto Miranda was arrested and
identiﬁed by a kidnapping-rape victim. Thereafter he confessed orally and
signed a written confession which was preceded by a typed paragraph
stating that it was voluntary, without promises or threats. and with “full
knowledge of my legal rights .” This confession was admitted into
evidence in his trial and he was convicted. After the Arizona Supreme
Court affirmed. the case was presented to the United States Supreme Court.
In speciﬁcally addressing the Miranda facts, Chief Justice Warren for the
Court held:
“it is clear that Miranda was not in any way apprised of his
right to consult with an attorney and to have one present during
the interrogation, nor was his right not to be compelled to
incriminate himself effectively protected in any other manner.
Without these warnings the statements were inadmissible. The
mere fact that he signed a statement which contained a typed-in
clause stating that he had ‘full knowledge‘ of his ‘legal rights’
does not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required
to relinquish constitutional rights.” 3'
Thus, from the right of silence we saw a merging with the right to
counsel, and from that union comes a new chapter in the right of silence.
Counsel is important precisely because he is necessary to protect the right
of silence.
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“At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to
interrogation, he must ﬁrst be informed in clear and unequivocal
terms that he has the right to remain silent
The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied
by the explanation that anything said can and will be used
against the individual in court
The right to have counsel present at the interrogation is
indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege
under the system we delineate today 32
Although the Supreme Court spelled out in some detail the
circumstances in which cautions were to be given, the nature of the
cautions themselves, and the necessity for an express waiver, these concepts
have created some confusion. First, custody means any deprivation of
freedom of action and is not, therefore, conﬁned to the police station. In
Orozco v. Texas 33 the Supreme Court held that a suspect under arrest in
his own bedroom was “in custody" and that a confession obtained without
the cautions and a waiver was inadmissible. The same is true for on the
street situations if sufﬁcient elements are present to amount to a speciﬁc
detention. Further, the detention need not be for the crime being
investigated. 34
Another determination is whether an .investigation ceases to be a
“general inquiry” and has begun to focus on a particular suspect. It is
primarily a factual question and depends on the nature of the unsolved
crime, the knowledge of the questioning police ofﬁcer and the object of the
inquiry. Thus where police were engaged in an emergency search for a
missing child and questioned a suspect in his home regarding her
whereabouts but left him afterwards without making an arrest no cautions
were necessary.
“At the time defendant was questioned at his home the police
were engaged in a search operation for a missing child.
Defendant’s statements made at that time were lawfully obtained
and therefore admissible. The paramount interest in locating the
child justiﬁed the ofﬁcers in not impeding their efforts by
informing defendant of his right to remain silent ..'."35
Third, any interrogation which elicits admissions or confession is
barred by Miranda, although “volunteered” statements by a suspect are
admissible since they are not the product of interrogation. The general
inquiry “What happened?” is one of the borderline areas, the answer
sometimes depending on whether there is a speciﬁc suspect or only a
general gathering of witnesses, 3" and sometimes depending on whether
there is a general confusion over the circumstances. 37
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Fourth, there is no formula which sets out the exact words for the
cautions or the request for waivers, so long as they are intelligible.
However, the individual understanding of the suspect must be established in
order to satisfy the “heavy burden on the government to demonstrate
that the defendant knowingly and intelligently” waived the right of silence
and right to assistance of counsel. 38 In one California case, the fact that
the police interrogating could not remember whether the accused spoke or
nodded his assent to the waiver did not invalidate it per se, but was one
factor in measuring the totality of the circumstances. 3"
Finally, once a suspect has declined to waive his rights can he change
his mind? In People v. Fioritto the California Supreme Court held that once
a suSpect had refused to waive it remained a refusal and required exclusion
of a later waiver and confession. 40 In State v. Godfrey the Nebraska
Court admitted a statement made in circumstances similar to Fioritto. 4‘
In People v. Hill the su5pect waived his rights and spoke with police at
some length. He later called a detective back and implicated himself. The
Illinois Court admitted the later statement and expressly declined to require
a second caution. “2 Factors in these cases seem to have been whether
the second inquiry was initiated by the investigators or the accused,
whether it was the same policeman doing the interrogation and the length
of time between the original cautions and the subsequent waiver.
Nor is the right of silence conﬁned to police interrogation. In two
1967 cases the Supreme Court struck down decisions which forced the
suspect to speak or to suffer loss of his job. In the ﬁrst, police ofﬁcers
who were called before a special investigator had the choice of incriminating
themselves or being ﬁred. 43 In the second, an attorney was struck off
the rolls for refusing to respond to a subpoena duces tecum for books and
records which he claimed would incriminate him. 44 The Court in both
these cases recognized the Constitutional dilemma and refused to put an
individual to Hobson's choice.
As was noted earlier, once the accused elects to testify in his own
behalf he is subject to cross-examination the same as any other witness.
What if he should testify contradictory to his pre-trial statements which are
excluded under Escobedo or Miranda? In 1971 the Supreme Court held that
the statements barred on Miranda grounds could be used for purposes of
cross-examination so long as the court is convinced of their voluntariness.
“The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a
license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk
of a confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances."45
In the case of a juvenile the waiver of legal assistance may not be the
most important thing controlling the voluntariness of his confession. In a
recent California case a l6-year-old boy was arrested on a murder charge,
waived both the right to remain silent and the offer of legal advice, and
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confessed. The confession was held to be inadmissible on the ground that a
request by the youth to see his father had been refused by the police.
“It is fatuous to assume that a minor in custody will be in a
position to call an attorney for assistance and it is unrealistic to
attribute no signiﬁcance to his call for help from the only
person to whom he normally looks — a parent or guardian.”
46
D. Non—testamentary evidence
As has been seen, the Fifth Amendment does not expressly guarantee
the accused a right of “silence” but rather frees him from compulsion to
“be a witness” against himself. Thus the Fifth Amendment question comes
up in the context of blood alcohol tests, ﬁngerprints, handwriting. trying on
clothing, identiﬁcation parades and the like.
To answer this question the Supreme Court has drawn a somewhat
shaky distinction between testimony and physical evidence.
“ . the privilege is a bar against compelling ‘communications’
or ‘testimony’, but that compulsion which makes a suspect or
accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate
it.”47
In applying this distinction the courts have ruled that blood tests,
breath tests, urine tests, voice identification, handwriting examplars,
ﬁngerprint exemplars and physical identiﬁcation are all non-testimentary and
therefore permissible under the Fifth Amendment. 48 Furthermore there is
no distinction between pre-trial demonstrations such as trying on clothing,
walking or speaking and the same demonstrations at trial, save the
materiality and relevancy rules governing all forms of evidence. Restrictions
on the method of obtaining these items of physical evidence may be
imposed on other grounds, however. 49 It is also conceded that there may
be cases where physical tests require testimonial responses, and the line is
not clearly drawn. Compulsory polygraph tests, for example, may be
prohibited on this basis. 50 A hit and run statute, however, which
requires a driver involved in a trafﬁc accident to stop, render aid, and
identify himself has been held not to violate the Fifth Amendment, either
because it is neither incriminating, nor testimonial, or because the right of
the government to make reasonable regulations which are not directed
toward criminal liability overbalances the limited self-incrimination required.
51
E. Withdrawal of the right
This survey of the American right of silence would not be complete
without mention of a “hot” t0pic of current debate. Immunity statutes are
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a direct outgrowth of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. If the government grants immunity under an appropriate
statute to a witness it may then compel his testimony, notwithstanding the
Fifth Amendment. Thus prosecutors in trials, grand juries and legislative
investigative committees have compelled testimony which would otherwise
be protected by the right of silence, and where a witness refuses to answer
questions after such a grant of immunity he may be held in contempt.52
There are some areas of confusion with reSpect to immunity. Until
recently it had been held that a grant of immunity by one jurisdiction was
sufficient to compel testimony, even if another jurisdiction could use that
“immune" testimony in a criminal case against the witness. 53 In 1964
the Supreme Court reviewed this procedure and overruled the earlier cases,
holding that a grant of immunity by a state was sufficient to supplant the
Fifth Amendment right of silence only if it operated to bind the Federal
government as well. 54 Furthermore, it binds both jurisdictions not only
with respect to the use of the actual testimony, but also with reSpect to
any evidence developed as a result of leads obtained from the “immune”
testimony. 55
Another area of confusion was whether this immunity extended to the
entire transaction testified to by the witness who has been granted
immunity, or merely to the use of the testimony and the leads gained
therefrom. 5‘5 This question was answered last year in Kastigar v. United
States. 57 Immunity for the entire transaction is not required, and the
grant of immunity does not mean that the witness is immune from any
further prosecution. However, the onus is on the prosecution in any future
case.
“Once a defendant demonstrates that he has testiﬁed, under a
state grant of immunity, to matters related to the federal
prosecution, the federal authorities have the burden of showing
that its evidence is not tainted by establishing that it had an
independent legitimate source for the disputed evidence.”58
It has been argued on one hand that this standard is too harsh and will
effectively prevent prosecution in any circumstance,59 and on the other
hand that it is not harsh enough and ought to create a presumption of
taint which has to be overcome beyond a reasonable doubt. 60
A ﬁnal problem is whether a grant of immunity is a bar to
subsequent civil suits. Since the Fifth Amendment does not purport to
grant a right against self-incrimination in civil cases it would appear that
there is no bar created by the immunity, but the issue has not been
satisfactorily resolved, and some immunity statutes give immunity wider
than merely criminal. 6’
One thing which should be clear is that the Fifth Amendment right of
silence in the United States Constitution is not an absolute right, and in
some circumstances may be withdrawn.
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IV. CONCLUSION
From this brief survey it is apparent that the right of silence based on
the language of the United States Constitution is a very broad “right”. In
examining whether a similar right exists in Australia. and its scope if it does
exist. a basic understanding of the concomitant right in America may be
useful.
While even the basic tenets may seem extreme to overseas observers
they illustrate the vast impact which the right of silence has. Further, some
secondary concepts such as right to counsel, non-testamentary evidence and
immunity grants might at ﬁrst be overlooked. but the American experience
has indicated that they are important adjuncts to the right of silence. Much
of the indecision and uncertainty which has plagued the criminal justice
system in the United States for the last few decades might well be avoided
here if these important areas are considered in advance by Australians and
weighed in the balance as the existence or scope of a right of silence in
Australia is debated.
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THE RIGHT TO SILENCE:
THE EXPERIENCE IN THE SUMMARY COURT
M. F. Farquhar, 0.B.E., E.D. Dip.O‘r'm.
Chairman of the Bench 0f Stipendiary Magistrates
Whether police investigation should be subject to legal controls has
long been debated. It certainly had prominence in the deliberations of the
1965 Commonwealth Law Conference held in this city. Almost without
exception. participants from the United Kingdom were of the View that
there should be some reconsideration of just what shackles should be put
on ordinary methods of investigation. And they certainly saw the right to
silence in this period as being a formidable hindrance.
Others of the speakers at this forum will look at the period of
investigation. As I understand it, my role is to set down that which, in
particular, affects the Summary Court. Both the restraints imposed on the
police and the rights conferred on the accused will affect the available
evidence in all courts alike — be it the Supreme Court or the Court of
Petty Sessions. For that reason I would move at once to the trial period.
Before doing so. perhaps I could be permitted two comments.
First. at the time he led those wishing to see this branch of the right
to silence modiﬁed, the Director of Public Prosecutions was greatly
concerned at the very low rate of conviction then obtaining in his country.
And, on that factor alone, I am sure neither his attitude nor his conviction
would be different today. But, on the information available to me. our
conviction rate at trial both in the Supreme Court and at Quarter Sessions
(1 can still call it that) is markedly different.
Here we may pause to consider an interesting decision in the Ontario
County Court. It is reported as R. v. Balsdon.’ Police on several occasions
entered a book store to execute warrants for parking convictions on the
defendant. The clerk in attendance on each occasion informed the police
ofﬁcers that the defendant was not present. Later it transpired that this
clerk was in fact the defendant. He was charged under their Criminal Code
with obstructing the course of justice.
The facts appeared not to have been in dispute. Waisberg J. said
“Were it not for the principle of ‘nemo tenemr scipsum accusare', I would
have no difficulty in finding the accused guilty as charged".2 And he then
looked at what Professor Williams had to say in ‘Criminal Law The
General Part’.3
 M. I". l-‘arquhar 99
 
He carefully examined the cases including two from Australian Courts,
and concluded:
“The principle to be gleaned from the cases is that while a third
party may commit an offence by lying on behalf of an
offender, the offender himself has no obligation to be truthful
about his own criminal conduct. The doctrines ‘nemo renetur
seipsum accusare’ — no man can be compelled to incriminate
himself — and ‘nemo tenemr prodere seipsum' — no one is
bound to betray himself — have been carefully safeguarded and
preserved".4
And on this notion that there was no legal obligation on a person to
betray himself, the accused was then acquitted.
This may well be true at Common Law but the effect of some
statutes here should be noticed. The Motor Trafﬁc Act 1909, in certain
circumstances obliges a motorist to provide information and makes it an
offence not to comply.5
The Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1912, has a similar provision.6 And,
without doubt, there are other statutes requiring persons under investigation
to answer truthfully.
But it is with the related privilege against self-incriminatiun, that is,
the right of [a defendant to remain silent at a summary trial, that I should
primarily concern myself. The broad subject matter is discussed in detail in
Glanville Williams “Proof of Guilt” at Chapter 3.
In both civil and criminal cases, a witness in the box must claim
privilege — the accused in a trial both in the Supreme Court and at Quarter
Sessions is not even required to go into the box. The statutory law which
established this position applies only to those Courts. The criminal
procedure of the Court of Petty Sessions in this respect (and in others)
differs not at all to its civil proceedings.7
This aSpect of the right to silence has had notable supporters and
critics. Of it, Jeremy Bentham declared:
“If all criminals of every class assembled and framed all rules as
they wished — would not this be the first. The privilege against
being required to testify would be their first rule for security.”8
Of the contra opinion Sir James Fitzjames Stephens approved the
right and saw it as supplying dignity and humanity at the trial. He felt that
the fact that a prisoner could not be questioned stimulated the search for
independent evidence.
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The Indian Criminal Code allows that the accused be questioned by
the Judge with the safeguard that false evidence in those circumstances
could not be the foundation of a further prosecution.9 And it is of some
interest that this Code was very nearly adopted in England.
The right to silence as obtaining in Petty Sessions is affected both by
statute and case law. Section 78 (3) of the Justices Act 1902 provides:
“(3) If he does not admit the truth of the information or
complaint then the said Justice or Justices shall proceed to hear
the prosecutor or complainant and the witnesses whom he
examines and such other evidence as he adduces in support of
the information or complaint and to hear the defendant and the
witnesses whom he examines and such other evidence as he
adduces in his defence.”
Section 79 reads:
“The practice upon the hearing of any information or complaint
shall, in respect of the examination and cross—examination of
witnesses and the right of addressing the Justice or Justices upon
the case in reply or otherwise, be as nearly as possible in
accordance with that of the Supreme Court upon the trial of an
issue of fact in an action at law.”
Then the Vagrancy Act 1902 created a special procedure for the trial
of persons charged with “vagrancy”. Section 4 (1) (3) reads:
“Whosoever — having no visible lawful means of support, or
insufﬁcient lawful means, does not, on being required by or
summoned to appear or brought before a justice in pursuance of
the provisions of this Act, give a good account of his means of
support to the satisfaction of the justice — shall on conviction
Thus it was a condition precedent of conviction that the defendant
should fail to give a good account of his means of support to the
satisfaction of the Justice. Upon prima facie proof of the absence of lawful
means of support, the onus fell upon the defendant to prove the existence
of such means. This statute was repealed in 1970 by the Summary Offences
Act. There is some change in the wording but the proviso to Section 22
still insists:
“(2) It is a sufficient defence to a prosecutor for an offence
under subsection one of this section if the defendant satisfies
the court that he has sufficient lawful means of support.”
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A not dissimilar situation arose under section 27 of the Police
Offences Act 1901—1961-, In part the section reads:
“. .. which thing may be reasonably suspected of being stolen or
unlawfully obtained, does not give an account to the satisfaction
of such Justice how he came by the same
The section was obviously passed to overcome difficulties of strictly
proving possession of stolen goods. It was not an essential ingredient to
establish that the goods were in fact stolen. A reasonable suspicion having
been established the onus shifted and it became necessary for the person
found in possession of these goods to give an account to the satisfaction of
the Justice how he came by the same.
This provision has also been repealed and re-enacted in somewhat
similar terms by Section 40 of the Summary Offences Act. A proviso to
this section reads:
“(2) It is a sufﬁcient defence to a prosecution for an offence
under subsection one of this section if the defendant satisﬁes
the court that he had no reasonable grounds for suspecting that
the thing referred to in the charge was stolen or otherwise
unlawfully obtained.”
The defendant cannot escape conviction if he chooses to remain silent
after the prosecution has established prima facie the elements required by
subsection one either of section 22 , “vagrancy” — or of Section 40 —
“goods in custody.”
Perhaps, too, I should tangentially refer to the notion of it not being
required by Statute to prove exceptions in a summary trial.l0 Standing
silent would avail the defendant nothing. And in certain ways
Commonwealth Acts further reduce the position of the defendant when the
prosecution, often by the use of averments, establish a pn'ma facie case.
Both the Income Tax Assessment Act, ” and the Electoral Act,12 in
certain circumstances require that a conviction be recorded unless the
defendant establishes proof to the contrary.
1 turn now to the cases. It will emerge that in both civil and criminal
trials in the summary court the procedures are identical as we noticed
above. The difference lies only in the standard of proof.
ln Wilson v. Buttery '3 Napier J. (as he then was) in delivering the
judgment of the Full Court, said:
“It is therefore necessary to consider whether the evidence
before the justices disclosed what is referred to as a ‘prima facie’
case. Of course, the charge was one of an offence. and when the
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evidence came to be ﬁnally considered it was necessary that it
should be such as enabled the Court to come to a conclusion,
free from any reasonable doubt. But. for the purpose of raising
a prima facie case and thereby throwing upon the defendant the
onus of making an answer, or giving an explanation for facts
which he may be presumed to know, we cannot ﬁnd that there
is any distinction between civil and criminal cases.”14
In the following paragraph their Honours say:
“When this stage has passed, and the defendant has been called
upon for his explanation or answer, and no evidence has been
forthcoming, the Court or jury is entitled to take into
consideration the probable means of knowledge, on either side.
If the truth is not easily ascertainable by the prosecution, but is
probably well known to the defendant, then the fact that no
explanation or answer is forthcoming, as might be expected if
the truth were consistent with innocence, is a matter which the
court or jury may properly consider. They have, then, to say
whether in this state of the evidence they have any reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the accused. if they have they must
acquit.”15
I have referred to the judgment in Wilson v. Buttery in some detail as
it attracted the concentrated attention of the High Court when they came
to deliver judgment in May v. 0’Sullivan '6. The High Court had this to
say of the decision in Wilson v. Buttery as noticed above:
“If the words italicized above were omitted, the passages quoted
would seem to be unexceptionable and to contain an accurate
statement of the law . . .. It is not really correct to say that the
‘raising of a prima facie case’ throws upon the defendant ‘the
onus of making an answer.”17
The High Court then concluded:
“When, at the close of the case for the prosecution, a
submission is made that there is no case to answer, the question
to be decided is not whether on the evidence the defendant
ought to be convicted, but whether on the evidence as it stands
he could lawfully be convicted. This is really a question of law.
Unless there is some special statutory provision on the subject, a
ruling that there is a case to answer has no effect whatever on
the onus of proof, which rests on the prosecution from
beginning to end. After the prosecution has adduced evidence
sufﬁcient to support proof of the issue, the defendant may or
may not call evidence. Whether he does or not, the question to
be decided in the end by the tribunal is whether, on the whole
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of the evidence before it, it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt
that the defendant is guilty. This is a question of fact. In
deciding this question it may in some cases be legitimate, as is
pointed out in Wilson v. Buttery (3) for it to take into account
the fact that the defendant has not given evidence as a
consideration making the inference of guilt from the evidence
for the prosecution less unsafe than it might otherwise possibly
appear: cf. Morgan v. Babcuck & Wilcox, per lsaacs J. (1). But
to say this is a very different thing from saying that the onus of
proof shifts. A magistrate who has decided that there is a use
to answer may quite consistently, if no evidence is called for the
defendant, refuse to convict on the evidence for the prosecution.
The prosecution may have made a prima facie case, but it does
not follow that in the absence of a satisfactory answer the
defendant should be convicted.”18
ln proceedings in a court of petty sessions by a lessor for recovery of
possession of prescribed premises, there is no rule which compels a lessee to
elect at the close of the lessor’s case whether or not he will go into
evidence before submitting that there is no evidence to support the lessor’s
case. This was the gravamen of what was decided by the Supreme Court in
Tare v. Johnson.l9
Street C. J., in delivering the judgment of that court had this to say:
96139—8
“In our opinion, there is no rule, such as that which it was
suggested applies in the present case, which compels a defendant
to elect at the close of the informant’s case whether or not he
will go into evidence before submitting that there is no evidence
to support the informant’s case. This has not been the practice
of magistrates’ courts in the past. and every rule of convenience
appears to be against introducing it now. If, at the close of the
informant’s case in proceedings of a civil nature, such as those
under the Landlord and Tenant Act, the defendant thinks that
there is no evidence of one or more of the elements necessary
to be proved by the informant before an order can be made in
his favour, there is no reason why he should not ask the
magistrate to rule that there is no such evidence and to dismiss
the information on that ground, without thereby incurring the
penalty of being precluded from going into evidence if the
magistrate should rule against his submission of law. Any other
question of law may be raised in the same manner. We think,
however, that the phrase no case to answer is not one suitable
for use, and the defendant should take each point of law
explicitly and submit it for the magistrate’s consideration. If he
fails, he may then go into evidence. If on the other hand, a
defendant submits at the close of the informant’s case that,
although there is some evidence of all the necessary elements
required to be proved before the order sought can be made.
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such evidence is so weak or so unsatisfactory that it should not
be accepted. then’ this is an argument on an issue of fact, and a
defendant should not be allowed to argue such a question of
fact and. if defeated. then claim to be entitled to call evidence.
Questions of fact should be decided only after all the evidence
has been given. It is only questions of law which may be raised
and argued at the close of the informant’s case without the
defendant being subjected to the necessity of electing whether or
not he will go into evidence”.20
Two other authorities adopting this same reasoning were CIyne v.
Macdonald 2‘ and Permewan v. Ippolito.22
What may be sufficient to establish a prima facie case under a ground
set out in Section 62 (5) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1948 was
considered by Asprey J. in Curry v. Ping. 23 The particulars given were that
the lessee resided in and had available for his occupation a dwelling house
in Rose Bay. The only evidence led to establish residence was (a) that the
notice to quit had been served on the defendant at the particular address
and (b) that the defendant had on two occasions been observed to enter
the premises during the early evening, for the lights to be extinguished still
later and the defendant not to leave the premises. The magistrate would as
well have had to draw the inference that the premises were reasonably
suitable alternative accommodation.
His Honour had this to say:
“It stands to reason that that branch of S.62(5)(u) of the
Landlord and Tenant (Amendment) Act which speaks of the
lessee having ‘reasonably suitable alternative accommodation’
must be on a great many occasions very difﬁcult of proof on
the part of a lessor for the reason that the factual matters
necessary to establish that situation would, far more often than
not, be only within the knowledge of the lessee.”
He went on to look at a number of earlier cases touching on this
issue, and, in particular what was said in Hampton Court v. Crooks 24. By
that decision it was established that a party was not relieved of the
necessity of offering some evidence in discharge of the burden lying on him
by the fact that the material circumstances are peculiarly within the
knowledge of his opponent. But it was also said in that same decision that,
in such circumstances, slight evidence may be enough to discharge the
burden.
In the event Collins J. was satisfied that the evidence already related
was sufficient to discharge the burden of the lessor.
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To further illustrate both the procedure available at the end of the
informant’s case in a summary trial and that that procedure obtains in both
civil and criminal proceedings perhaps I might now finally turn to several
cases requiring the criminal standard of proof.
in Duthie v. Brebner 25 Mayo J. was confronted with an appeal from
conviction for giving information relating to betting odds on intended horse
races. After the case the prosecution had concluded the defendant chose
not to give evidence. Likewise earlier he had declined to answer questions
as to his conduct put by Detective Culley.
His Honour had this to say:
“... the failure or refusal of a person to respond to questions,
his silence may provide a logical basis for inference, but that is
not so from the mere fact that no answer is given, taken alone.
An inference hostile to the person can only be safely made
when no other explanation is equally consistent with the
omission to answer interrogation. Usually there is some other
possible explanation. But in some instances. the circumstances
are such that in ordinary experience a dissent or disclaimer
would be forthcoming if the question or communication required
it. ‘When there has been no attempt on the part of the defence
to answer or explain the circumstances of incrimination,
disclosed by the evidence for the prosecution’ a dismissal of the
complaint would be ‘a departure from the recognized and
necessary practice of our courts in relation to the hearing of
circumstantial evidence’: per Napier C]. in 0’Sullivan v.
Srubbs. ” 26
Still later on the same page he went on to say:
“Turning to the oft-quoted May v. O’SuIIivan (10), I do not
understand the principle stated therein to mean that some
circumstances. that constitute an element in a charge. proof of
which prima facie is established indirectly by the aid of
statutory authority, can not be treated as sufficiently beyond
reasonable doubt in the absence of any accepted denial or of
any persuasive inference to the contrary. If that were the value
of such prima facie proof it would be singularly futile. If there
be nothing to introduce reasonable doubt the fact so introduced
may be given the requisite evidentiary status. lndeed prima facie
proof may stand alone in the absence of contradiction or
contrary reasonable possibilities to be inferred. What is the use
of prima facie proof if incapable of such reliance without
corroboration?" 27
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and he added:
“ . . .Notwithstanding that. however. it may be quite proper
to give some weight where the circumstances permit to the
failure of the accused to give evidence. An inference of guilt
from the evidence is ‘less unsafe’ where that is the position.”23
Then in Lenzi v. Millerfgin a joint judgment. Napier C. J. and Travers
J. said:
“We agree with the Magistrate that his ruling, that there was a
case for the defendant to answer, left it open to the defendant
to contend that the fact had not been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, but it seems to us that a Judge or Magistrate,
who has to answer a question like that, is expected to use his
common sense, and to act upon the common sense principle
enunciated by Lord Mansﬁeld in Blatch v. Archer (1774) l
Cowp. 63 and applied in R. v. Burden (1820) 4 B & Aid. 95 at
pp. 161-162, namely, ‘the maxim that all evidence is to be
weighed according to the proof, which it was in the power of
one side to have produced, and in the power of the other to
have contradicted.”’3°
On an order to review, the Full Court in Queensland, in Fawkes v.
Schadwell“ , in separate judgments, reiterated that a magistrate was bound
to rule upon the question whether there was a case for the applicant to
answer and that he should not before deciding that have called upon the
defendant to elect.
And at page 23 of that decision Lucas J. referred to the remarks
made by Philp J. in Cumming v. Cumming 32. That was a case however,
under the Maintenance Act of 1949 (Queensland).
In its wake a_ maintenance case may result in the unsuccessful
defendant being deprived of his liberty. And, therefore, in accordance with
the principles enunciated by the High Court in Briginshaw v. Bn'ginshaw33
something more than, at any event, that proof upon a mere balance or
probability is required.
Philp 1., in Cumming v. Cumming, said this:
“I think a Magistrate should be very slow to determine the
question of sufﬁciency of evidence upon the application of
counsel for the defendant at the end of the complainant’s case.”
“There is no law which obliges him to make the determination
at that stage. Except in the very clearest cases it is wiser for
him to hear the evidence (if any) adduced by the defendant
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before making his ﬁnal determination. Of'course, if counsel for
the defence intimates that he will call no evidence the question
of sufﬁciency of evidence falls for immediate determination.”34
CONCLUSIONS
There are some conclusions. as to summary trials, that can now be
reached. Patently, in such a hearing. there is provision neither for the
accused to make a statement from the dock nor to make any form of
unsworn statement.
It is true that. from time to time. particular cases will arise and
attract what might be called the second ‘leg’ of the principle enunciated in
May v. O’Sullivan, that is to say, that, having held there was evidence on
which a court could convict nonetheless it may not convict despite the
absence of any answer from the defendant. Nonetheless, in most
circumstances, a failure to answer a case held to be established prima facie,
will result in a conviction.
In both civil and criminal trials in Petty Sessions the procedures are
alike. It is the standard of proof that differs. On this it is interesting to
recall what fell from Rich J. in Briginshaw v. Briginshaw:
“In a serious matter like a charge of adultery the satisfaction of
a just and prudent mind cannot be produced by slender and
exiguous proofs or circumstances pointing with a wavering finger
to an affirmative conclusion. The nature of the allegation
requires as a matter of common sense and worldly wisdom the
careful weighing of testimony, the close examination of facts
proved as a basis of inference and a comfortable satisfaction that
the tribunal has reached both a correct and just conclusion. But
to say this is not to lay it down as a matter of law that such
complete and absolute certainty must be reached as is ordinarily
described in a criminal charge as ‘satisfaction beyond reasonable
doubt'.”35
We have noticed also that when occasion seems to demand it,
Legislatures have attached no weight to the notion of the right to silence in
a summary trial.
Notwithstanding much has been said and written (and in this I do not
exclude these present proceedings) concerning the right to silence, after
detached and careful examination you may well think that the procedure in
our courts has tnuch to commend it. No man may stand secure behind the
thicket of the dockbars launching insinuation and innuendo at those who
testify against him. He is entitled to have a case proved against him before
he is required to say a word in his defence but then he remains silent at
his peril. You may think this to be an eminently fair procedure. Certainly
it has served us well for almost one and a half centuries.
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R. V. Bulsdon (1968) 2 Can. Cr. Cas 164.
lhid. p.l67
Williams. Criminal Law — The General Part. 2nd ed. Stevens. Lond.. 1961. p.
417.
“It would accord better with the spirit of the law to hold that nothing said by
the accused in answer to the charge is regarded as public mischief. obstructing
police or delaying justice."
R. v. Balsdon. supra. p.169.
Motor Traffic Act (N.S.W.) (1909) 555(1) and (3). 7 (a), 8.
Coal Mines Regulation Act (N.S.W.) (1912) 55.270), 3]. 35. 36(1). (2) and (3),
36A. 42(3). 59, 798(2).
Vide ss.78(3) and 79 Justices Act (N.S.W.) (1902)
—s.78(3): “If [the defendant] does not admit the truth of the information or
complaint then the said Justice or Justices shall proceed to hear the prosecutor
or complainant and the witnesses whom he examines and such other evidence as
he adduces in support of the information or complaint and to hear the
defendant and the witnesses he examines and such other evidence as he adduces
in his defence”.
—s.79: “The practice upon the hearing of any information or complaint shall, in
respect of the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and the right of
addressing the Justice or Justices upon the case in reply or otherwise, be as
nearly as possible in accordance with that of the Supreme Court upon the trial
of an issue of fact in an action at law”.
Bentham. J. Works Vol. VII. p.444.
—s.342 Indian Criminal Procedure Code (1898)
(1) “For the purpose of enabling the accused to explain any circumstances
appearing in the evidence against him, the Court may, at any stage of any
inquiry or trial. without previously warning the accused, put such question
to him as the-Court considers necessary. and shall, for the purpose
aforesaid, question him generally on the case after the witnesses for the
'prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his own
defence. '
(2) The accused shall not render himself liable to punishment for refusal to
answer such questions, or by giving false answers to them; but the Court
and the jury (if any) may draw such inference from such refusal or answers
as it thinks just.
(3) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such
inquiry or trial. and put in evidence for or against him in any other
inquiry into. or trial for. any other offence which such answers may tend
to show he has committed.
(4) No oath shall be administered to the accused when he is examined under
subsection (1),
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10. $.145A(2) Justices Act (N.S.W.) (1902).
“Any exemption. exception. proviso. excuse or qualification, whether it does or
not accompany in the mme \cction the description of the offence in the Act,
order. by-law. regulation. or other document creating the offence, may be proved
by the defendant. but need not be speciﬁed or negatived in the information or
complaint, and if so specified or negatived, no proof in respect of the matter so
specified or negatived shall be required on the part of the informant or
complainant.“
11. Income Tax and Social Serrices Contribution Assessment Act (Commonwealth)
(1936—1950) 5.243.
12. Commonwealth Electoral Act (1918) 5.215.
13. Wilson v. Buttery (1926) S.A.S.R. 150.
14. lbid. pp.153~154.
15. lbid. p.154.
16. May v. O'Sullt'ran (1955) 92 C.L.R. 654.
17. lbid, p.658.
18. lbid. pp.658—659.
19. Tate v. Johnson (1953) S3 S.R. (N.S.W.) 492.
20. lbid. p.495.
21. Clyne v. Macdonald (1965) N.S.W.R. 161.
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“THE RIGHT TO SILENCE"
Mr Justice J. H. .llcClemens:
This problem of the voluntary statement, the problem of the right of
an accused person to give evidence not on oath,and not subject to
cross-examination. and the cognate problem of the prohibition against a
judge commenting on the fact that an accused person has failed to give
evidence on oath in the witness box is, I am afraid. one that is always
clouded with a certain amount of emotion. I think it might be proper at
the outset to ask oneself a very important question — one that we are apt
to balk at. which I certainly baulked at in my own paper. and which is
probably basically a philosophical one. We have all looked at this too much
from a legal point of view as the right of the individual as against the right
of the State or as against the varying rights of the individuals who comprise
the State. because every individual has the right not to be interfered with,
not to be hit on the head with a bottle, not to be shot by a gunman, not
to be robbed. These are basic rights in the conduct of civilized life. On the
other hand. one of the other basic rights has got to be balanced against
this, and that is the doctrine of the reasonable doubt. Somehow one has
got to get a balance between the two. In Mr Farquhar’s paper you will see
a reference to certain cases in which by statute the onus is shifted from the
prosecution to the accused person. Although in one way it takes away the
right of silence if a man found in possession of cannabis or marijuana has
under the Poisons Act to satisfy the court that his possession of it is
lawful, the court has got to prove the possession, and in my opinion that
does not detract in any way that is material from the right of a human
being to silence (if such a right exists — which I sometimes gravely doubt).
The application of the right is of course a different matter. The right
of silence can only be looked at as a basic human right which has to be
'weighed in the light of the existence of the rights of other people. Take a
case like R. v. Ryan,l where a man was night attendant at a service station
one night when a young man arrived with a revolver. held him up, and in a
struggle over the money the service station attendant was shot. Well, I dare
say the man who was shot couldn't assert very effectively before the trial
judge and jury that he had been deprived of the greatest of his human
rights, and the protection of the greatest of human rights is one of the
things we have to look at in weighing up the reality of this right to silence.
The interesting thing about the papers we have here is that depending
on the function one fulﬁls one has a different approach to the right to
silence. The ordinary practising barrister thinks that there are certain things
de divino institutione: the right of the man not to answer questions, the
right of an accused to make a statement from the dock making all sorts of
allegations on which he can not be crossexamined. and the right that if he
doesn’t give evidence there will be no comment on his failure to do so. The
average prosecutor will take a different view. The average policeman will
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take a different view again. And I imagine the average juryman, no matter
how much we lawyers talk about it. does apply a rough and ready rule in
many cases , why didn’t this fellow go into the witness box and give
evidence. and why didn’t he talk to the police when he was asked. We have
here in the papers quite a number of different approaches. The approaches
of the judges are very different from the approaches of Mr Pumell, the
Public Defender. Mr Wallace, the Crown Prosecutor, Mr St John,
representing Civil Liberties, and Detective Inspector Clyne who is putting
the police point of view. And you have then got four views from judicial
officers in the persons of Mr Justice Neasey, Judge Loveday, Mr Farquhar
and myself. all of which in some way put different points of view on this
very important and signiﬁcant topic.
Now in my own paper 1 have sought very briefly to analyse the
English proposals, and you will see that I have set out some of the
provisions of the English Draft Act. Evidence can be given that a person
failed to mention any matter relied on in his defence, and if that was a
fact that in the circumstances existing at the time he could reasonably have
been expected to mention, then the court or jury, in determining whether
he is guilty of the offence, is at liberty to draw inferences from his failure
to answer. You will observe also the suggested abolition of the caution in
England. and i think that that, for reasons which appear in my paper,
represents something that is wise. for if (not going nearly so far as the
English suggestion) you take the view that the failure to answer is
something that could be considered by the jury in weighing up the
explanation, then the existence of the caution as laid down by the Court of
Criminal Appeal in Vandine’s casczwould merely be a trap. Then you will
see the references to what happens if there is any oppressive treatment. One
of the interesting things is the drafting of section 5 — the calling on the
accused to give evidence, the court being required to tell the accused that
he will be called upon to give evidence, and of course if he doesn’t the
court, in determining whether he is guilty of the offence or not, may draw
such inferences as they see fit.
I have expressed the view here that we ought to take a middle course
compared with that adopted in England. If the argument against change is
an argument based on abuses, then the answer is that it is for us as a
democracy to remove those abuses. lf with a highly disciplined centralized
police force such as we have in Australia (unlike the county, borough, and
city police forces in England) we can’t maintain proper discipline and
proper standards, then it is a poor lookout for all of us. It is scarcely the
mark of innocence for a man to refuse to answer questions. He should not
be compelled to answer, but if he fails to answer his failure should be
something for the jury to weigh up. not as making any difference to the
onus of proof, but for the purpose of determining whether his explanation
is the true one.
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l have one other observation. I have doubts as to whether the
statement from the dock should be abolished. but if it is not abolished I
think the judge should have a right to comment as he now has a right to
comment under 5.407(2) of the Crimes Act. If two people are tried
together and one makes a statement. the other gives evidence, the judge has
a right to comment. I have suggested an adaptation of the civil approach
enunciated by Mr Justice Menzies in Jones v. Dunkel3 as the proper
approach, so that failing to give evidence can be made the subject of a
comment but the comment should be a comment within limited bounds.
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Mr Justice F. M. Neasey:
I concentrated in my paper on what seems to me to be far and away
the most radical proposal by the English Committee and that seems to be
the one that relates to the suspect’s rights to silence during a police
interrogation. When the Justice Committee in England a year or two ago
brought out a proposal that interrogation should take place in a formal way
before a magistrate it seemed to me then that one of the main reasons for
objecting to that was that it would allow too much of an incursion into
the subject's right not to be questioned and not to be pushed into
perhaps foolish or contradictory or stupid answers by a degree of
compulsion to answer questions and to speak. But the thought that you
ought to give this power to question suspects and put them under a
measure of compulsion to speak in privacy behind closed doors fills me
with what I think I can only describe as a certain amount of horror. May
I. in saying that, also say that I, along with the judiciary as a whole and
the community generally, have a very high regard for the police in general,
but I would not willingly entrust this sort of power over individuals to any
group of persons no matter how generally honourable they may be. There
are all sorts of reasons for that view and they are dealt with in detail in
the papers that are before you. They all have to do with how far it ought
to be permissible to encroach upon a subject’s liberty.
In thinking about that question it is not a bad idea to consider how
far we go already. I suggest it is a completely false idea to think that the
hands of the police are tied behind their backs in interrogating subjects
under our present law. We allow the police to go very much further than
the US. Supreme Court is prepared to go under the Miranda and Escobedo
and other rulings. The position in fact of the minority in the Supreme
Court seems to me in those cases to be like our own. In Miranda’s case the
late Mr Justice Harlan said in effect that the question up to this time (he
was speaking as of the date of that case) was not whether any pressure can
be lawfully put upon the suspect during interrogation but how much
pressure can be put upon the suspect. If that is thought to be an
overstatement of what our own rules allow, consider the reality of our
present position. Might I suggest that you look for example at the article
by then Inspector Crowley on the interrogation of suspects which is
reprinted in the Chappell and Wilson’s “The Australian Criminal Justice
System" apparently from the Australian Police Journal of April I969. In
that article the author sets out what seems to me is the reality of what our
law allows in practice in the interrogation of suspects. In effect he says
that to the best and the most skilled interrogator interrogation is a contest
which he is determined to win, and the author sets out a long list of rules
as to the best ways for winning that contest. Now it would I think not be
desirable to quote in detail any of those rules because it would perhaps
inevitably be thought that I was denigrating the content of that article,
whereas that is not so at all. Because it seems to me that he is merely
setting out the reality of what may lawfully be done and, one suspects,
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usually is done in the approach to an interrogation and in the carrying of it
out. An authority as well respected as Lord McDermott has said that
deception as a method of detection is as old a method as the constable in
plain clothes and he says, “..... regrettable though the fact may be the
day has not yet come when it will be safe to say that law and order could
always be enforced and the public safety protected without occasional
resort to it”: The People v. O’Brien“. 1 would respectfully agree with that.
But this, in my submission, is how our rules operate in practice.
In very many cases, an interrogation, must be, having regard to human
nature; a contest in which the good interrogator is determined to win by
means which the law allows, and furthermore one which he is conﬁdent in
a majority of cases he can win by lawful means. I would submit that the
line at the present time between what is permissible and what is not in this
area of interrogation is a very delicate line indeed. And you ought not to
interfere with it to the detriment of the subject’s liberty without the very
gravest consideration and caution. I submit that there is a world of
difference between an ofﬁcial attitude which says in effect you may not
apply overt pressure on a suspect to talk and one which says. as the
English Committee advocates in effect, you are encouraged to apply verbal
pressure provided it is not oppressive. You only have to read some of the
American publications to realise that there are hundreds of ways of
applying psychological and verbal pressure without harming a hair of
anyone's head. I think we ought not overlook, also, the point that a police
ofﬁcer who is faced with a suspect who will not talk in a situation in'
which the law says he ought to talk (which is the proposal) may feel a
much greater sense of frustration than one who under the present system is
faced with such a suspect. At the present time he knows that the ofﬁcial
attitude of the law and the courts and possibly even more important the
police forces is that the suspect should be put under no pressure at all to
talk if he does not wish to do so.
I would suggest also that if this proposal of the English Committee
were put into practice its operation in practice may well be quite different
from what the Committee expects. I would hazard a guess that the
suggested changes would be very unlikely to persuade the clever hardened
criminal to confess. He would instead I think spend some of his energies at
least in inventing excuses why it was reasonable for him to remain silent.
and .then a substantial portion of the trial may be diverted in that way to
canvassing those reasons, whether they are reasonable and so forth. This is a
point which the Committee of the Bar Council in Great Britain made in
opposing this suggestion. At the other end of the scale from the hardened
criminal, the proposed rule, I suggest, would play havoc with the
inarticulate, the frightened, the man with a record, who did not perhaps
commit this particular crime. Or, if you like, the habitual liar who did not
in fact commit this crime of which he is suspected, or perhaps a person
who maybe, again with a record, committed some lesser offence connected
with a particular crime. The changes suggested by the Committee might well
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convict more who are in fact guilty, but as Lord Devlin said, “Convictions
can be bought at too ‘high a price". In any event I suggest that these
particular changes would go} a long way towards destroying the public
regard for criminal law ~ a most important aspect.
As to the other ~proposals by the Committee, in relation to the
unsworn statement I very strongly support its abolition, but the majority of
the profession in Australia I think at the present time would oppose it. We
recently in our State put up some twenty odd proposals to reform the
Criminal Code, this was one of them. but it was soundly rejected by the
Government without any hesitation at all even though I think nearly all
the others were accepted. In New Zealand they have abolished the unsworn
statement. We had quite a deal of communication with them and all those
people we were in contact with from the Bar Council and people on the
Crown side and on all sides that we could contact said that there was no
dissatisfaction there with the way it had worked.
As to the suggestion that an accused person at the trial should be
called upon to give evidence. I oppose that entirely. I think that there
should be no interference with the present right of a person not to give
evidence if he doesn’t wish to. The only sanction ought to be that which
the refusal to give evidence in itself may carry with it. That is to say that
the jury may draw an inference against the accused.
As to comment on failure to give evidence, it seems to me that the
present English position is the one which ought to be preferred and
continued, which is, as I understand it, that the judge may comment but
the prosecution may not. The judge’s comment must be fair. If it is not a
fair comment a conviction may be set aside on the grounds of its
unfairness.
llb Judge R. l-'. Loved-4y
Judge R. F. Lurcdaji'.‘
I attempted to collect and consider the main arguments for and against
the right. In doing so. of course. I tried to cover the whole field. whereas
many of the other writers merely contented themselves with covering small
portions of it. In preparing the paper, I used the sources that were available
to me. the main ones being Wigmore (the McNaughton edition 1960) and
American writings. mainly those referred to in Wigmore, the Miranda and
Escobedo cases both of which contain lengthy judgments (I think the
Miranda case is well over 100 pages in the US. Supreme Court Reports)
and the book Proof of Guilt by Professor Glanville Williams. written I think
about 1950. Professor Williams was also of course a member of the English
Criminal Law Revision Committee which prepared the 11th Report. I was
very much indebted to Mr Justice Neasey for the paper which he delivered
at the 15th Law Convention in Brisbane in July 1969 and the discussion
reported thereon. I think it is 43 Australian Law Journal. I had available to
me the llth Report of the English Criminal Law Revision Committee,
which has of course sparked off most of this current controversy. and the
draft bill that was prepared by that Committee. I had also the preliminary
memo by the Committee of Justice prepared in November. 1972, and also
the proceedings of the Annual Conference of Justice in England on 10th
February, 1973, when there was a great deal of discussion upon this
particular subject. I had also the memo on the llth Report prepared by
the Criminal Bar Association of England and adopted by the General
Council of the Bar of England and Wales in January, 1973. which contained
a great deal of discussion and criticism of the report of the 11th
Committee. I read various articles on the report in recent publications,
particularly in the Criminal Law Review, and of course the debate in the
House of Lords which took place in February. 1973, on this particular
Report. Added to all that. I very tentatively advanced some arguments of
my own. For example. I added some theories which are not novel but
which I believe are justified by psychologists and by some writers, such as
that fettering too closely an investigation by a police officer causes
frustration which evokes either apathy or agression and that is the theory
which is contained in the paper.
I appreciate. as I say in my conclusion, that my support for the
Criminal Law Revision Committee’s recommendation will subject me to
criticism by those who claim to be supporting the liberty of the subject. 1
do hope, however, that my paper will serve as a basis for rational and
logical discussion rather than emotional outbursts about treasured heritages
and living in the past, which I think have to justify themselves by the
needs of present society.
ll. l9. Purncll ll7
Mr Howard H. F. Parnell, QC, LLB:
At the time I completed my paper I had no idea of what view my
fellow Speakers might take as to the retention or the abolition of the right
to silence. Although fortiﬁed by the views expressed in England I felt that
on this occasion I might be found to be pr0pounding views which would be
supported perhaps by nobody other than my good friend Bob St John
However, having seen the papers I ﬁnd this not to be the case. His Honour
Judge Loveday was apologizing for his paper to a degree, but I thought it
was excellent, and I did note that he concluded his remarks by talking
about the fact that he has just referred to, namely, that perhaps those who
are supporters of the liberty of the subject might be opposing him. I would
like to feel that I am a supporter of the liberty of the subject but I also
like to feel that it is prOper to hasten slowly when it comes to changing
something which has stood the test of time.
One immediately asks oneself on this occasion when one is asked to
speak in these circumstances as to why all the clamour about abolishing the
right to silence and thus setting in train a number of changes to the
criminal law which would be of a very far reaching kind. It is obvious to
all of you I am sure, that the motivating force behind the question of
change was in fact the English Criminal Law Revision Committee Report
and, as I see it, the basic premise of that report was “too many criminals
are getting off". In my paper I have sought to demonstrate that whatever
the Criminal law Revision Committee may think about that situation, a
great many eminent lawyers in England and elsewhere do not believe that
too many criminals are getting off. It might be said that my approach is
somewhat simplistic because I have stuck to that line throughout my paper.
I would agree that a great deal of useful material can be found on this
subject in the House of Lords and you will note that I have made quite
some use of that material. Particularly have I relied on what Lord Justice
Salmon has said. That speech in fact was his maiden speech in the House
of Lords and I have relied to a great degree on what he has said because
he was a practising lawyer, a practising Judge, and a man of very great
experience.
As a citizen I am tired of saying I agree that there is too much
crime. As a practitioner in the criminal law that is perfectly obvious to me.
However. it is also painfully obvious that the detection rate for some kinds
of crime is painfully low. This means that we need better equipped police,
better organization, so that offenders will be detected. As I see it, those
who are detected and charged with committing crimes in this State
punishable on indictment are either pleading guilty or being found guilty in
almost all cases You will note that I quote some statistics which in my
respectful submission to you are unanswerable. At Sydney Quarter Sessions,
1972 884% of all accused pleaded guilty. Of the remaining 11.6% who
went to trial 62% were convicted. This means only 4.46% of all people
charged with indictable crime went free. I have conceded in the paper that
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my experience would suggest that perhaps in the country the rate of
acquittal may be a little higher, but not very much higher. Of course those
ﬁgures I quote relate to persons charged, and not numbers of charges. Some
of these people of course will have been charged with a large number of
crimes and would have pleaded guilty to multiple charges. The question I
pose is “What is wrong with the system that produces that sort of a
result?” In my submission there is nothing wrong with it.
Lord Salmon told the House of Lords in the debate that I have
already mentioned that in his view there is no doubt that the vast majority
of those acquitted in England are proved not guilty. I note with some
satisfaction that His Honour Mr Justice Neasey in his paper (and he has
made a very distinguished contribution to the discussion with regard to
various aspects of the criminal law and possible change) said this:
“that the Criminal Law Revision Committee appears to have
ignored the substantial body of sociological research which bears
on the common reactions of persons in inferiority situations and
has given little or no attention to two very important issues.
The dignity of the individual subjected to investigatory process
and public regard for the administration of criminal law.”
I would respectfully adopt what His Honour has said.
Whilst others have commended the system whereby interviews are
recorded '(and Det. Insp. Clyne makes mention of that) I am far from
satisﬁed that it is not the subject of abuse on some occasions. I have
suggested that by its use (which involves the very 'process of putting
prepared questions — and I have no doubt that they are prepared at some
length in many cases) there is already a sort of compulsion on people to
talk. The courts have approved the system, but any suggestion of
compulsion on a suspect that talks is abhorrent to me. Such a situation
could lead to all kinds of statements which are inaccurate and confused and
would be meat and drink for the prosecution, and in this State now we
rely heavily on the records of interview. Again I would like to adopt
something that His Honour Mr Justice Neasey said in his paper and it was
this:
“putting the suspect under a measure of compulsion to talk
when questioned would open up a huge ﬁeld for confused,
inaccurate, contradictory or frightened answers and statements
and subsequent use thereof by the prosecution.”
The list of adjectives could be extended. Of course this sometimes
happens now, notwithstanding the reminder of the right to silence, but
there is no need for the system to try to make it the rule rather than
the exception. I referred a moment ago to what Bill Clyne had said, and
there would be no person in the N.S.W. Police Force who in my humble
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opinion would have set a finer example of thorough painstaking and
successful investigation. However. it is not without some significance that
Bill says in his paper. and he stresses this. the necessity for the proper
psychological approach. Policemen are great practical psychologists and they
have an impressive armoury of techniques at their command. It is exactly
because of this that l have stressed in my paper. as did Lord Reid in the
House of Lords. that you must bear in mind that an innocent person is
often stupid. he is often slow. he is often overawed and is generally
nervous. The result is that he must have a fair deal.
If we start thinking again from the beginning we must take as our
basic test: Is this giving that kind of man a fair deal? There is enough
subtlety under the existing system without giving police and the courts
generally powers which would virtually force a person to speak. I don’t
agree with any of those speakers who say that a criminal trial is loaded in
favour of the accused person. I would submit to you that the results
suggest otherwise. Nor do I accept that our existing system, whilst it may
not. be perfect, should give way to pressures for changes based on false
premises. l have no doubt that the changes that have been suggested would
cause grave injustice.
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Detective Inspector W. G. Clyrre:
The Eleventh Report refers to the additional powers which should be
given to the police. The real beneﬁt that police could derive from these
powers is to bring that clear-up rate up to a much higher ﬁgure — not so
much what goes on in the courts but what goes on in the actual field of
investigation on the practical side of police work — that is where we are
going to get some advantage and that is where the community is going to
beneﬁt from any change that comes into effect. The llth Report from
England is one of the best ﬁllips that we have had. if something of this
nature were adopted in this State we would have a chance of getting
somewhere and getting some good result for the community. '
The Lord Chancellor made some very good comments pointing out
that the obsolete law in relation to criminal evidence over there has a
dominating inﬂuence on the high crime rate which is troubling that country
at the present time. They are not alone — we have our crime rate here
also. it has been mentioned in some of the papers, I think Mr Howard
Pumell mentioned the various causes of crime and i don’t want to go into
too much detail on this with the limited time. He refers to the population
trend increasing, the public apathy, the media. and he refers to the
efﬁciency of the N.S.W. Police Force. Now you can take it from me that
the police force of New South Wales is very well led. they are very
dedicated men who belong to it, and they are doing a good job for the
community. We know that there are some limitations. We have problems
with recruiting. We make the best of the material that we have available to
us and I think we are doing pretty well there. We have excellent in-service
training. We have a Detectives’ course which would be second to none in
the world and is regarded in other States as being outstanding.
The question of records of interview has been mentioned and this, I
say. and my colleagues say. is the real answer to the problem of
safeguarding the individual. The llth Report refers to a lot of these
suggestions being good and quite capable of being adopted and their
adoption would be in the interest of the community providing as i think
Viscount Dilhorne says. the proper safeguards are introduced. 1 say we have
no problem on that score in this State with our records of the interview.
This is the most practical and the most commonsense way of putting an
interview with a suspect or an offender before a court. Police are fair, they
are fair minded. There are some exceptions. This is unfortunate and this is
something we can’t overcome in any large body of men but by and all
detectives and police are fair and the records of interview that go before a
court can be accepted as a true and valid record of the interrogation.
Occasionally we have offenders who do not sign records of interview.
Strangely, this is a psychological aspect of some criminals. Today I was
speaking to one of our senior Sergeants in charge of one squad only and he
told me that last year no less than 40 unsigned records of interview were
the subject of pleas of guilty before the criminal court. some dealt with
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under the provisions of s.51A of the Justice Act and others just eventuated
in a plea of guilty before a court. Now that is one squad only. There are
hundreds of records of interview being dealt with throughout this State over
a number of years and there are a few unsigned records of interview which
are contested. That is something we can’t avoid. Every suspect, every
offender, has the right to deny interviews; he has a right to ﬁght for his
life all the way. It is strange psychology, but a fellow will initial alterations
but he will not sign the statement. Now there is a pretty strong feeling in
Long Bay Gaol amongst criminals that it is a sign of weakness if you sign a
record of interview. You are somewhat ostracized if this happens, so they
tell me. So we do find this cross-section of the heavy criminals, you might
say, who will refrain from signing a record of interview.
At all stages the suspect has the privilege. There are sanctions from
the very beginning. The detective’s brief is placed before the Police
Prosecutor, from there it goes to the Magistrate, to the Senior Crown
Prosecutor of the Court, through the instructing ofﬁcer and then before the
Judge, who has the discretionary right of rejecting that statement. I would
be prepared to say that there would be very few, if any, records of
interview which go before a jury which are not true records. In these
circumstances I submit that the signed record of interview, or the record of
interview being contemporaneous notes made at the time of the interview,
is the best answer to any additional procedures that might be introduced
into this State.
With regard to unsworn statements from the dock, we feel that this is
one of the most grossly unfair procedures ever introduced in the law. In
these days. criminals are getting a tremendous advantage by making
unsigned, unsworn statements from the dock. We regard this as something
which brings about a lot of acquittals before the court. Mr Howard Purnell
mentioned that 38% has been the rate of acquittals before a court. He
seems quite happy with this ﬁgure as a citizen, but personally I don’t feel
very happy about it. I feel that 38% is a pretty poor result and we look
for the reason for this. It is impossible to say whether the jury believed or
didn’t believe a statement from the dock, but I have an uncomfortable
feeling that a lot of jurymen are misled because of the circumstances
surrounding the making of that statement and lack of comment as it is
now.
You can be assured that the N.S.W. Police Force is anxious to do an
honest job for the community and I feel they are doing exactly this. If we
can get the benefit of any legal assistance that is forthcoming then we can
do an even better job for you than we are doing now. We ask for your
support.
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Mr R. J. B. S! John:
Having heard the comments front Mr Justice Neasey. and Howard
Purnell I think anything I have to say would be largely repetitious. I would
re-emphasize. though. the ﬁrst and major point in relation to any change in
the criminal law, and that is this: that. adopting Sir Edward Coke‘s ﬁrst
principle for a change in legislation, you ﬁnd the evil. If the evil is an
increase in the crime rate, a failure to clear it up. or some other factor,
you then look to see what causes it. As lawyers. whether we be judges or
barristers or public defenders I suggest that we have a very narrow view of
the problem, and that very often we do the law itself a disservice by
looking at it only from our own point of view and our own experience. So
far as a high crime rate is concerned. there could possibly be many causes,
some of which I pointed to in my paper. I think that before we should
embark on any amendment to the law which destroys some freedom we
have. we should be very careful to see that all other avenues of change or
remedy have been exhausted.
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Mr V. R. Wallace, QC..-
This paper of mine does not pretend to be founded on any profound
research of the subject but rather on personal experience. The answer to
those who would oppose any change at all, I feel, lies in the complete and
utter change in social conditions ~ in the readiness of transport, speed of
communication. the general rise in the level of education, the emergence of
more sophisticated crime and sophisticated criminals. If one acknowledges
that there has been that vast change, then we have come a long way since
some of these principles were first established. There has been such a
profound change that l feel one must acknowledge that this problem should
at least be investigated and thought about. It is no answer to adopt a
Iaissez-faire attitude and say. “Things are going to be all right — let them
be”.
A comment by Inspector Clyne leads me to suggest that some
consideration might be given to a limited right of police to detain for
questioning. May I put, by way of example, a case which happened within
the last two weeks. A person was found strangled at Beacon Hill and the
identity of the deceased was established through a minor conviction
interstate. Enquiries revealed that he had come south in a car and a police
message was broadcast suggesting that if seen this vehicle should be
intercepted. It was eventually intercepted in the south western corner of the
State by a country constable who did not know the reason it was to be
intercepted. It had two men in it, and it so happened that it was the
deceased’s car and there was at least some justification for laying a charge
of “goods in custody” in respect of the car. But let us assume that it was
not the deceased’s car. but a car in which the two men legitimately were,
and that the police were proceeding on the basis of information that the
deceased had been seen shortly before his death in that vehicle. If one
affords the police no right at all to detain those men for questioning, then
what was to be done? The speed of transport had got them hundreds of
miles from the scene. the police officers having knowledge of the facts were
hundreds of miles distant. ls it to be suggested that the two men should be
allowed to go their way. when they were obviously in a position to give
significant information to the police concerning a murder, and not
necessarily implicating them. This instances the Vast distances that can be
covered in a short time, and that alone might lead to some consideration of
this right to detain — subject to safeguards, I unhesitatingly concede.
l have adverted in my paper to a matter which seems to me very
frequently to be overlooked, and that is that juries have changed and the
constitution of juries has changed. In this day and age jurors by and large
are relatively well educated men. I am not competent to speak of the
attitude adopted by the defence, but for my part I am happy in striking a
jury of men who look intelligent. That is about all we can say of them, we
know nothing else except their names, but it is quite obvious that they are
now better educated. more responsible. more experienced and better
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travelled — a different type of juror altogether. And I am perfectly satisﬁed
that juries have an innate sense of justice. Anyone who has prosecuted for
the Crown for any length of time becomes very much aware of the damage
done to the Crown cause if one appears at all oppressive or overbearing. In
my experience I have seen juries acquit in face of a virtual direction to
convict, and I have seen them convict in the face of a virtual direction to
acquit. This is because of the sense of independence that juries manifest. If
a judge tells a jury that their sphere is that of fact, that they and only
they determine the facts. that that is their function and what anyone else
may say is of no concern. juries are independent enough to resent any
intrusion on that ﬁeld. Indeed, I venture to suggest that if a judge be
venturesome enough to intrude markedly on that ﬁeld, and in a way which
suggests that he is seeking to impose a view upon the jury, they overreact
only too well.
So far as the statement from the dock is concerned it has been
suggested that the great majority of people who fall foul of the criminal
law, or are suspected of doing so, are inarticulate, or weak, or fearful, or
inadequate, or deprived. That may well have been true enough some time
ago, but the very nature of criminals has changed, and I feel sure that
Inspector Clyne would agree with me here. Again this is a matter of
personal experience. One is confronted with the Mayor of a country town
who makes a statement from the dock, and he is not an ill—educated,
inarticulate man. I have prosecuted any number of company frauds and
conspiracies when well educated, highly experienced, successful businessmen
(successful personally, but devastating in their activities to the shareholders
and subscribers of money) have remained in the dock to make a statement.
Can it be said that they’ are inarticulate? If one acknowledges that there is
at least some diversification in the type of accused, why should one apply
only one rule? And which rule is to be applied?
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Dr W. T. Westling:
In making the comments today i must confess that i am wearing two
hats. The paper is I hope an unbiased account of exactly what American
Courts have said, with respect to this Right of Silence. But I was a
prosecutor for some years in America and a lot of the opinions that I have
about the right of silence are gleaned from that experience.
The American position in very simple terms as far as trial is
concerned is an absolute right of silence at trial. No one would even put
forth the position that the defendant ought to be called upon to make a
statement in trial and that adverse comment could be made by the Judge,
by the prosecutor or by anyone on his failure to make such a statement.
Furthermore, if the defendant requested, the jury would be instructed that
they were not to draw any inference at all from the fact that he remained
silent in trial and did not take the witness stand. There is no such thing as
a statement from the dock in American jurisdictions. That would be
considered completely anathema. If you believe that the jury is able to
learn the truth from hearing witnesses examined on one side and cross
examined on the other side it strikes me that the idea of an unsworn
statement from the dock, without the rules of evidence and without the
testing of cross—examination, is completely opposed to the whole idea of
reaching the truth through this searching enquiry. One of the real problems
which American Courts also have in this respect is the fact that almost
everywhere the defendant will be subject to cross examination on his prior
record if he takes the stand. It seems to me when you have a situation
where you have some control over that, the statement from the dock will
die out.
One thing that has been suggested today. and I agree that it may be a
great disservice to us, is that we don’t have the benefit of hearing what
juries think about all this. Almost all of the people presenting papers and
speaking today have this gut reaction that juries in fact draw an inference
from the defendant failing to testify. We don’t have the rules in California
that forbid counsel to talk to juries after the case. It is a very common
procedure, especially for young attorneys, to talk to jurors after the case
and for jurors to want to talk to the attorney. The very ﬁrst question that
is asked in every case if the defendant doesn’t take the stand is why didn’t
the defendant take the stand and testify? “We on the jury were puzzled
about that for hours”, they say. This is after the Judge has told them not
to draw any inference or put any reliance on this at all. I remember one
case the jury came up after having convicted his client in about 25 minutes
and asked the defence counsel why his client didn't take the stand. The
reason was because he was being charged with attempted extortion and he
had a prior conviction for attempted extortion. He didn’t want the jury to
ﬁnd that out; it’s very reasonable that he wouldn’t. If you had a
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procedure whereby he could take the stand and tell his story without this
very damning prior conviction coming out against him it seems to me you
avoid some of that problem.
The real question of the right of silence in America has been this
business at the police station. What goes on there‘.’ It wouldn’t be suggested
by even the most ardent opponents of Miranda, Escabedo and all their
progeny that the fact that the defendant failed to make a statement at the
police station could be taken as evidence against him. Rather the only real
right of silence issue in the United States arises when the defendant has
made a statement to the police. Then the issue is whether the statement is
in fact admissible. The Supreme Court and perhaps all the courts in all the
states have been particularly concerned with these abuses in this police
questioning process. We have heard today and we have seen in the prepared
papers that everyone agrees that there may be some abuses and almost
everyone agrees that they are very small — almost insigniﬁcant. The
American courts have treated these very small and perhaps insigniﬁcant
abuses with a great deal more respect; they have considered that the system
which allows any kind of confession, any kind of admission, any kind of
statements must in some way account, not for 99% of the cases, but for
the 1% of the cases or the 1/10 of 1% of the cases where there may be
abuses. That is why you have all these procedural devices presented to cut
down the abuses. Detective Inspector Clyne said that no doubt there are
going to be a few bad apples — that there will be an exception everywhere.
Mr Justice McClemens suggested that what we really want to be doing is
correcting the abuses. I would suggest that what the American Courts have
done is simply take a different tack in deciding how to correct the abuses.
The suggestions that we have seen in the debate so far on how to
correct the abuses are methods of recording the statements and the absence
of statements that are made. and the difﬁculty in doing it by tape
recording, the difficulty in doing it by police in a written form, the
difficulty in having a neutral observer available to come to the police
station 24 hours of the day 7 days of the week. United States Supreme
Court has come up with a different device. It has imposed a great deal of
very intricate procedural rules that have to be followed before you will ever
get a statement which is admissable in court. Some people have suggested
that the whole reason for producing all of these rules is to eventually to
get to the state of affairs where no one will ever be able to follow all the
rules and therefore that no statements will ever be admitted. A lot of
critics say this is throwing out the baby with the bath and perhaps it is.
But it is just further evidence of the fact that the United States Courts are
more concerned with the 1% or the less 1% than they are with the rest of
the cases.
One ﬁnal item seems to be raised by all of this but hasn’t been
addressed is the right to counsel. If you are in fact going to have legal
ramifications as to what the jury can and do attach to what the defendant
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says or doesn’t say at the time he is interviewed by the police it seems that
you have to consider very carefully the question of whether he should be
represented by counsel right then and there. We foresee debate about what
constitutes reasonable ground for failing to answer a question or failing to
raise a point of fact that you are relying on at a trial? If you stop and
think about it you can think of all sorts of circumstances in which the
accused may not know that the fact had any signiﬁcance until after he had
been arrainged and until ﬁnally he hired counsel or until perhaps he had
ﬁnally proceeded into the Supreme Court and had counsel appointed for
him. So it seems that if you are going to go so far as to have prior
statements or the absence of prior statements to police being considered at
the time of trial some months later, it opens the door very wide to the
question of counsel representing the accused at that very time. This means
a counsel for everyone; not just the ones that can afford it, who have an
attorney’s name and phone number in their pocket and can ring him up
immediately. But counsel for everyone who says I don’t want to talk, or I
think I ought to ﬁnd out from someone what my legal rights are before I
say anything to you.
These are the sort of problems which the United States courts have
come to grips with and this is of course where Miranda has its real
meaning: when you combine the right to be silent with the right to be
advised by a legal counsel who is familiar with the law and familiar with
the ramiﬁcations of the facts. He can advise you as to whether you ought
to say something or ought to remain quiet, or even, which questions you
ought to answer or which questions you ought not to answer. In the very
sort of situation that we are talking about here, police interrogation.
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Mr M. F. Farquhar, CS.M.:
Perhaps we might ponder the questions that must arise in the minds
of juries from time to time as to the evidence presented before them, and
rarely have we any evidence on that. As a consequence I found the
sequence of events in Kaslar5 quite fascinating. On trial for a criminal
offence, the accused did not go into the witness box but elected to make a
statement from the dock. The jury retired on completion of the usual
formalities and were out for quite a long time, then returned and said they
would like 'to know if the accused was now willing to go into the witness
box. The judge properly informed them as to the accused’s rights, and they
went out again. After a time they returned and inquired whether they
could ask the defendant’s counsel to put the defendant in the witness box,
and the judge simply said, “I am afraid you cannot”. They went out again,
then returned and the foreman said the jury would like to ask the prisoner
a question. His Honour of course repeated his previous statement as to the
rights of the accused. The jury retired again and two minutes later returned
a verdict of Guilty. I think there is an interesting lesson there. It may well
be that there was a particular point they wanted him to explain and felt he
was dodging.
Perhaps I could add another case that I have come across since. This
is what fell from Mr Justice Sugerman (as he then was) in R v. Bouquet5.
He referred to all the questions that had been posed by Sir Patrick Devlin
(as he then was) in The Criminal Prosecution in England7. Some of these
were:
“How do] reconcile what I have said with the accused’s right to
silence? Does not the English system pride itself on having
nothing to do with those inquisitorial methods which are said to
be practised on the Continent and are designed to get the
accused to convict himself out of his own mouth? ls the
constitutional right to silence a reality? If it is, is it not odd
that the accused’s own admission should so often be the
mainstay of the prosecution? What is the point of all these
elaborate provisions whereby the accused is cautioned that he
need not say anything unless he wishes to do so if in the end
he generally speaks?”
Well, Mr Justice Sugerman listed all those questions and then went on to
say:
“The answer to these questions is that while the English system
undoubtedly does give the accused man the right to say nothing
it does nothing to urge him to take advantage of his right or
even to make that course invariably the attractive one. The
balance on which the English system works is that it combines
the suspect’s right to silence with the opportunity to speak.”
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During the paper I have instanced certain statutes where a total
disregard of his right has been shown by the legislature when it suits them.
Especially does one notice a tendency in Parliament not to be overtender
towards the right to silence, or indeed any other right, when offences
against the revenue are involved.
In the paper 1 dwelt at some length on the signiﬁcance and effects of
Sections 78 and 79 of the Justices Act and on proceedings in the Summary
Court. I might add that I felt there were so many people covering the 11th
Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee that it was much better
for me to dwell entirely on the Summary Court aspects. The effects of
those two sections came to be considered by Mr Justice McClemens in
Connelly v. Brooksa. A magistrate had dismissed the information for
negligent driving without calling on the defendant to go into evidence. His
Honour found that some evidence of negligence had been adduced, although
he described it as being sketchy and weak. As to the sections, he had this
to say:
“By Section 79 of the Act the practice is laid down as being as
nearly as possible in accordance with that of the Supreme Court
upon a trial of an issue of fact. In an action of law in the
Supreme Court the judge, assuming there is no jury, is bound to
hear each party fully, except that he can indicate that he does
not desire to hear counsel for whose client he ultimately ﬁnds if
at the end of the evidence he has formed the view on the facts
favourable to that party, but he cannot stop the case until all
the evidence has been adduced on both sides, and must, if the
party not bearing the onus does not go into evidence, obtain his
election not to go into evidence. A verdict, in my opinion,
could not stand, for instance, if the defendant having made a
submission for a non-suit, had a verdict entered in his favour on
that application without the judge calling on him to say whether
or not he would go into evidence.”
Later on His Honour concluded:
“It is with regret, therefore, that I am forced to the conclusion
that this matter must be remitted to the magistrate with my
expression of opinion that there was some evidence on which
the magistrate might have inferred negligence and that being so
he should have called upon Mr Watson to elect whether or not
he was going into evidence.”
Well, that goes to the very essence of what I put as being the situation in
the Summary Court. As a consequence it might well be said that His
Honour has already stolen the thunder of what I have asserted in this paper
tonight, and he did this. of course, some twenty years ago. Perhaps I
should hasten to say that this. I believe, was near the commencement of his
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long and illustrious career on the Bench. In particular, it supports all that l
have said as to our procedure. and that procedure is alike in both criminal
and civil trials.
It seems, of course. to be very close to what was proposed by Mr
Justice Neasey tonight. I notice that Mr St John sought to draw Mr Justice
Neasey into one particular fold. 1 formed the opinion that whilst he was a
dove in respect to the period of investigation he became a hawk in respect
to statements from the dock. and to have in fact taken on some of the
characteristics of both birds in respect to comment. At any rate, I think I
should conclude by repeating something of what I said in the paper itself.
The defendant is entitled to have a case proved against him in the
Summary Court before he is required to say a word in his defence, but
then he remains silent at his peril. And since our system has worked
successfully, I suggest, since 1842 with very little challenge indeed it may
well bear scrutiny as an exemplar.
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‘ Ryan v. Ryan (1966—67) 40 A.L.J.R. 488
3 R. v. Vandine.(1968) l N.S.W.R. 417 (Court of Criminal Appeal) at p.
421.
— McClemens, Isaacs and Lee, 1.1.: It is a basic principle in the
criminal law that such warning (i.e. during police questioning) gives
full privilege to an accused to say or not to say anything and if he
remains silent on any aspect during the interview whether it be in
relation to what is being recorded whilst it is so recorded or to any
matter thereafter until the whole interview is concluded that such
silence cannot be treated or construed as any evidence of any
admission. Otherwise the warning is a sham. The privilege extends to
the whole of what transpires once the warning is given and is not
conﬁned to just the particular questions asked and answers recorded
or unanswered. The person interrogated is entitled to assume that the
warning so extended continues and that he has complete freedom to
answer or refrain from answering or making any statement without
fear of such silence being used against him. The Courts should see
that full and meaningful effect is given to such warnings and that the
words of warning are not merely treated with lip service.
3 Jones v. Dunkel (1958—59) 101 C.L.R. 298 at p.308 per Kitto,J. at p.
312 per Menzies, J.: at pp.3lo~322 per Windeyer. .l.
4 People v. O’Brien (1965) LR. 142
5 R. v. Kaslar (1928) 28 SR. (N.S.W.) 29.
6 R. v. Bouquet (1962) N.S.W.R. 1034 (Court of Criminal Appeal)
7 The Criminal Prosecution in England by Patrick Devlin. 1960, Oxford
University Press.
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APPENDIX
EXTRACTs FROM THE HANSARD REPORT OF THE
DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON THE ELEVENTH
REPORT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE
ON EVIDENCE (GENERAL) (Cmnd. 4991): 14 FEBRUARY
1973.
(Reprinted by permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s
Stationery Office.)
Viscount Dilhome:
. .. I should like to begin by referring to their recommendations as to
the giving of evidence by the accused. They propose that the right of an
accused person to make an unsworn statement should be abolished. I think
that is right. An unsworn statement is not evidence in the strict sense and
it must be difficult for a jury to decide what weight, if any, to give to it. I
think if an accused person is to give evidence at his trial he should do so
like any other witness, from the witness box and on oath. I shall be
interested to hear whether there is any disagreement with that.
What I think will be more controversial is their proposal that unless
the accused’s physical or mental condition is such that it is undesirable for
him to be called upon to give evidence, he will be called upon to testify;
that if he does not, the jury may draw such inferences from his refusal as
appear proper, and further, that such a refusal may amount to
corroboration.
It has long been recognised that a judge is entitled to comment on
the failure of an accused to give evidence if there is a prima facie case
against him. The Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, prohibits comment on his
failure by the prosecution: the Committee recommend that that prohibition
should be abolished. I agree with that, for it must appear to a jury very
odd that there should be no comment by the prosecution; and also if the
judge comments, as he should in some cases, it may tend to make it appear
that he is putting on the mantle of a prosecutor. Such a comment, of
course, can only be made where a prima facie case has been established;
that is to say, a case which points to the conclusion that the accused is
guilty if that case is not answered. When such a case is established, if the
accused does not give evidence what weight is to be given, and should be
given, to the fact that he has not done so? On this there has been a
difference of legal opinion.
In a case in which I prosecuted many years ago the noble and learned
Lord, Lord Devlin, having ruled that there was a prima facie case. then,
when the accused chose not to give evidence, directed the jury that it was
“utterly wrong” (those were his words) if they were to regard the accused’s
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silence as contributing in any way towards proof of guilt. He said — and I
again quote his words — “It does not, and it cannot”. With respect, I
venture to disagree. The silence of an accused is not evidence, but it is a
fact that the jury are surely fully entitled to take into account when they
retire to consider their verdict and when they have to decide whether they
are satisﬁed beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. In 1953
the late Lord Goddard said in a case:
“Everybody knows that absence from the witness box requires a
very considerable amount of explanation.”
That observation has been cited with approval in a recent decision of the
Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in Regina v. Sparrow.
If a case is established against the accused what is the point of a
judge being entitled to comment (as he clearly is) on the accused’s failure
to give evidence, if that is not a factor which the jury is entitled to take
into account? If the noble and learned Lord, Lord Devlin, is right, what is
the point of the judge, and the judge alone, being entitled to comment on
something which has no bearing on the guilt of the accused?
The Criminal law Revision Committee clearly rejected his view. They
expressed the opinion that the present law and practice are much too
favourable to the defence. I agree. They say they — and I quote their
words —:
“are convinced that when a prima facie case has been made
against the accused it should be regarded as incumbent on him
to give evidence.”
I am not quite sure whether “incumbent” is a very happy word. An
accused is, and must always be, entitled to remain silent. He has always the
privilege of silence and he must continue to have it; but he must know,
and common sense should tell him and also the jury, that if he exercises
that privilege when there is a case for him to answer established against
him, significance will be attached to his doing so. The Criminal Law
Revision Committee go further and propose that the court should tell the
accused that he will be called upon to give evidence and tell him what the
effect will be if he does not. I do not think that that is necessary where
the accused is represented, but where he is not that is clearly desirable.
My Lords, I have dealt with this recommendation ﬁrst for it bears on
the Committee’s recommendations that it should be permissible for a court
or jury to draw whatever inferences are reasonable from the failure of the
accused, when interrogated by the police, to mention a defence which he
puts forward at his trial. That is translated in the draft Bill to failure to
mention, when interrogated, a fact relied on in his defence. It is provided
in the Bill that such inferences may be drawn from such a failure as appear
‘1
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proper. With the greatest respect to the Committee. that is going far too
far. It seems to me that it is one thing to say that silence when an
innocent person would have been expected to speak can have signiﬁcance
attached to it. and quite a different thing to say that if an accused fails to
mention in the course of his interrogation by the police any fact upon
which he subsequently relies, an adverse inference can be drawn. That is
wholly unacceptable. I do not think it right that any inference should be
drawn from an accused’s silence on committal proceedings before the
magistrates. He may submit to them that there is no case for him to
answer. That submission may fail. He may wish to renew it at his trial. I
believe that it would be wrong to prejudice his chances of doing so
successfully by allowing an inference to be drawn at his trial from the fact
that he kept silent before the magistrates. An accused person should be
entitled to reserve his defence, if he so wishes, to his trial.
What about when he is interrogated by the police? Should any
inference be drawn from his failure to speak, when an innocent person
would be expected to speak? I would say, “Yes, undoubtedly” but for one
thing: there is not now available a complete record of the interrogation.
Unless and until such a record is available, it seems to me that the risk is
very considerable that in a number of cases, from the account given of the
investigation, an adverse inference would be drawn when, if the complete
record could be seen, it would be clear that no such inference should be
drawn.
Further, in the Report of the Royal Commission on the Police in
1962, it is said in paragraph 369:
“There was a body of evidence too substantial to disregard
which in effect accused the police of stooping to the use of
undesirable means of obtaining statements and of occasionally
giving perjured evidence in a court of law.”
— a practice commonly known as “putting in the verbals”. I do not think
that it is a very frequent practice, but those who “put in the verbals” to
strengthen the prosecution’s case may be tempted so to present their
evidence as to make it clear that the accused’s silence or his failure to
mention a fact had significance.
So while I believe that inferences can properly be drawn from the
accused’s silence at his trial, from his failure to answer the case against him,
I am strongly opposed to a court or jury being entitled to draw inferences
from his silence or failure to mention a relevant fact in the course of his
interrogation by the police, unless and until a satisfactory method of
recording what happens during the investigation is brought into use. Indeed,
I feel that no matter whether the recommendation of the Committee be
accepted or not, some such safeguard for the accused by the provision of a
record of his interrogation is very desirable. Two methods have been
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proposed: one by Justice ~ that interrogation should take place before
magistrates and that a complete verbatim record should be made of the
interrogation. I believe that that might cause delay and might impede the
proper activities of the police. The other method is that tape recorders
should be used to record investigations which take place at police stations.
A minority of the Criminal Law Revision Committee favoured that method.
How large a minority we are not told. We do not know how many
constituted the majority, but the minority suggested that a speaking clock
should be superimposed on the recording to make it more difﬁcult to
tamper with. If that was done, and the tape recorder kept in a locked box
to which only a very senior police ofﬁcer had the key, with the
interrogating officer only able to switch on or switch off the recorder that,
I believe, would provide an adequate safeguard. Only if some such safeguard
can be brought into operation should, I think, any part of the Committee’s
recommendations in relation to interrogations by the police be implemented.
The Committee further recommend that the accused’s silence when an
innocent person would be expected to speak can be treated as
corroboration of the evidence against him. If my view is accepted that will
only be in regard to his silence, until a satisfactory safeguard is devised,
after a prima facie case has been made against him at his trial. There are
some offences where Parliament requires that there should be evidence of
corroboration. I would expect that if that evidence of corroboration is not
produced by the prosecution before their case is ended, the judge would
accept a submission that there was no case to answer. But there are other
cases where it is open to a jury to convict on the evidence of a witness
alone but when it is safer if there is evidence of corroboration. In those
cases I see no reason why the silence of the accused when a case has been
made out for him to answer, should not be regarded as corroboration. That
is common sense and that is a desirable change.
The House may remember that when the Report was published
he (Monsieur Simon) wrote a letter expressing regret at a number of the
proposals. He explained to us that in France. for example, the ordinary
police do not interrogate at all. All the interrogation is done by a highly
trained body of interrogators working under the procurator. The moment
the prosecution starts, the police then come under the orders of the juge
d’instruction. If there is to be further interrogation, he decides the nature
of it and his orders are all under appeal. Monsieur Simon's strong View was
that no one can be safely trusted with the enormous powers which the
police would have in this country if the right of silence were abolished in
the way proposed and the Judges’ Rules were not made statutory but
depended upon some Home Ofﬁce circular.
The dangers are set out in the views of the Minority on this first
main point. In paragraph 52 they say:
“(i) That the police should be able to question su5pects in
custody is now generally thought to be necessary for the due
96139—10
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They then
quoted by
administration of the law; but the practice is fraught with
dangers. In the ﬁrst place there is the danger of the use of
bullying and even brutal methods by the police in order to
obtain confessions. Examples are the Shefﬁeld case in 1963 and
the Challenor case in 1964. These incidents are attributable to a
small number of “black sheep” in the police force. However rare
their occurrence may be, every effort should be made to erect
safeguards against them. Our arrangements should not depend
upon the good faith of everyone concerned in the administration
of the law. Perhaps a provision for the electronic recording of
interrogations would not always eliminate the use of “third
degree” methods by ofﬁcers who are tempted to use them; but
the knowledge that a recorder is running during an interview
would surely exercise a deterrent effect. It is of great
importance for the police themselves that any public suspicion
of their practices should be allayed. In America misconduct by
the police has been partly responsible for the alienation of
sympathy of the public from the police, which leads the public
to refuse to help the police with information, and so greatly
increases the difﬁculty of enforcing the law. Also, every proven
instance of third degree by the police, or credible allegation of
it, increases the suspicion with which juries regard the ordinary
confession, which in fact is very likely to be true and properly
obtained.
(ii) The minority argue that the use of tape recorders may help
to reduce the occasions on which the police are tempted to
fabricate confessions. As with the use of violence, it is
impossible to assess the extent to which the police at present
commit perjury, but there is a widespread impression, not only
among criminals, that in tough areas a police ofﬁcer who is
certain that he has got the right man will invent some oral
admission (colloquially known as a “verbal”) to clinch the case.”
cited the passage from the Royal Commission on the Police,
the noble and learned Viscount. The Report continues:
“If the accused alleges that the evidence against him is perjured,
he is not likely to be believed, and the mere making of the
allegation by the accused in giving evidence enables the
prosecution (under the present law) to elicit damaging facts
relating to his previous record.
(iii) Short of using violence and perjury, the police may get
confessions by the use of various kinds of persuasion, which is
all the more effective when the suspect is isolated from his
friends. The present position is that the courts do not exclude
evidence of confessions merely because they were obtained by
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questioning at night or in the small hours. In a murder case in
1963 the police started to question a suspect at about 2 am.
and obtained a confession at 5.15 a.m.: the confession was
admitted in evidence. In 1962, a man was questioned in a
Birmingham police station for 10/5 hours and was in that time
given only one cup of tea; a conviction obtained by means of
the resulting confession was sustained on appeal, though on this
occasion the appellate court spoke severely about the conduct of
the police. It is demonstrated from time to time that even
ordinary questioning can produce false confessions, but the risk
is greatly increased if oppressive methods are used. Often there
is a conflict of evidence between the accused and the police as
to the time and duration of questioning. Electronic recording
might reduce the conflict .. .
(iv) A more subtle danger lies in the way in which confessions
are generally taken. Most written statements produced in
evidence are not in the suspect’s handwriting and absolutely in
his own words. As a result of questioning, the police ofﬁcer
may write a narrative which is in part a blend of question and
answer. The statement reads as though it was volunteered by the
SUSpect; but in fact it may have consisted of a monosyllabic
answer to a leading question asked by the ofﬁcer with one or
more subordinate clauses. Since the statement does not
distinguish between question and answer. one cannot tell from
the statement what facts were suggested to the suspect by the
way in which the question was worded. And the written word
does not reproduce the inflection of the voice upon which
meaning may depend. One may not even be sure that the ofﬁcer
understood what the SUSpect said, or that the suspect understood
the written statement when he read it through or had it read to
him. His signature is not a guarantee that the written statement
exactly reproduces what he said.
(v) The possibilities of error are multiplied if, as often happens,
the statement is not reduced to writing at the time and signed
by the suSpect. The investigating ofﬁcer may simply embody
what he regards as the kernel of the suspect’s statement in his
notebook. This notebook will be entered up after the interview,
and the note may represent only a very small part of a long
interrogation. It may be months before the case is heard, and by
that time the ofﬁcer may have no memory of the interview
beyond his written note. If there are two or more investigating
ofﬁcers, they are allowed to agree their evidence together before
writing up their notes; this practice was approved by the Court
of Criminal Appeal in 1953. The ofﬁcers may even prepare a
joint note. If they are inclined to stretch the case a bit against
the accused, perhaps because he has a ‘record’ and appears to
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them to be guilty, they know that they will be able to back
each other up at the trial and will be virtually impregnable from
attack."
That being the situation today with the Judges‘ Rules, I should have
thought that it is not the right time to abolish the right to silence;
certainly not unless and until an independent record (not, I think, kept by
even a senior police officer) can be taken of what really goes on in the
course of an interrogation.
.. . Therefore . .. I am most unhappy about the abolition of
the right to silence. I agree with M. Simon that nobody, whatever splendid
body of men they may be, can really be trusted with sweeping powers in a
sphere the kernel of which really is the temptation not to bother to call
the evidence of the man who committed the crime, but more and more to
rely on confessions in police stations. We all know what happens in police
stations in some other countries .....
The Lord Chancellor:
What I want to say this afternoon is that in Spite of these
advantages [an uncorrupt and independent Judiciary, a system of trial which
diSposes of cases more rapidly than any other in the civilized world, the
presumption of innocence, and trial by jury] there is really no
justiﬁcation for complacency. There is no field of law, in my belief more
urgently in need of rationalization, reform and ultimately codiﬁcation than
criminal law and procedure. I believe its rules to be artiﬁcial, complex and,
in some ﬁelds, almost if not entirely unintelligible. Quite apart from the
verdicts of juries which are sometimes open to criticism, when a conviction
is quashed by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) and an accused
person gets off, he gets off in many cases not because he is innocent
(which may or may not be the case) but because the judge has failed to
state the law accurately to the jury. This happensnot infrequently, and I
believe we should sometimes ask ourselves whether this is not partly due to
unnecessary complexity in the law which the judge is compelled to state.
The status quo which we are discussing is almost all judge-made. It has been
made by judges at different times during our history on the basis of
precedent and to meet legal and social conditions wholly different from
those which now obtain; and when Parliament has intervened, as it has
from time to time, it has almost always intervened on an ad hoc basis ~
sometimes (as in 1898) by imposing rules a shade more artiﬁcial and
illogical than those which have been thought out by the judges from time
to time.
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In the meantime we must remember that we are living in an age of
increasing crime. i believe he would be a bold and possibly optimistic man
who could see an end to it. We cannot therefore, in these circumstances.
leave things exactly as they are, indeﬁnitely trusting to good fortune and
a
serene belief that there are an inﬁnite number of persons in the pipelin
e
who are capable of acting as judges. So it behoves us to discuss calmly a
nd
without complacency what we can do to maintain our fundamental valu
es
and at the same time to introduce a more or less contemporary system
of
evidence and procedure
Let us now look at some of the rules of evidence and procedure, with
Bentham’s eyes if we can recover them, remembering the kind
of danger
which the rules were intended to avert. The rules were devised by
judges at
a time when a prisoner could not give evidence on his own be
half — he
could not do so until 1898, if my memory is right; he could n
ot call his
wife, his partner or his brother as a witness in his defence.
In theory,
although he was entitled to counsel, the counsel could only ar
gue points of
law. He could not appeal at all from the verdict of the jury
, however
inadequate the summing-up might be ! and in some cases until
the middle
of the nineteenth century and later they were virtually non-existent
. He was
at the mercy of a Titus Oates or a common informer paid by the
results of
his evidence. There was no disciplined police. 1 ask the House
, is it likely
that all the rules designed to mitigate the severity of that kind of a
rtificial
situation are really of contemporary value to protect the righ
ts of the
innocent at the present day, when we have moved into an era
of rational
evidence and discussion?
English law has progressed from mystification to rationality, alth
ough
I must say at a depressingly funereal pace. It has moved fro
m a discussion
of competence of witnesses, admissibility of evidence, to th
e question of
reliability, relevance, probative value and .the weight to be
attached to
different bits of evidence , but, oh, so slowly! The first thing
I think your
Lordships have to make your minds up about is whether you
trust a jury
as a tribunal of fact. The Bar Council says it does. So di
d Bentham, I
think, and so do 1. But if you trust the jury as a tribunal
of fact, why
cannot it be allowed to decide for itself questions of weight
and relevance,
or probative value in accordance with the ordinary canons of
logic and
common sense and not by a series of artificial lawyer constructe
d rules?
What about the so-called right of silence? Of course Bentham was in
favour of the right of silence, and so am I, if by that we mean th
at
nothing can be done or might be done to a man who refuses to speak. But,
surely, all the behaviour of an accused person who is confronted with
a
charge is something which the tribunal of fact is entitled to consider in the
context of the other evidence. Take a man — and for this purpose I am
not inventing, I am reminiscing — who is accused of incest with his
daughter. His wife comes to him with the weeping child and tells him what
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she has learned. To use the language of the Bar Council he is entitled to
say to her:
“In this country, a person is innocent until proved guilty. If you
think I have committed an offence, prove it. I do not wish to
be interrogated. I wish to seek advice. I do not intend to answer
any questions until you tell me what your case against me is.”
I submit that a man so accused would have every right to say this or, more
literally, he would have every right to remain entirely silent. But how
artiﬁcial can you get in maintaining that if counsel, or the judge, or, worse
still, the jury, discuss with candour the possible reasons for his silence they
are depriving him of one of his fundamental liberties?
Obviously there are many explanations for silence. Some of them may
be innocent, some of them may be guilty, but which is to apply in a given
case is surely a matter for discussion by the tribunal of fact. But
apparently, according to the critics, discussion in front of the tribunal of
fact is to be either taboo or artiﬁcially restricted. If the accused blushes, if
he appears confused, if he hangs his head, if he makes inconsistent
statements, that is all right: it is evidence against the accused or, arguably,
evidence in his favour. But if he says nothing, apparently the jury are to
adopt an attitude towards his silence which they would never adopt in the
conduct of their family or business affairs.
I had always thought that one of the advantages of having juries was
that you could apply common sense to important and disputed questions of
fact. The main object of some lawyers seems to me to provide artiﬁcial
criteria which would not be applied anywhere except in the strained
atmosphere of a court. I agree with the Bar Council — and here again I
quote — that:
“the great majority of people who fall foul of the criminal law
or who are suspected of doing so are inarticulate or weak or
fearful, or inadequate or deprived”.
But these are just the people who talk naturally when confronted with an
accusation. They do not remain silent. They do not say: “In this country a
person is innocent until he is proved guilty”. They are precisely the people
who do not get the beneﬁt of the rule. What I am pleading for is not an
adverse decision against accused persons but a breath of fresh air, a little
more common sense and a freeing from artiﬁciality.
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I must say with the Court of Critninal Appeal — because they said so
in 1967 — that the present law is devoid of common sense. Perhaps
I
should quote their own words:
“it seems pretty plain” # said the court — “that all the
members of the jury, if they had any common sense at all, must
have been saying to themselves precisely what the learned judge
said to them”.
They then said that what the learned judge said to them w
as a
misdirection, and went on to say:
“The line dividing what may be said and what may not be said
is a very ﬁne one, and it is perhaps doubtful whether in a case
like the present it would be even perceptible to the members of
any ordinary jury”.
What we are saying is that judges have got to go on telling the jury
things
which would not be perceptible to any ordinary member of i
t. If the
accused fails to give an account of his conduct, or fails to give it unt
il the
last possible moment, the judges can tell the jury that they can
take into
account his silence when considering the weight to be attache
d to his
evidence in court, but they may not tell the jury that the jury mig
ht think
it odd in the context, or even incredible if he were innocent, if he
did not
venture an explanation at all. That is what we are asked to defend . ..
They [the Criminal Law Revision Committee] have drawn atte
ntion to
an extremely complicated, obsolete and unintelligible field of th
e law which
is urgently in need of rationalisation and reform. and the p
resent state of
which has a distinct bearing on the current prevalance of cr
ime. They have
established, I believe beyond peradventure, that thin
gs cannot be left as
they are, and in my view there is no field more urgently in nee
d of reform.
We hear a great deal about the rights of the accused, but
what are
they? The right of an innocent man is to be acquitted
. That is an
unqualified right. It is an absolute right. It is sometimes s
aid that every
acquittal involves a miscarriage of justice. and. rhetoric apa
rt, there is a
sense in which that is true: because if the accused man is inno
cent he has
been put in peril; if he is guilty, justice has been baulked of
its objective.
We are told, and of each accused we rightly insist, that a man is
innocent
until proved guilty. But in dealing with the rights of a whole
series of
accused one cannot always make the same assumptions. All are
subjected to
some restriction. Some who are ultimately acquitted are deprived of the
ir
liberty altogether while awaiting trial and must be assumed to be
innocent
in such a condition. What is wanted is a system that will
guarantee
acquittal for the innocent and protect the guilty from oppressi
on - two
quite different objectives. I do not think that anyone, if he thinks
about it,
will doubt this.
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But what is really under discussion is whether the methods by which
traditionally we seek to obtain the objective are rational or efficient. I am
of the opinion that at present they are neither. and therefore 1 am not
content with things as they are. Without committing myself to a single one
of the Committee’s proposals as they stand. I consider that the subject has
not so far had a fair ventilation, and that is what I wish to obtain in the
relatively short time available to us before we shall have to act.
Lord Foot:
. .. My main purpose in intervening in the debate is to draw attention
to only one aspect of the Committee’s Report and draft Bill. For about
150 years in every criminal trial before a judge and jury there has been one
requirement laid on the judge when he comes to sum up the case to the
jury. It is that he shall always tell them that it is the business of the
prosecution to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt and that it is not
the task of the accused to prove his innocence. In appropriate cases there is
another injunction which the judge is required to give to the jury as to
how they should sift the evidence and reach their conclusion; that is, that
they are not to make any adverse inference because it has been given in
evidence that at some earlier stage the accused — whether when he was
being interrogated by the police, when he was being charged, or when he
was being committed for trial by the magistrates’ court — remained silent.
If either of those injunctions and instructions is omitted in any criminal
case, it is almost inevitable, such has been the state‘of the law for one
hundred or two hundred years (I should perhaps qualify that by saying that
such has been the state of the law since we had a Court of Criminal
Appeal): that the conviction will be quashed and upset because of the
failure to give the direction.
It scene to me that the seriousness of the proposals which are made
in Clause 1 of the draft Bill, and in the sections of the Report related to
Clause 1, constitute a serious breach in those two propositions or principles
which have so long been a hallowed part of our legal system. Those two
principles are intertwined; the principle that the prosecution must prove its
case and it is not for the accused to prove his own innocence, and the
principle that a man cannot be convicted as a result of the fact that he
remained silent at some stage before he reached his trial. It is precisely
because the two principles are intertwined, and precisely because the burden
of proof remains always with the prosecution, that the prosecution cannot
rely upon the accused had (sic) remained silent at some earlier stage. it
would be tantamount to saying: “If you are innocent, why have you not
sought to prove it?”; or, “if you are innocent and were innocent when you
were earlier Charged, why did you not protest your innocence at that
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stage?”. ls it not perfectly clear that the “right to silence”, so-called, is an
integral part of the general rule that it is the business of the prosecution to
prove their case?
What does Clause I propose in this regard? I suggest that it proposes
that these ancient safeguards — which we have heard recited at every
criminal case we have attended before a judge and jury: these hallowed
principles that judges have been compelled to tell to juries, on peril of
having the verdict upset — should be breached and that these elementary
propositions, as they have for so long been regarded, should be revised and
in some senses reversed. The reason I say that they are being breached is
because what Clause 1 provides is that the failure of the accused person at
any stage prior to his trial to disclose a fact upon which he later relies,
that being a fact which he might reasonably have been expected to disclose,
can be counted to his disadvantage and an adverse inference drawn. Is that
not in fact the abrogation of the right of silence?
One of the remarkable things about the Committee’s Report is that
the Committee want to deny that they are saying any such thing. The
reference is at paragraph 28, and the footnote to it, where the Committee
say:
“The suspect will still have the ‘right of silence’ in the sense
that it is no offence to refuse to answer questions or tell his
story when interrogated; but if he chooses to exercise this right,
he will risk having an adverse inference drawn against him at his
trial.”
Then the footnote says:
“In relation to the trial the ‘right of silence’ enjoyed by the
accused means that the prosecution have the burden of proving
his guilt, that he may refrain from giving evidence and that the
prosecution may not comment on his omission to give it. Under
our proposals discussed in paragraphs comment on the
omission will be allowed and it will be permissible to draw
adverse inferences from it. We do not propose to weaken in any
way the principle that the prosecution have the burden of
proving the guilt of the accused: in fact our proposals discussed
in paragraphs are intended to strengthen this principle in one
respect.”
I am mystified by that statement, my Lords, because I do not
understand how it is sensible to say that a man has a right if he can
exercise it only at his peril. It does not seem to make any kind of sense to
say to somebody, “You are not obliged to say anything; you are perfectly
entitled to remain silent. But woe betide you! if you do.” That is even
more so when a man comes up at the court [to be] tried and is told;
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“You are perfectly entitled to refrain from giving evidence; that is your
legal. constitutional right. But if you do, it may be the worse for you.” I
do not understand in what sense it can be reasonably said that a right is
being retained if that right can be exercised only —
The Lord Chancellor:
My Lords, may I put a question to the noble Lord at this point? He
has practised at the law probably as long as I have. He knows as well as I
do that in practice if an accused does not give evidence, the jury does take
it against him. In these circumstances the judge is very severely limited as
to what he may or may not say, and prosecuting counsel is altogether
debarred from commenting. But does the noble Lord not think that when
the fact, as every lawyer knows, is that his chances of acquittal are
dropping like a stone if he exercises that right, somebody — perhaps his
own lawyer in private but if he has none then somebody else — might warn
him of the fact?
Lord Foot:
Of course it is true — and I accept it — that if today somebody
decides not to go into the witness box, even if he is not brought up under
the new procedure and asked: “Are you going to give evidence or are you
not?”, the jury may well draw an adverse inference. I do not dispute that.
What I do object to is what may happen if a person is told, “You are not
under any obligation to give evidence.” He is told: “You can do one of
three things: you can remain silent; you can make a statement, or you can
go into the witness box and make a statement on oath. Of course, the jury
perhaps will not attach so much importance to an unsworn statement as to
a sworn one.” In those circumstances, if he decides that he will not be put
on oath a jury may very naturally draw an adverse inference. But is it right
that when he has been told that he is not obliged to give evidence the
judge, or anybody else, should seek to emphasize the adverse inference
which the jury may draw of their own accord. You cannot in one breath
say to a man, “Here is a right”, and in the next moment say, “You would
be foolish to exercise it.”
Another foundation stone, as I have always understood it, of legal
procedures in criminal cases, which, as I think, is being overturned by the
proposals of the Committee, is the old rule that no evidence can be
received of a statement made by a suspected or charged person which is the
result of a threat or an inducement. The cases, of course, are full of
examples of the sort of inducement that the law has in mind. If a person
in authority says to a man when he is interrogating him, ,“Look here, it
would be better for you if you told me the truth, if you talked”, that may
be held to be an improper inducement and result in the evidence being
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excluded. It is in this context that it seems to me that the new form of
caution which is proposed by the Committee is important and relevant. It is
set out in paragraph 44 of the Committee’s Report, and perhaps I may
quote it because it has not been quoted yet.
What the Committee propose is that when a man is being interrogated
by the police, or indeed, as I understand it, by any other person with
authority to ask questions, he shall be addressed in this fashion:
9
“You have been charged with . . .’
or he may be told that he may be prosecuted for a particular offence —
and then the caution goes on:
“If there is any fact on which you intend to rely in your
defence in court, you are advised to mention it now. If you
hold it back till you go to court, your evidence may be less
likely to be believed and this may have a bad effect on your
case in general. If you wish to mention any fact now, and you
would like it written down, this will be done.”
It seems to me that if that recommendation were adopted we should be
taking something which has always in the past been regarded as thoroughly
repugnant, something which is likely to lead to miscarriages of justice, and
we should be elevating it and giving it the blessing and approval of society;
in other words, we should be giving our blessing to the use of inducements
to enable accused persons to make statements and make confessions. That
seems to me to be an extraordinary reversal of what historically has been
the situation in this country.
My Lords, I conclude by saying this. My primary concern here has
been to try and make clear what is proposed. or what I think is the
significance of these proposals, in this one field of the right to silence
Lord Salmon:
The principles upon which our system of justice rests are well
known, generally accepted and have hitherto never been threatened. My
Lords, they are threatened now, not, of course, intentionally, but
nevertheless in my view really threatened by some of the recommendations
contained in this Report . . .
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. .. I certainly fully share the general deep concern on account of the
enormous rise in the incidence of serious crime. It increases at an even
faster pace than inﬂation, and the problems of how to contain either seem
to be equally intractable. But I am convinced that the answer is not
devaluation; certainly not the devaluation of British justice which, however
unintentionally, would in my view inexorably follow if some of the major
recommendations in this Report were to be adopted.
. I welcome the relaxation of some of these rules proposed in
the Report. But some of the recommendations in respect of these rules
appal me. If A and B are charged together with committing a crime, and A
makes a statement to the police which is written down and which he signs,
in which he seeks to exonerate himself and throw the whole blame onto B,
then under the draft Bill accompanying the recommendations that statement
can be put in evidence against B, without A even having been called. I say
it appals me that material of that trashy kind could be received as evidence
in an English court of justice. It goes further than that, because, under
Clause 5 of the draft Bill, at the end of the case for the prosecution the
judge then has to call upon the accused to give evidence, and has to warn
the accused that if he does not give evidence the jury will be entitled to
look upon his failure to give evidence as corroborating the facts set out in
that piece of paper and which were written out behind his back, the
signatory to which has never been called to give evidence. I think that
would be terrible.
One is tempted to say that you might as well go back to the days of
the French Revolution, the terror at the end of the 18th century, when
someone had only to drop an anonymous note into what was then the
equivalent of the police box for it to be sufﬁcient material on which to
arrest and try you, and sometimes to convict you. Believe it or not, this is
the very thing that the draft Bill would allow. Any statement on any piece
of paper, unsigned, where it is impossible to discover the identity of the
writer, is evidence of a fact that it contains. Surely a recommendation of
that sort, however well-intentioned, cannot be accepted .. .
. My purpose in addressing your Lordships this afternoon is not to
knock down the Committee’s proposals any further, but rather to suggest
that the alternative is not between accepting the Committee proposals and
doing nothing It seems to me that if you look at the matter on
broad lines you must start from two major considerations. The ﬁrst, rightly,
is that you must do nothing to prejudice the innocent accused. You must
bear in mind that an innocent accused person is often stupid, he is often
slow, he is often overawed and generally nervous. The result is that he must
have a fair deal. If we start thinking again from the beginning we must take
as our basic test: Is this giving that kind of man a fair deal?
The second thing that we must think about is the public diSquiet,
which has been increasing, with regard to the operation of a few members
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of the police force , and the trouble is that although they are very few,
one never knows who they are or what is happening in a particular case. I
think that one can say that juries are becoming a little suspicious of
“verbals” and things like that. So far as my own experience goes, many
years ago now,.l used to be responsible, as a Law Ofﬁcer, for the conduct
of criminal prosecutions in Scotland. 1 formed two very clear impressions,
although they were not based on anything that one could call evidence.
One was that the police never harassed a man who had no record —
virtually never — but if a man had a record and they were convinced that
he was guilty of the offence in question, then sometimes — not very often
but sometimes — they used very undesirable methods. I have no doubt that
the position is not very different today. Therefore, if we are to start
altering the present position we must alter it in a direction which will
lessen any temptation to the police to overstep the mark.
Central to the whole problem is the so-called right to silence. If we
can solve that problem, the others will not be very difﬁcult. If we apply
the tests which I have suggested I do not think that the solution is so very
difficult. If you are to get rid of the right to silence you must have a
system. I do not believe there is such a thing as a right to silence; it is not
a human right. A great deal of trouble has been caused in our controversies
by theoretical approaches. You say, “Oh, well, the Crown must prove its
case.” You make all kinds of generalities instead of looking at the vital
question: Are you being fair to the accused? Instead of that, you ask
whether this complies with some generality which does not matter a bit in
comparison with the practical realities.
My Lords, if we take as the test fairness to an accused person,
perhaps a substandard person of the kind I have been discussing, then why
not a fair interrogation? What innocent person would ever object to a fair
interrogation? The reason why the right to silence has grown up is that in
past times it was impossible to be in the least sure that interrogation would
be fairly done. Unless we can be sure today that interrogation can be fairly
done we should not have it. But I suggest that we can be sure. Of course,
it is unpleasant for the accused; but so is being accused, and so is appearing
at a trial, and so is the whole process. But why should it be unfair? The
purpose of the safeguards is not to give the guilty man a sporting chance; it
is to see that the innocent man is as fully safeguarded as human ingenuity
can achieve. If we can achieve a fair interrogation, then on what possible
ground can any innocent person object? 1 can see none. As I say, it may
be embarrassing, it may be unpleasant; but I cannot see how an accused
person can possibly object if he can be assured that his interrogation is
going to be entirely fair.
How are we going to do it? It seems to me that there are two vital
safeguards. What I have in mind is that a week after the arrest — or it may
be later, depending on the complexity of the case — there should a formal
ii"
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interrogation. The man should be brought in. He can see his solicitor
beforehand; or, if you like. his solicitor can be there. He should be told:
“You are going to be asked questions. We cannot compel you to answer;
but remember that the record of what you say will be read out to the jury
and they will be allowed to draw their own conclusions”. It can be
commented upon if necessary, but there must be an accurate record.
Therefore it will be necessary to have either a reliable tape-recorder or a
shorthand-writer. There must be somebody in charge of the proceedings, not
necessarily a magistrate; it might easily be a panel of part-time people. Of
course they would have to be paid, and perhaps it would be far better not
to have one man all the time. It could be someone who need not know
much about the case but would be there simply to see fair play. The police
could employ counsel or a solicitor to examine the man and the
tape—recorder would show whether that had been fairly done. The man or
his solicitor would object if it was not. The person in charge would be
there to make a report if necessary.
It is, said, my Lords, that that kind of procedure might cause delay. I
do not think that it would. It would save a great deal of time. It is said
that it would cause expense. Of course it would. It would be elaborate, it
would cost a great deal, but it would save ten times as much in the time
of the court later on, because a great many people would be so shown up
that they would not dare to plead not guilty. Far from being a
disadvantage for the innocent man, it would be a great advantage, because
his solicitor would advise him to be candid, and he would be candid.
..... I have yet to hear any coherent reason why-this system should
not be introduced. Of course it depends on the human factor. If we cannot
be sure that tape-recorders or shorthand writers are not tampered with or
that the man in charge is competent, then it will not work. But I do not
believe that in these modern times we cannot be sure that a system of that
kind will work. It is turned down by the Committee — I think on page 28
of the Report — in the thinnest and most unconvincing argument that I
have read for a very long time. It is obvious that the Committee had no
sympathy whatever for that kind of thing and that they were much keener
on tinkering on without a radical reform. I must say, I thought that was
about the weakest passage in the whole Report. They brushed the matter
aside. I agree that if the purpose of these so-called principles is to give a
guilty man a chance, of course this system will not do; but if the purpose
is to help the innocent man I suggest that it would be favourable to him
and not the other way. Therefore I put that forward as something which
ought to be very seriously considered.
My Lords, I want to make it clear that in no circumstances would I
support the giving of any additional questioning power to the police
without those safeguards, and it seems to me that the Committee are giving
additional powers to the police. I would not allow to the police one iot or
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tittle of additional power to question anybody beyond the power they have
at present. I would not interfere, as a ﬁrst step at least, with the present
system down to, as i say, a period of a week after arrest, when we would
have this interrogation. Let the police carry on the way they are doing at
present. But, of course, if they got some statement during that preliminary
period it would have to be put to the man at his investigation. It would
then be so fresh in the minds of everybody that it would be much more
difﬁcult for the police to get away with a false statement
What are these “reforms" my Lords? First, the abolition of the
caution and the reminder to the su5pect of his legal rights — and the latter,
at least, has been reinforced by the United States Supreme Court in the
Miranda ruling. Secondly, the abolition of the right of silence, in which we
now have a situation where we have the absurdity that anything you do
not say may be taken down and used in evidence against you . .. This
[silence being a presumption of culpability], in my estimation and that of
so many other speakers here today, is intolerable. Silence can be the
helpless confusion of someone caught in an apparatus. It is like relying on
the lie detector
l have always felt that it is invidious for interrogation to be left
to the police. It is unfair to them and it encourages a distrust of the police
and their methods by the public. It needs only a few “rotten apples” and
some “rough-ups” and the public at large, not just those affected, begin to
distrust the police.
I do not want to make invidious comparisons with Scotland,
particularly in the presence of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner,
but I have always preferred the proceedings of the procurator ﬁscal to
those under the English system. The procurator ﬁscal is, after all,
answerable ultimately to the Lord Advocate. He is an ofﬁcer of justice and
not just a law enforcement ofﬁcer in the service of the police. He can get
from the police the facts and the witnesses; and in taking the precognitions
he examines the witnesses, but not in the presence of other witnesses. He
can invoke the judicial authority of a magistrate, with consequences of
contempt of court if a witness refuses to give information in his possession,
provided that that information would in fact make him a competent witness
at the trial. The procurator ﬁscal’s job is to satisfy himself that this is a
case to go to trial. He co-operates with the defence in the interests of
justice and not of securing a conviction. It is not an infallible system but it
has merits which I ﬁnd lamentably missing from this Report, and 1 would
add my support to anyone who suggests that while we are talking about a
judiciary system we ought to be paying some attention to the procurator
ﬁscal.
One more point: I add my voice to those who distrust
tape-recordings. In terms of tape-recordings I am a para-professional. for
broadcasting purposes, and l know how easily tapes can be doctored most
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convincingly. I could produce to you a suspect‘s incriminating silence on a
tape, produced by means of a magnet, even if, as the Report suggested, you
had a speaking clock. If it were in a sealed casette, I could still produce
you an incriminating silence . . .
Lord Widget)»:
I should like to take a moment or two with your Lordships to look
at the right of silence, to see what exactly it is and where it comes from,
because those who feel (and obviously feel sincerely) that the proposed
removal of the right to silence is a great death blow to our traditional
pillars of common law are, in my understanding of the law, incorrect. It
certainly has never been the law of England, as I understand it, that a man
could not be convicted on the evidence of his silence. There is an
illustration, which is known to every criminal lawyer, known as the
“doctrine of recent possession”, which says in the clearest terms that if a
man is found in possession of recently stolen goods, and he declines to give
an explanation as to where they came from, his guilt as a thief may be
inferred from that silence. I doubt if a day passes without some judge
somewhere up and down the country in a Crown Court instructing a jury
on those lines.
But it does not stop there. If an outraged father, whose daughter has
been assaulted, publicly accuses a man in the street of the assault, and if
that man remains silent when an innocent man would speak, a jury can
properly be directed that they may, if they think' it right, draw an
inference of guilt from his guilty silence. The common law in the main
accepted the fact that silence, where there appeared to be every reason for
an innocent man to speak, was capable of use as proof of guilt.
Although the books contain a few rather desultory references to the
fact that a man is not bound to incriminate himself, I was intrigued to find
that my noble and learned friend Lord Gardiner had to take us to the
United States, and to the Miranda case for the authority he quoted this
afternoon. The acceptance of any right to silence, or right against
self-incrimination, in the English common law is something which I have
never been able to ﬁnd in any authoritative sense. The two instances where
in practice the right of silence arises are two relatively modern exceptions
to the common law, both brought in in the course of the past 70 or 80
years. The ﬁrst one is the well known rule under Section I of the Criminal
Evidence Act, 1898, that if a man fails to give evidence at his trial, the
judge can comment on his failure but the prosecution cannot. That is not
one of the great pillars of English freedom; that is a rather odd rule which
Parliament saw ﬁt to incorporate in the Act of 1898, when it first gave the
accused the right to give evidence. For reasons which we shall probably
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now never discover it was thought proper to say that although the judge
could comment on his failure, the prosecution could not. That has remained
so to this day, and that is the first place at which a man can reasonably be
regarded as having a right to silence today, a right created by that Statute.
The other instance, which is regarded so widely today, has an even
more unusual parentage. It is the right to remain silent under police
interrogation, which has been referred to, with the corollary that if you
remain silent you cannot have an adverse inference drawn against you.
Where does that come from? It comes from the Judges’ Rules, First
Edition, of about 1906 or 1908. At that time the judges (with what we
would now regard as considerable presumption) laid down these rules, and
they provided for the giving of a caution. The caution was, to tell the man
that he need not say anything unless he wished to do so. The only reason
why a failure to speak does not give rise to an adverse inference is that it
would obviously have been grossly unfair if the accused or suspect, having
been told in terms that he need say nothing, was then caught in the trap
of having an adverse inference drawn from his resulting silence. The
so-called right of silence in that regard is the creation of the judges, a
necessary consequence upon their having laid down that there should be a
caution.
Although it has that rather peculiar and relatively modern beginning,
it has been one of the major safeguards of suspects in police stations
for
the past 60 or 70 years. I fully recognise that and, in sympathy with
a
number of noble Lords who have spoken — among them my noble and
learned friend Lord Reid — I would be entirely in favour of the proposit
ion
that we should not alter the Judges’ Rules, take away the caution, or do
anything about this aSpect of the right to silence until we have provided
something better to take its place.
I agree with what was said by my noble and learned friend Lord
Reid, that if only we could achieve a situation in which.one had a
guaranteed tape recording of all police interrogation, so that after the ev
ent
you could hear what was said, with what inflection, and one could
see
precisely what the suspect did admit to, and what he did not admit t
o — if
we ever achieved that situation all our other troubles about police
interrogation would go out of the window. I am in the same mind as o
ne
of the unidentified minorities in the Report who was minded to abolish the
Judges’ Rules and get rid of the caution, but who said that this was not to
be done until proper arrangements for tape recording had been substituted.
That is the attitude I would take up, and I would be glad to see the
departure of the Judges’ Rules, for which I have no affection at all. I will
not take up your Lordships’ time in explaining why I do not like them, or
what their disadvantages are; they are certainly not the ideal method of
protecting the suspect today. I would be happy to wave them goodbye if
we could substitute at the same time a prOper system of tape recording
which would show us precisely what had happened in the course of the
interrogation . . .
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Lord Morris of Borrlz-y—Gesr:
Recognising the serious state of affairs in regard to crime at the
present time, I would not for my part relax any one of the principles
which are really basic to our system. But I cannot feel that the
interrogation or questioning of those who are suspect is of necessity
anything unfair. Surely, the community has a right to make inquiries if a
crime has been committed and when the author of a crime is being sought.
No man can be compelled to speak and no man will be compelled to
speak. But are there not times when no innocent man would remain silent?
We all have duties to the State. We are required to disclose our personal
ﬁnancial affairs to the Revenue; we are required to give information at thé
time of a Census, and one of the paragraphs of the Judges’ Rules records
that citizens have a duty to help a police officer to discover and apprehend
offenders.
.. I see no reason, always provided that there are complete
safeguards, why there should not be the inferences indicated in Clause 1 of
this Bill. But the assurances would have to be complete, and they would
cover the fact that in any questioning there should be no threat; there
should be no promise; no oppression of any kind.
In order to ensure that, it would be very satisfactory if one could
have various safeguards. I am contemplating questioning or interrogation not
after some days in custody but at a very early date. It would be very
satisfactory if you could have the presence of some entirely neutral person
who could insist that all was fair. But I very much doubt whether that
would be practicable. Whether the neutral person was a magistrate or
whether he was any well-disposed citizen, it would not be possible, I think,
to have somebody available at all times of the day or night in a great many
police stations.
The second safeguard I would think appropriate would be the
safeguard of having recording, and though I listened with attention to what
the noble Lord, Lord Ritchie-Calder, said I cannot help thinking the
difficulties he mentioned could be overcome. The third possible safeguard
would be that a person being questioned should be able, if he wished, to
communicate and to consult privately with a solicitor; and now that there
are the extended legal aid facilities he should whenever possible be given
help to have a solicitor if he so wishes, because the cause of getting at the
right result will never be impaired if there is fairness at all stages.
This leads me to the conclusion that I share the minority view
expressed by the Committee on pages 30 and 31 of their Report. They said
on page 30 that they considered that arrangements should be made for the
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compulsory use of tape recorders at police stations in the larger cent
res of
population and that the Operation of Clause 1 should be suspended un
til
this has been done. They set out on page 33 their recommendation
— it
was the minority recommendation A- in more detail, and they say that:
l
“the principal safeguard required is — the recording of the voices
of all those concerned in an interrogation”
and
“in the view of the minority, the operation of clause 1 of the
draft Bill should be suspended until such time as provision has
been made for the electronic recording of interrogations in
police stations in the major centres of population. These police
stations would in due course be specified in statutory
instruments and statements made by suspected persons when
under interrogation in a listed police station would not be
admissible in evidence unless they had been recorded."
i would take the view in regard to this question of interrogati
on of
suspects, which i do not think would of necessity involve anythin
g unfair,
that the provisions of Clause 1 of the draft Bill should not be contemp
lated
until after some system of recordings has been deployed and until it c
an be
seen whether a system is satisfactory .. .
The Earl of Mansﬁeld:
There is no doubt that public confidence in our criminal law,
and indeed in our criminal procedures. is at an all-time low. That
is
exempliﬁed by the number of noble Lords who. throughout this debate
,
have sought ways to stop the police from behaving in a thoroughly
disgraceful, and certainly illegal, fashion rather than trying to discover ways
of stopping criminals. There is no doubt in my mind that a great many of
our procedures are outmoded, and I can scarcely do better than quote from
the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, who said this in a
recent
speech:
“A criminal trial today is more a test of tactics, eloquence,
expertise and self control than of guilt or innocence”.
1 submit that there is at least one area where reforms could be
initiated now, and I refer of course to cautions and confessions. Of all the
artilicialities about our English legal system — and I speak as a Scot — i
think that cautions are the most artificial. For one thing. they are hardly
ever used in the sense that we think of them. They are certainly never used
as the court is told they are used.
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Many of your Lordships . . . do not quite realise what happens
when a suspect is apprehended. Let us take the case, for instance. of a
lorry hijacking or a robbery. One man is apprehended near the scene of the
crime. is put into a police car and the police are very anxious to find out,
first. what has happened; secondly, who has done it; and thirdly. where the
property is. If they have to wait until they can get that man before a
referee, a tape recorder or a magistrate, the whisky, or whatever it is, that
has been hijacked will have gone and they will be left with only the person
they have in their hands. in other words, interrogations start very
frequently in circumstances and at a time when it is impossible to have
these safeguards which have been put forward by certain of your Lordships
But basically the police do their job well and conscientiously, and
if they are given the freedom to do it as they think best I am quite certain
there will be very little dishonesty on their part. Where one begins to get
dishonesty is where a police officer conscientiously and honestly prepares a
case and, in spite of that, a jury returns a verdict of not guilty. It is that
depressing effect, especially on a young police ofﬁcer, which puts him in
the attitude of starting to take short cuts, and the easiest short cut to take
is to manufacture what has been called “a verbal”
The other matter I was going to talk about was the right of silence.
Other noble Lords have already covered that matter more than adequately.
As I say, the time may come, if we have an inquisitorial procedure, when
the right of silence may go. As things are at the moment, I feel that it
would have to stay, if only because a person may be interrogated in the
wrong way for the type of activity he has been up to. By that I mean that
he may be asked a “When did you last beat your wife?” type of question,
and if he says nothing it would be manifestly unfair if that were to be
taken against him. Equally he may, as we say in the law, want to “confess
and avoid”, get it wrong and have that taken against him. In the
circumstances, therefore, I feel that the matter is best left as it is.
 
Lord Goodman:
On the question of the right of silence, I would certainly not
engage in controversy with the Lord Chief Justice of England'as to whether
or not that right is enshrined in our law, but it seemed to the Committee
that it was, because in a particular paragraph they say so. The right of
silence was understood by them to be a right not to make any statement
when you are apprehended — that is what it really boils down to.
Historically, the reason for the rules and the safeguards that have existed is
not because people are concerned so much about what the man may say,
but they are deeply concerned about what may be reported, which is quite
a different matter. The number of times in criminal trials where immense
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controversy and detailed argument goes on about whether or
not a
statement has been made, with or without the safeguard
of a warning,
would be increased a hundredfold if we introduced a system wher
e it was
indispensable that a man should make a statement because he would
know
that if he did not it could be used to his detriment.
And what safeguards can you introduce? You cannot introduce
tape-recorders for the excellent reasons Lord Ritchie-Calder gave; voices
are
not clearly distinguishable, they can be tampered with. Tape-recorders wo
uld
not at this stage be safe. You certainly cannot introduce the safeguard
that
the man can summon his solicitor to the interrogation. How many solicitors
would you require? Men are being arrested all over the country every h
our
of the day. Solicitors, if I may venture to say so, are people of the hig
hest
standard of public service, but the notion that they would gallop off
like
bumble bees every time they were summoned in the middle of the nigh
t is,
I think, stretching the belief in the degree of public service they
are
prepared to extend.
There are, in my view, no effective safeguards that can be achieved to
ensure the exact accuracy of what is said, and the whole of this dispute
turns on the question of the exact accuracy, on the doubt or disbelief that
what is recorded by a policeman is exactly accurate. I would echo every
word of what is said about our police force, with whom I have considerable
dealings; I do not believe there is a better police force in the world But
the fact remains that a police officer is a man who starts off with
predisposition towards a belief in the guilt of the accused man. Hence it is
not a remote possibility that what emerges of what the accused man said is
the police officer’s notion of what he said in that context. It would be
grossly unfair to the police to impose on them the obligation of taking a
statement every time they saw fit to make an arrest or interrogate someone.
I believe that that is a dangerous situation.
In relation to the necessity to give evidence, or if you do not give
evidence to have it used as a factor against you in connection with your
guilt, I would venture to point out that it would create a situation
(although this was challenged by the Lord Chief Justice) where the onus of
proof changed entirely because however tenuous a case the police might
have against a man, on which they would be very wary of launching a
prosecution at the moment, if this new rule were introduced they would
have a situation in which they could add to that tenuous evidence the
certainty that the man was to go into the witness box or has to explain
why he does not. if he does not go into the witness box, and if they
should happen to know that there is some embarrassing or even criminal
circumstance that he does not want to explain, then his conviction, i
should have said. was inevitable. The police. therefore, would be given the
opportunity of launching prosecutions on the basis of much more secure
and established evidence than is at present the case.
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Then there is the other rule: that if you are apprehended and
interrogated you are at a disadvantage if you fail to state any circumstance
which you later wish to adduce in evidence and which you would have
known at that time. This appears to me an appallingly dangerous principle,
and alsoﬂa principle that can be reduced to considerable absurdity. A rather
inelegant example came into my mind in the rare instance of a man who
happens to have been castrated. If this man is charged with rape, it may
well be that he will not recollect to state this rather vital fact — as indeed
occurred in another case to which I will refer in a moment. Thereupon, if
he wishes later in his trial to introduce the fact that he is castrated, it can
be used only as corroboration of his guilt. This is a reductio ad absurdam
that is entirely admissible from the provisions of this particular section
I agree with what has been said on all sides in this House as
regards Clause 1: any inference from silence should not be drawn until
some provision has been made, by guaranteed tape recording or otherwise,
to make sure that the material from which the inference can be drawn is
put accurately before the jury.
. At the same time as the Criminal Law Revision Committee was
given the reference on the law of evidence in criminal cases, another
committee was given similar terms of reference about evidence in civil
cases Our object in civil cases was to see whether we could bring into
this mumbo-jumbo of rules of evidence, which are without logical basis and
much of them historical, the rationality that Jeremy Bentham had
recommended nearly 150 years earlier. And let me say this, that the
problem is the same in civil cases as in criminal proceedings; that one is
looking to see what material should be put before the court which will
enable it to ascertain the true facts. The only difference is that the degree
of conﬁdence in the facts in criminal proceedings must be greater than in
civil proceedings.
. What has been the complaint of those who have been criticising
the proposals in the Bill about the right to silence? What do the two
clauses say? They say that all proper inferences can be drawn from the
accused’s failure to give evidence. I do not think that anyone who has any
experience of criminal trials, or anyone who can possibly believe that a jury
is a suitable tribunal for deciding innocence or guilt, would doubt for one
moment that if an accused fails to go into the witness box when there is a
prima facie case against him a jury draws the proper inference, which is all
that this Bill says it may draw — that if there was not something that he
was afraid to be cross-examined about he would have gone into the box.
Certainly, my experience in trying cases was that the jury drew that
inference in proper cases; also, that they drew the proper inference —
though one was not allowed to comment on that — when the accused
brought forward at the last moment a defence which, if he had been
innocent, it would have been natural to expect him to give to the police
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I commend the greater part of this Bill on the grounds
that it
brings some rationality, some common sense, into a part of t
he law which.
however proud we may be of it, we must recognise that
a great deal is
today quite irrational nonsense.
The jury knows it and thank Godl, a jury generally has
enough
common sense to ignore the mumbo-jumbo which I, as a jud
ge, had to say
to them at the early stages of a case so that they forgot
about it when
they went into the jury room
 
Lord Hacking:
whatever the cause and whatever the remedy for the increase in
crime, there is no justiﬁcation for abolishing such a fundamental rig
ht
as the right of silence, which, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Sa
lmon,
so ably illustrated, goes far beyond the procedural change and runs co
ntrary
to the basic concept of a criminal trial; namely, that the prosecution
should
prove its case. My... concern, which again is one that I believe me
mbers of
my profession share, is that the proposals in the Report as brough
t out in
the draft Bill are bound to increase both the complexity and t
he length of
criminal trials, resulting in real issues — for example — the prosecutio
n
proving its case - being obscured before the jury consider them
, and
resulting, too in injustice to both defence and prosecution .. .
1 can do no better than quote, if 1 may, and adopt, the types
of problems and questions that will arise in argument upon
that section
(Clause 1), taken from the excellent memorandum prepared by the Crim
inal
Bar Association. These, 1 suggest, my Lords, are the types of
questions that
will arise:
“What is the status of the questioner? does he fulﬁl the terms
of Clause 1(2)? what facts were mentioned to the police
or
other ofﬁcial? which of these facts are of sufﬁcient
importance for them to be held to be ‘relied upon?’ was it
reasonable for the accused not to mention those facts found not
to have been mentioned? did the facts relate to the offence
(with which the accused is) actually charged? Was the police
officer trying to discover by whom the offence had been
committed or was he making general inquiries from which he
later decided that the offence had been committed? What
inference could be drawn properly from any omission to
mention facts? If the fact omitted is found by the jury to be
true, or possibly so, but they are not sure, then what inferences
are they entitled to draw? Should the judge allow police
prosecution witness to be called for questioning after the
accused has given evidence setting up facts which the witness did
not say had been mentioned?”
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In thinking about the answers to these questions postulated by the
Criminal Bar Association. I think one begins to get a picture oi a new area.
in my submission. of evidence and a new area of argument . ..
Lord Stow Hill:
My Lords. the noble Viscount. Lord Colville of Culross. and l are
faced with a task of some difficulty in seeking to resume and possibly to
highlight the various arguments adduced in this extremely valuable and
interesting debate . . . V
I think we all know. broadly speaking. what we mean by the
“right of silence". The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice said.
“After all. what is it?" It was the Act of 1898; it was the inhibition placed
on prosecuting counsel under the terms of that Act and the limitations on
the comments that a learned judge may make: and also it was the question
of the treatment of the accused person when in the hands of the police.
Speaking for myself. I think it is the latter which is infinitely tnore
important than the former. I think it is fundamental to our system that
people should have conﬁdence in the way in which an accused person will
fare and be treated when he is in the hands of the police. For that reason
I think it is very important that before we make any change in the existing
system we should make certain that the change we make will not give rise
to suspicions which do not now exist.
I have been in a police station and watched people being charged.
I have noticed their de'meanour They are people who perhaps are a
little more articulate than they used to be in the old days They are
men of moderate intelligence. mostly, who have gone wrong, made a mess
of their life and are very often inarticulate . . . Possibly they are over-awed;
possibly truculent: certainly in nine cases out of ten they are not very good
at expressing themselves. I would defy any member of your Lordships’
House, who was suddenly confronted with the task of stating clearly,
succinctly and accurately an incident or a series of incidents in which he
had recently been involved. to do so.
These people. violent and so on. or truculent as I have said. have
been called upon to make a statement of that sort which is going to be
taken down, and later it may be referred to. How are they going to fare? I
feel, my Lords. that the result would be quite catastrophic. Not only would
they not be advantaged. but also what I suspect would happen, if a change
of this very fundamental character were made would be that over and over
again there would be complaints about the police that the police officer
put pressure on the man and tried to put words into his mouth, and all the
rest of it. I do not think you will get any more convictions against
the hard type of criminal. All you will do is to give rise to complaint on
the part of the weak criminal who says he has been misused
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Viscount Colville of Culross:
On Clause 1 — this deals with the celebrated right of silence
— there have been two different approaches. The noble Lord, Lord Foot,
said that he did not want any lawyers’ wrangle here, and he considered it
to be a very large question about the relationship between the person
and the State, and a tremendous matter of principle. I respect their views
on this.
But then I listened to the noble Lord, Lord Widgery, who told us
about the origin of the matter and mentioned specific examples. Let us also
see what a dreadful thing it is that turns out to be suggested on this
particular point by the Committee. This is the present law on the right to
silence, as stated by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division):
“lt is wrong for a judge to say to the jury, ‘because theAaccused
exercised what is undoubtedly his right, the privilege of
in
remaining silent, you may draw an inference of guilt.
The Court of Appeal statement went on:
“It is quite a different matter to say, ‘The accused, as he was
entitled to, has not advanced at an earlier stage the explanation
that he has offered to you today. You, the jury, may take that
into account when assessing the weight you think it right to
an
attribute to that explanation.
That is the difference between the case of Ryan and the ease of
Sullivan . . .
I want the House to consider whether this is the “ancient
safeguard” mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Foot. The distinction is
keenly supported as being one of the fundamental underpinning pillars of
the freedom of the individual. Let us take the case where the defence has
turned entirely on a new explanation of facts which had never previously
been revealed. 1 tell the House, as the jury, that you are allowed to say to
yourselves “It is really very odd that he never produced this explanation
before. We do not think we can rely on this new explanation. That is a
matter of weight; that is legitimate. l suppose that a jury might say that if
they did not rely on that explanation, and there was no other defence,
they had little option other than to convict. But they are allowed to put it
that way. What they cannot say is: “It is really very odd that he never
produced this explanation before; we infer from the earlier silence that this
explanation is not true and that he is guilty". They cannot say that because
that is an inference of guilt. But they can say what I said just now, and
this is the difference between the two propositions: the existing law and
the one in the Criminal Law Revision Committee’s Report. It may be vital
— I do not wish to say whether it is or not - but let us get clear exactly
what we are talking about.
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1 agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reid, that we want to
leave the generalities aside and look at some of the particularities of the
case. One has to remember also that despite the one prohibition that a jury
must not infer guilt from silence, they can, as I understand it, infer guilt
from the hang-dog look and from the other things that my noble and
learned friend mentioned. They can also infer guilt from the fact that the
man ran away; and from the fact that he told a pack of palpable lies when
he was questioned by the police. They may not infer guilt from silence; but
even then they can take that failure to explain into account on the matter
of the weight of evidence.
There is one other point on which the House ought to be a little
careful that is, that the Committee’s proposal is not unqualified. The
inference from silence is to be drawn only if the man could reasonably
have been expected to mention it when questioned before. The court and
the jury may draw only such inferences from silence as may appear proper.
If you take seriously those two words that I have emphasised, it cuts out a
great deal of the absurdities to which it is suggested all this is going to
lead. I am sure that those qualifications apply also to the use of silence as
corroboration . . .
I can tell the House that no Government would propose to
reduce the safeguards or seek to reduce their effectiveness in looking after a
person under interrogation But how do we do it? The noble Lord, Lord
Ritchie-Calder, said that the tape recording idea was so easy to falsify that
it was not worth considering; but, on the other hand, the noble and learned
Lords, Lord Gardiner, Lord Diplock, Lord Dilhome and Lord Widgery, all
agreed that something like this would be prerequisite before we had
anything in the way of Clause 1 at all. This, of course, is a matter where
we must take into account — and this was very clear in several speeches —
the further dimension, which really is a further dimension, of the legitimate
and essential activities of the police in detecting and investigating crime.
This goes far beyond the rules of evidence and impinges on the whole of
their efficiency. They must be fair, but I cannot believe that the House
would ever wish them to be less than fully effective in bringing the
criminals to court . ..
The subject of confessions has been mentioned. I am sure that we
must always take great care that there is no improper pressure put on an
accused to obtain a confession from him. What puzzles me a little is that
set out in the Committee’s Report, in paragraphs 57 and 58. are cases such
as Northam and Zaveckas and Clear/v. Then the case of Smith was
mentioned earlier in regard to the court-martial. Here there are really grave
anomalies, and one finds that the Bar Council in their Yellow Book, say
that these cases involve threats or inducements which may be harmless in
themselves and may lead to confessions which are true and which cannot be
said to be obtained by oppression. Then all they do is to throw up their
hands in despair and say that there is no reform of the law that they can
see which will bring about a cure for what is apparently. an accepted ill.
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As to the conclusion to be drawn from the speeches with regard
to the silence of an accused during interrogation by the police, the
impression I got from those speeches was that those who spoke would be
prepared to have inferences drawn from silence of the accused during an
interrogation if, and only if, there was an accurate record of that
interrogation in such a form that there would be no risk of an inference
being wrongly drawn. So, my Lords, progress can be made on that perhaps
if the Home Ofﬁce and others can devise a system for accurate recording of
the process of interrogation. I do not mean by that that all the
interrogation has to be recorded. The noble Earl, Lord Mansﬁeld, talked
about the interrogation beginning straight away. 1 see nothing to stop that.
But if you are going to ask anyone to draw an inference from silence, in
my belief that inference should not be open to be drawn unless it can be
seen from a recording that it is clearly properly drawn.
So far as I am concerned, I draw a very big distinction between
evidence in civil cases and evidence in criminal cases, where there is a
different burden of proof . . .
D. West, Government Printer, New South Wales — 1975
  
